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 Abstract 
Ethnic politics has been an important feature of Malaysia’s political life since even 
before its formation in 1963. Despite being part of Malaysia, however, the East Malaysia 
state of Sabah historically was devoid of such politics. But since the formation of 
Malaysia, there has been a long decline in ethnic tolerance and harmony in Sabah due to 
the federal elite’s success in expanding ethnic politics there. This thesis investigates the 
following questions: How did the governing elites in Kuala Lumpur successfully expand 
ethnic politics to Sabah? Why was it important for the governing politicians to expand 
such politics to the periphery state? Why did the public allow this to happen? 
By carrying out in-depth ethnohistorical investigation into the role played by governing 
federal politicians in generating ethnicity in Sabah’s politics, this thesis notes how ethnic 
politics can be developed, escalated and diffused. It describes how the federal political 
elite’s decision to export West Malaysia’s model of ethnic based coalition government 
eventually established ethnicity as a feature of Sabah politics due to competition and 
collaboration between federal and local political elites, and competition between local 
politicians who elicited responses along ethno-religious lines from the public. For their 
part the people of Sabah came to accept the expansion there of ethnic politics and its 
principles of consociational democracy under pressure from the federal elite.  
From a policy perspective, the findings suggest that abandoning ethnic-based democracy 
and policies is crucial in providing more universal benefits to the citizenry and 
preventing full-fledged conflict within an ethnically and religiously diverse population. 
v 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
 
Declaration            ii 
 
Acknowledgement          iii 
 
Abstract            v 
 
Table of Contents          vi 
 
Tables             x 
 
Abbreviations and Glossary          xi 
 
 
 
Chapter 1: Ethnic Politics and Politicians        01 
 
1.1 Background and Focus of the Study        01 
 
1.2 The Plural Society          08 
 
1.3 Consociational Democracy         14 
 
1.4 The Federation           20 
 
1.5 The Theoretical Framework         24 
 
1.6 Studying the Federal Leaders’ Role in the Expansion of Ethnic Politics   30 
 
1.7 Thesis Outline           35 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: The Origin of Ethnic Politics in West Malaysia        38 
 
2.1 Introduction           38 
 
2.2 Early History of West Malaysia and the Creation of Malay  
      Ethno-Religious Identity         40 
 
2.3 British Colonialism: Towards the Importance of Ethnicity in    
      Malayan Politics and Public Administration       46 
 
vi 
 
2.4 The Formation of UMNO: The Rise of Malay Nationalism     56 
 
2.5 The Birth of Inter-Ethnic Political Coalition and Consociationalism    65 
 
2.6 Conclusion           69 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: Ethnic Politics in Post-Colonial Malaya (West Malaysia)    72 
 
3.1 Introduction           72 
 
3.2 Legitimacy of Ethnic Based Coalition Government in  
      Post-Colonial Malaya           73 
 
3.3 The Rise of Multiracial Parties: Early Challenges To Malay-led   
      Based Coalition          79 
 
3.4 The Formation of Malaysia: Maintaining Malay-led Ethnic Based  
      Coalition            82 
 
3.5 Internal Threats to AP: From Malaysian Malaysia to the 1969 Tragedy   91 
 
3.6 The Birth of BN and NEP: Efforts of Malay Leaders to Preserve  
       and Consolidate UMNO-led Coalition       97 
 
3.7 Conclusion         100  
 
 
 
Chapter 4: Introducing West Malaysia’s Model of Government to Sabah   102 
 
4.1 Introduction         102 
 
4.2 The Socio-Political Background of Sabah     105 
 
4.3 The Early Attempt to Impose West Malaysia’s Model of Government in  
      Sabah (1963-1976)        118 
 
4.4 West Malaysia’s Model of Government in Sabah during BERJAYA  
      Rule (1976-1985)        124 
 
4.5 West Malaysia’s Model of Government in Sabah during PBS Rule 
      (1984-1994)         128 
 
4.6 West Malaysia’s Model of Government in Sabah after 1994    134 
 
vii 
 
4.7 Implication of Recent Voting Trends in Sabah    137 
 
4.8 Implications for the Survival of UMNO-led Federal Government  144 
 
4.9 Conclusion         148 
 
 
 
Chapter 5: The Demographic Change and Ethnic Politics in Sabah   150 
 
5.1 Prologue         150 
 
5.2 Brief History of Cross-Border Migration and Religious Differences in  
      Pre-Colonial Sabah         154 
 
5.3 The Growing Importance of Cross-Border Migration and Religious  
      Differences in Post-Colonial Sabah      161 
 
5.4 Projek IC and the Malay-Muslim Domination     171 
 
5.5 Increased Feelings of Insecurity among Non-Muslims   178 
 
5.6 Change in the Relationship between the Non-Muslims and the  
      Malay-Muslims, and between the Indigenous and the New Citizens  182 
 
5.7 Conclusion         188 
 
 
 
Chapter 6: Affirmative Action Policies and Ethnic Politics in Sabah  190 
 
6.1 Introduction          190 
 
6.2 The Spread of Bumiputraism in Sabah     193 
 
6.3 The Practical Application of Bumiputraism in Sabah    195 
 
6.4 Ethnic Discrimination against the Non-Muslim Bumiputra in Sabah  201 
 
6.5 The Bumiputra Question and the Politicization of Communal Rights  
in Sabah         213 
 
6.6 Pesta Kaamatan Islamic: Manifestation of Growing Disunity in Sabah 219 
 
6.7 Conclusion         225 
 
 
viii 
 
 
Chapter 7: Conclusion        228 
 
7.1 Introduction         228 
 
7.2 Ethnic Politics and the Governing Politicians     229 
 
7.3 Implications of the Thesis       237 
 
7.4 Agenda for Future Research        240 
 
  
 
Bibliography          244 
 
 
Appendix            283 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ix 
 
Tables 
 
 
Table 4.1: Sabah’s Population by Ethno-religious Categories in 1960  119 
 
Table 4.2: Elections Results in Sabah, 2004-2013     138 
 
Table 4.3: Seats Captured by UMNO and its Coalition Partners in Sabah,    
                 2004-2013         140 
 
Table 4.4: BN’s Popular Vote by Ethnic Divide in Sabah, 2004-2013    
                 (in Percentage)        141 
 
Table 4.5: BN and PR’s Popular Vote in Sabah, 2004-2013    
                 (in Percentage)        142 
 
Table 4.6: Elections Results and UMNO-BN Hegemony, 1999-2013  146 
 
Table 5.1: Population Growth in Malaysia (1960 – 2010)    161 
 
Table 5.2: Ethnic Group Representation in Sabah (1960-2010)   163 
 
Table 5.3: Muslim Converts in Sabah (1970 – 2015)     168 
 
Table 5.4: Percentage of Voters by Ethnic Group in Sabah, 1960-1991  177 
 
Table 6.1: Incidence of Poverty by State in Malaysia, 1970-2009 (in percentage) 204 
 
Table 6.2: Poverty Incidence in Sabah by Location and Ethnicity, 1970-2010  
                 (in percentage)       205 
 
Table 6.3: Occupation by Ethnic Group in Sarawak, 1970-1980   212 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
 
 
 
Abbreviations and Glossary 
 
 
ABIM Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia 
 (Islamic Youth Movement of Malaysia) 
 
AKAR Angkatan Keadilan Rakyat 
 (People’s Justice Front) 
 
Allah term used by Muslims and Malay-speaking Christians for 
 God 
 
AMCJA Pan Malayan Council of Joint Action 
 
AP Alliance Party 
 
BA Barisan Alternatif 
 (Alternative Front) 
 
BCB Bumiputra Commerce Berhad 
 
BERJAYA Partri Bersatu Rakyat Jelata Sabah 
 (Sabah People’s United Front) 
 
BN Barisan Nasional 
 (National Front) 
 
BR1M Bantuan Rakyat 1 Malaysia 
 (1 Malaysia People’s Aid) 
 
Bumiputra Malay term referring to indigenous people 
 
C4 Centre for Combat Corruption and Cronyism  
 
Ceramah  Discussion in a small groups, political meetings, public 
 rallies 
 
CPA Commonwealth Parliamentary Association 
 
CPM Communist Party of Malaya 
 
DAP Democratic Action Party 
 
DYMMYDPA Duli Yang Maha Mulia Yang Dipertuan Agong 
xi 
 
 (King of Malaysia) 
 
EC Election Commission  
 
ECM Election Commission of Malaysia 
 
EON Edaran Otomobil Nasional 
  
FELCRA Federal Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority 
 
FIMA Food Industries of Malaysia 
 
FIP Federal-Independent Party 
 
GERAKAN Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia 
 (Malaysian People’s Movement Party) 
 
Gerakan Merah Red Shirt Movement   
 
GLCs Government Linked Companies 
 
IC Identification Card 
 
ICA Industrial Coordination Act 
 
IGC Inter-Governmental Committee 
 
IMP Independence of Malayan Party 
 
Ini Kali Lah This is it 
 
ISA Internal Security Act 
 
ISMA Ikatan Muslimin Malaysia 
 (Malaysian Muslimin Solidarity) 
 
IDM Immigration Department of Malaysia 
 
JMM Jaringan Melayu Malaysia 
 (Malaysia Malay Network) 
 
JOAS Jaringan Orang Asal SeMalaysia 
 (Indigenous Peoples Network of Malaysia) 
 
KCA Kadazan Cultural Association 
 
KDCA Kadazandusun Cultural Association 
xii 
 
 
KDM KadazanDusunMurut 
 
Ketuanan Islam Muslim dominance, domination, hegemony, supremacy 
 
Ketuanan Melayu Malay dominance, domination, hegemony, supremacy 
 
KK Kota Kinabalu 
 
Lawan tetap lawan Fight on 
 
LDP Liberal Democratic Party 
 
LPN Lembaga Padi dan Beras Negara 
 (National Paddy and Rice Authority) 
 
MAGERAN Majlis Gerakan Negara 
 (National Operation Council) 
 
MARA Majlis Amanah Rakyat  
 (Peoples’ Trust Council) 
 
MARDEC Malaysian Rubber Development Corporation 
 
MAS Malaysian Airline System 
 
MCA Malaysian Chinese Association 
 
MCP Malayan Communist Party 
 
McP Machinda Party 
 
MEGA Mendepani Agenda Asing 
 (Facing Foreign Agenda) 
 
Merdeka Independence 
 
MHA Ministry of Home Affairs 
 
MNC Momogun National Congress 
 
MP Member of Parliament  
 
MPAJA Malayan People Anti-Japanese Army 
 
MSC Malaysian Solidarity Convention 
 
xiii 
 
MU Malayan Union 
 
MUIS Majlis Ugama Islam Sabah 
 (Sabah Islamic Council) 
 
NCP National Culture Policy 
 
NDP National Development Policy 
 
NEC National Economic Committee  
 
NEP New Economic Policy 
 
NEdP National Education Policy 
 
NFP National Feedlot Corporation 
 
NGO Non-Government Organizations 
 
NOC National Operation Council 
 
NRD National Registration Department 
 
NVP National Vision Policy 
 
PAP Peoples’ Action Party 
 
PAS/PIMP Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party/Pan-Malayan Islamic Party 
 
Pasok Momogun United Pasok Momogun Organisation 
 
PBDS Parti Bansa Dayak Sarawak 
 (Sarawak Native People’s Party) 
 
PBRS Parti Bersatu Rakyat Sabah 
 (United Sabah People’s Party) 
 
PBS Parti Bersatu Sabah 
 (Sabah United Party) 
 
PDS Parti Demokratik Sabah 
 (Sabah Democratic Party) 
 
PDSB Parti Democratik Sabah Bersatu 
 (Sabah United Democratic Party) 
 
PERKASA Pertubuhan Pribumi Perkasa 
xiv 
 
 (Mighty Native Organization) 
 
Pernas Perbadanan Nasional Berhad 
 (National Corporation) 
 
PKMM Parti Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya 
 (Malay Nationalist Party) 
 
PLGP Progressive Local Government Party 
 
PKR Parti Keadilan Rakyat 
 (People’s Justice Party) 
 
PPP People’s Progressive Party 
 
PR Party Rakyat 
 (People’s Party) 
 
PR Pakatan Rakyat 
 (People’s Alliance) 
 
PRB Parti Ra’ayat Brunei 
 (Brunei People’s Party) 
 
PUTERA Pusat Tenaga Rakyat  
 (Centre of the People’s Power) 
 
RCI Royal Commission of Inquiry  
 
RISDA Rubber Industry Smallholders’ Development Authority 
 
SAMORA Sabah Momogun Rungus Association 
 
SAPP Sabah Progressive Party 
 
SEDCs State Economic Development Corporations 
 
SF Socialist Front  
 
SOEs State-Owned Enterprises  
 
STAR State Reform Party 
 
STPC Sabah Tourism Promotion Corporation 
 
SUARAM Suara Rakyat Malaysia 
 (Malaysian People’s Voice) 
xv 
 
 
SUPP Sarawak United People’s Party 
 
Ubah Change 
 
UDA Urban Development Plan 
 
UDP United Democratic Party 
 
UiTM Universiti Teknologi MARA 
 (University Technology of MARA) 
 
UMNO United Malay National Organization 
 
UMS University Malaysia of Sabah 
 
UN  United Nations 
 
UNKO United Kadazan National Organization 
 
UPKO United Pasokmomogun Kadazan Organization  
 
UPMO United Pasok Momogun Organization 
 
USDA United Sabah Dusun Association 
 
USIA United Sabah Islamic Association 
 
USNO United Sabah National Organization 
xvi 
 
 Chapter 1: Ethnic Politics and Politicians 
 
1.1 Background and Focus of the Study  
This thesis investigates the significance of the political elites’ role in the expansion 
of ethnic politics to the periphery state of Sabah in Malaysia. Ethnicity in Sabah for 
generations did not have the significance that it held in the peninsular states, where 
colonial and post-colonial policies entrenched a sense of indigenous claims by the 
Malays against other ethnic communities of Chinese and Indians. In Sabah, 
especially before the Federation of Malaysia, social identity focused more on smaller 
social groups who needed to find non-ethnic basis for political solidarity rather than 
construct ethnic differences. Nevertheless, after decades in the federation of 
Malaysia the political solidarity in this territory became more focused on what Tajfel 
and Turner (1979) calls ‘us’ versus ‘them’, an activity of constructing and 
reconstructing ethnic difference as in West Malaysia. This thesis explores and 
explains the reason why ethnic hostilities have more recently become a marker of 
political activities in Sabah.  
The principal argument of this thesis is that ethnic politics can be expanded to the 
periphery traditionally not plagued with such activities by the governing political 
elites either directly or by indirect methods for their own interests. To introduce this 
argument, however, it will be necessary to acknowledge how the governing 
politicians have actually expanded ethnic politics in the periphery. Accordingly, this 
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thesis investigates the federal elites’ role in expanding ethnic politics to the periphery 
state of Sabah in Malaysia. This research seeks to answer the following questions: 
How did the governing elites in Kuala Lumpur successfully expand ethnic politics to 
Sabah? Why was it important for the governing politicians to expand ethnic politics 
to the periphery state? Why did the public allow this to happen? 
By answering these questions, the thesis will contribute to ethnic politics 
theorization, especially in the context of making the concept of ethnic politics more 
applicable, in understanding how political elites govern in the modern nation-state. 
This is because like any other terminology, the concept of ethnic politics is a term 
that does not lend itself to an easy definition applicable to any society. As Sakhong 
pointed out “there is no way that we can define ethnic politics based on a single 
factor. Several factors, perspectives and points of view needed to be taken into 
account when defining ethnic politics” (2012, p. 1). Nevertheless, in contemporary 
use the term ethnic politics is usually associated with political mobilization (Esman, 
1994).   
In many societies, politicians and in particular governing politicians manipulate 
ethnicity for their own benefit often to dominate political mobilization. The concept 
of political mobilization refers to a process whereby political actors encourage 
people to participate in some form of political action, such as to vote, petition, 
protest, rally or join a political party, trade union or a politically active civic 
organization (Vermeersch, 2011; Johnston, 2007). Operating within the contexts of 
the nation-state, political mobilization often gives political actors incentives and 
opportunities to exploit ethnicity with the aim of gaining political support in their 
struggle for political power. In fact, since World War II (WWII), ethnicity has 
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become the most common tool used by the political actors in dealing with the issue 
of political mobilization. Examples include political mobilization in Nigeria where 
since WWII the political elites of ethnic groups such as Yoruba and Hausa-Fulani 
have made ethnicity their major tool in encouraging people to provide them with 
unwavering political support with the aim of gaining political power (Adebanwi, 
2014).  
However, this emphasis on ethnic politics is a narrow view that stresses the political 
mobilization activity rather than the political actors’ self-interests. If we wish to 
describe ethnic politics as an explanation of political actors’ self-interests we need to 
consider the socio-psychological perspective that analyzes ethnic politics as the 
product of fear of uncertainty among the citizens, especially in the context of the 
possibility of losing socio-political freedom. Scholars such as Hale (2008) and 
Appadurai (1998; 2006), who referred to this fear to explain the concept of ethnic 
politics observed that when citizens encounter uncertainty in their socio-political life 
they often decide to use ethnicity as a mechanism to reduce such fear by making their 
existence more calculable. The growing security dilemma among the citizens or even 
the decision to employ ethnicity to reduce the uncertainty, however, does not simply 
emerge in a society but requires what Al-Haj (2015) calls the ‘mobilizing 
leadership’. The mobilizing leadership in these regards refers to the political actors 
who are usually active in shaping the country’s political development by 
implementing action to remain in power. This point of argument was highlighted by 
Figueiredo and Weingast (1997) who stress that political actors who face a high risk 
of losing power often pursue a specific strategy in their attempt to maintain power 
based on the belief that it is a rational decision to impose security concerns in the 
minds of its citizens. Such a strategy emphasizes what may happen to an ethnic 
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community within the nation if they become a minority, loose political power and 
become incapable of improving their economic control.   
The emphasis on issues that may be encountered by the ethnic community in their 
effort to retain power, however, often made ethnic identity fluid. It is possible to see 
ethnic identity changes in a society due to the political actors’ determination to retain 
power. The governing politicians or the state bureaucrats of the Fijian government, 
for example, decided to maintain the traditional practice of subsuming all indigenous 
groups into one label called Fiji indigenous in order to maintain their numerical 
advantage based on ethnic political supremacy through their numerical advantage 
over the immigrants, even though their number now is more or less equal to the 
group classified ethnically as Fiji Indians (Lawson, 1993, p. 2). Similarly, in the 
United States the black persons who originally came from Jamaica could choose to 
emphasize their ‘Caribbean ancestry’, could voluntarily place themselves in the 
broad category of ‘African American’ or could emphasize their birth in former 
British-colony and English speaking country, as ‘West’ (Ritchey, 2014; Harper & 
Quaye, 2007: William, 2007). Their decision to become either African American or 
Westerners was influenced strongly by the political actors’ struggle, and such a 
strong influence usually occurred when political and economic advantages accrued if 
they identified themselves with the political actors, in particular the governing 
political elites.  
Since ethnic identity usually changes as the result of the governing political elites’ 
desire to ensure the success of their political mobilization, it is also important for us 
to consider ethnic identity change in an effort to define ethnic politics. By 
understanding the change in ethnic identity as an important aspect in defining the 
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concept of ethnic politics, we are able to acknowledge the fact that ethnic identity is 
indeed not innate or unchanging. Rather ethnic identities must be seen as a “creation 
– whether they are created by historical circumstances, by strategic actors or as 
unintended consequences of political projects” (Eriksen, 1993, p. 92). Several 
scholars describe this issue. For example, Chandra (2012) in the primordial 
interpretation of ethnicity by referring to constructivist interpretations suggests that 
an ethnic identity is a dynamic form of social identity.  
By interpreting ethnic identity change as part of ethnic politics, it also important to 
acknowledge the fact that despite the significance of other political actors, governing 
politicians always play a significant role in this process. The reason is that activities 
of constructing and reconstructing ethnic identity for political mobilization are 
usually relevant to the governing political elites’ success in their maintenance of 
nation-state power. As Puyok (2008) and Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) argue; the 
manipulation of ethnic identity usually pertains to governing politicians’ struggle to 
maintain their grip on nation-state political power because in order to maintain office 
usually they will move to employ every imaginable strategy to attract constituencies. 
In this regard, they pointed out that manipulating ethnicity tends to become the most 
influential strategy to attracting constituencies, and when the political competition 
becomes fiercer the governing political elites’ reliance on ethnic manipulation 
usually intensifies. In Zimbabwe, for example, the strengthening of political 
competition for nation-state power has made Robert Mugabe, who has been the 
President since 1980 constantly inject emotionalism into his ethnic appeal to the 
wider Black African population. The result of such decisions has not only been his 
success to retain office but also intensified ethnic hostilities in the country. It 
suggests that ethnic politics usually arise when the governing political elites become 
5 
 
more interested in manipulating ethnicity to facilitate their grip over nation-state 
political power.  
This thesis defines ethnic politics as activities to construct and reconstruct ethnic 
identity, and the use of this identity for political mobilization by the governing 
political elites or the state bureaucrats to maintain office. Defining ethnic politics as 
such particularly encourages an examination of the significant role played by the 
governing politicians of modern nation-states who manipulate ethnic diversity for 
maintaining office in the development of ethnic politics in the periphery. I argue that 
this definition of ethnic politics does not necessarily apply to all modern nation-states 
characterized by ethnic diversity. In fact, ethnic politics by nature, as Gisselquist 
(2013) argues, does not necessarily operate in some societies characterized by ethnic 
diversity such as in Northern Ireland, United Kingdom and Russia (Rabushka & 
Selpslie, 1972). However, ethnic politics is the main feature of some other societies, 
in particular Malaysia (Segawa, 2015; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007; Rabushka & 
Selpslie, 1972). For this reason, the thesis examines the role of the governing 
politicians based in West Malaysia in developing, escalating and diffusing ethnic 
political activities in Sabah.  
Malaysia by nature is a modern society described by Furnivall (1939; 1948) as a 
plural society that employs the consociational form of democracy that seeks to 
regulate the sharing of power among ethnic groups within a federation. Many 
scholars such as Segawa (2015), and Rabushka and Selpslie (1972) argues that ethnic 
influence over political activities become significant in Malaysia’s plural society 
formed as a federation. While I agree with such an idea, in reality, I argue that the 
nature of society and political system not only has made ethnic influence over 
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political activities in Malaysia strong but it also has largely contributed to the interest 
among the governing political elites to spread ethnic politics throughout the country, 
especially in the periphery state of Sabah that traditionally was not plagued with such 
hostilities.  
A similar point has been made by Prasad (2016) who argued that, such nature of 
society and political system which he described as the institutions that induced ethnic 
politics in Malaysia (Sarawak) and Indonesia (Kalimantan Province). The 
opportunity to expand political support base or to maximise chances of victory in 
elections among the governing politicians being the reason behind such development. 
Nevertheless, in such nature of society and political system, when elections are 
contested along ethnic lines, ethnic tensions in the region usually heightened 
(Davidson, 2005, p. 172; Mietzner, 2014; 51). While ethnic conflict is heightening, it 
is important to stress that the politics of ethnicity does not necessarily ended, rather 
remains a force to be reckoned with in Malaysia following the success of the 
governing politicians based in West Malaysia to expand ethnic politics to Sabah after 
the formation of the Federation of Malaysia using various strategies. As explained, 
this is what the thesis attempts to do: to understand the significant of the political 
elites’ role in the expansion of ethnic politics to the periphery state of Sabah in 
Malaysia. In order to understand the significant of the political elites’ role in the 
expansion of ethnic politics to the periphery state of Sabah in Malaysia, I think that 
understanding the link between the nature of society, the political system, and their 
strong determination to develop, escalate and diffuse ethnic political activities in the 
periphery should become the focus of enquiry for this thesis.  
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To show the link between the nature of the society, the political system and the 
governing political elites’ strong determination to develop, escalate and diffuse 
ethnic political activities in the periphery, it thus becomes necessary to examine the 
existing literature relating to these concepts. The contribution made by several 
scholars such as Furnivall (1939; 1948), Smith (1965), and Rabushka and Selpslie 
(1972) on plural society, Lijphat (1968; 1969; 2003), McGarry and O’Leary (2006) 
and Lembruch (2003) on consociational democracy, and Riker (1975) and King 
(1982) on federation are explored to establish their usefulness in the construction of 
theoretical linkages between these concepts. By doing so, this study will be able to 
construct a theoretical framework on the relationship between ethnic politics, the 
nature of society and its political system, and the need for the governing political 
elites to expand ethnic politics in the periphery. The following section thus presents a 
critical examination of the concept of plural society, consociational democracy and 
federation.  
 
1.2 The Plural Society  
Social scientists widely agree that ethnic politics is the phenomenon that 
distinguishes the plural society from another type of society. As Rabushka and 
Selpslie argue, “the hallmark of the plural society, and the feature that distinguishes 
it from its pluralistic counterpart, is the practice of politics almost exclusively along 
ethnic lines” (1972, p. 20). This concept of society was developed by Furnivall 
(1939) based on extensive research in Netherland Indies (contemporary Indonesia) 
and British Burma and was expanded by Smith (1965). In this comparative political 
economy study, Furnivall explained that a plural society is a society that comprises 
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“two or more elements or social orders which live side by side in one political unit1, 
but less mingling with one another” (1939, p. 446). He also stated that they are 
deeply divided culturally and meet only in the marketplace. As he puts it, in this 
society “each group holds by its own religion, its own culture and language, its own 
ideas and ways. As individuals they meet, but only in the market-place, in buying 
and selling” (1948, p. 304). 
He also noted that ethnic division within this society generally coincided with an 
economic division: the Europeans control the world of business and administration, 
Chinese dominates trade, Indians work in farming, and the Indonesians remain in the 
rural or underdeveloped areas. In this regard, it is important to note that both ethnic 
and economic divisions are the result of political manipulation by the colonial elite. 
In Peninsular Malaysia, for example, during the colonial era the Malays were 
consigned to villages and the Chinese to new towns (Sua, 2013; Suwannathat-Pian, 
2009; Hamid, 2007; Muhammad, 2000; Shamsul, 1986; Yegar, 1984). In Indonesia, 
however, the Chinese were given the role of collecting taxes from the natives and the 
natives were encouraged to focus on their traditional farming activities (Erkelens, 
2013; Merchant, 2012).   
Accordingly, the separation of communities according to ethnic and economic 
activities made the society become inherently unstable and prone to conflict because 
this led to the extermination of ‘common social will’ among the ethnic groups (Guan, 
2009; Pham, 2005; Sanders, 2002). In dealing with the possibility of ethnic conflict 
the colonial elite, as described by Furnivall, carry the duty of holding together the 
1 The concept of political unit here refers to a territory that usually having a boundaries or a line that 
separating it from other territory set by political authority and is govern by its own political 
organization.  
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society by becoming the arbitrator. By insisting that the colonial powers are the force 
that holds together the society Furnivall seems to have ignored the fact that the 
creation of plural society is generally linked to colonial policy. In fact, it was the 
colonial policy of encouraging the influx of cheap labor forces from various 
countries to develop the economy and the desire to retain political control in its 
colonies that contributed to the creation of the plural society (Chernov, 2003). In the 
process of policy implementation, the colonial powers also played a role as a buffer 
between ethnic groups to prevent the existing ethnic groups from working together to 
oppose and jeopardize its desire to gain political control and exploit the economic 
resources. The result of such policy implementation has been the creation of a 
heterogenous or plural society.  
The creation of a plural society, in turn, exposed the problem of ethnic conflict, 
which usually escalated following the departure of colonial power, following its 
decision to grant independence to these societies. Ethnic conflicts arise because the 
colonial power is removed from these societies. Their departure leaves these 
societies to manage their own ethnic problems. In some post-colonial plural societies, 
ethnic nationalism becomes the root cause of ethnic problems. Ethnic nationalism 
begins followed the increase in the ethnic groups who were originally immigrants 
brought into the country by the colonial power.  
Transformation of their economic status higher than the locals was due to the 
colonial decision to accord them lucrative financial roles and their own decision to 
participate in other employment that created a niche market when they were 
excluded from official roles such as the public service and the military. This 
provoked a response from the locals to protect their perceived traditional status as the 
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owner of the land and the natural resources in it. Such awareness translated into an 
intense effort to gain and maintain control over national politics. However, such 
efforts often led to the growing opposition by the other ethnic groups because they 
were of the opinion that all citizens should have similar rights regardless of whether 
they were originally immigrants. The local ethnic group’s struggle for political 
power and the demands of these new ethnic groups for equal rights as citizens, in 
turn, made ethnic relations more tenuous under the colonial power. The persistence 
of ethnic conflicts thus can be seen as the result of the plural society created by the 
colonial power. This is the issue that has not been clearly identified by Furnivall. 
Nevertheless, Furnivall’s contribution has laid out a foundation to understand the 
root cause of the ethnic crisis in these societies and the way we should distinguish it 
from homogenous societies.   
Furnivall’s concept of ‘plural societies’ was later criticized by many scholars 
(Coppel, 2010). The critics have analysed this concept through their systematic 
examination of societies in other parts of the world such as the Caribbean and parts 
of Africa (Kuper & Smith, 1969). Some of them found that although this concept can 
be used to describe the socially heterogenous societies, they remain unconvinced by 
this concept as they prefer to use the term ‘divided societies’ or ‘segmented 
societies’, rather than plural societies (see for instance Al-Haj, 2015; Bogaards, 
2014; Gilligan & Ball, 2014; Nicholls, 1974). This was because they saw Furnivall’s 
concept of a plural society as misleading because it concentrated attention upon 
differences in race and custom and upon group conflict while at the same time 
directing attention away from the unity and integration process, in society (Smith, 
1958). Smith (1965), for example, tried to refine the concept of a plural society into a 
general theory of cultural pluralism.  
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Smith suggested that not all societies composed of diverse cultural groups are plural 
societies. He saw the plural society as a society characterized generally by an 
incomplete institutional system. As he noted, the plural societies “are only units in a 
political sense. Each is a political unit simply because it has a single government” 
(1965, p. 14). Accordingly, he defined a plural society as a society made up of socio-
cultural sections that enjoy greater interdependence, consistency, and coherence 
within themselves than between each other. They are held together not because of 
consensus but rather by a government that represents the exercise of power or force 
by the dominant section over the subordinate ones. Given these socio-cultural 
sections are held together by the government, he asserted that political competition is 
an on-going process between sections in this type of society. This is because the 
dominant section of the society usually forms the government, and to become the 
dominant section each section must participate in political competition. Quite often, 
this political competition is characterized by ethnic manipulation by the political 
elites of a particular section or ethnic group in the society.   
Rabushka and Selpslie (1972) echo the idea that political competition is a continuous 
process and generally characterized by ethnic manipulation as they argue that ethnic 
identity is often politicized in this type of society because each socio-cultural section 
is interested in monopolizing political power. In this regard, they identify the 
determinants of ethnic identity as the ‘four bases of pluralism’ in plural societies: 
race, language, religion, and tribe/custom. They argue that the concept of race is a 
basis for repressive ideologies, and in this case it refers to selected phenotypical 
features: skin color, facial form, hair type, and so forth. These phenotypical features 
differentiate peoples and thus provide a basis for political cohesion that is crucial in 
several plural societies such as Burma and South Africa where indigenous and other 
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ethnic groups are usually distinguished according to skin color. They also insist that 
linguistic difference, religion, and tribe/custom can also provide the basis for 
political cohesion, and become crucial factors in the politics of plural societies. In 
Belgium, for example, language provided a basis for group cohesion, and in Northern 
Ireland it is the religion that had provoked group cohesion. However, in Congo, 
Burundi, Rwanda, and Nigeria the main factors of group cohesion have been the tribe 
and custom (Humphereys, 2008; Green, Preston & Janmat, 2006; Berger-Schmitt, 
2000; Lemarchand, 1994; Rabushka & Selpslie, 1972). These ethnic identities 
usually become salient in politics because they have the ability to unify people. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that political actors use ethnic identity as a tool for 
political mobilization.  
The politicization of ethnicity often made politics in this type of society unstable 
because such activity can provoke more intense ethnic conflicts between different 
ethnic groups. As Wilson (2012) observes, the politicization of ethnicity in what he 
calls ‘small plural societies’ often causes political instability because from time to 
time the ethnic problems becomes even sharper. This ethnic conflict, in turn, 
becomes the biggest threat to the democratic system and in some cases the state 
itself.  
Given that the stability of both democratic system and the state is in great danger if 
ethnic conflicts continue, social scientists have suggested different ways in which 
ethnic conflicts can be neutralized in democratic societies. Lijphat (1968; 1969; 
2003), and McGarry and O’Leary (1995; 2006) agrees that the consociational 
democratic system as a method of state formation is the most relevant in neutralizing 
ethnic conflicts within the society. I argue, however, that ethnic hostilities may not 
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be neutralized through the consociational democratic system. Rather, such a 
democratic system may not only maintain but also intensify the existing ethnic 
hostilities as it encourages the politicians to become more interested in politicizing 
ethnicity in their quest for power. In fact, in reality, ethnic hostilities usually are 
strengthened in many modern nation-states with an ethnic diversity that relies on 
consociational democracy for state formation. In post-war Bosnia, for example, 
consociationalism has contributed to perpetuating ethnic conflict instead of resolving 
conflict (Norheim, 2016).   
 
1.3 Consociational Democracy 
The concept of consociational democracy introduced by Lijphat (1968; 1969; 2003) 
suggests that cooperation between elites from different ethnic groups that transcend 
cleavages at a mass level is a prerequisite to the establishment of a grand coalition to 
govern the country. Lijphat noted that the key element of consociational democracy 
is elite cooperation because it is “a government by elite cartel designed to turn a 
democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy” (2003, p. 
143). For this reason, he stressed that the key principle of consociational democracy 
is the need for the creation of a ‘grand coalition’ among the elites of all segments of 
society, the establishment of mutual veto2, the application of proportionality-based 
representation within the grand coalition, and creation of segmental autonomy3. 
Through the implementation of these key elements, it was expected that all ethnic 
groups in the society including the minorities would always have representatives in 
2 The concept of mutual veto here refers to the consensus among the groups on the majority rule 
principle.  
3 The concept of segmental autonomy here refers to need of creating a sense of individuality and 
allows for different culturally based law. 
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the grand coalition. Such representation, however, is always based on the population 
composition, in a way that the percentage of representation in the state political 
system and public sector employments mirrors the group’s percentage in the entire 
society. At the same time, any decision made by the elite representative of each 
group is based on the compromise or negotiation process among the elites as a way 
to defuse any inter-groups conflict because the interests of all citizens are protected 
within a peaceful framework.  
Therefore, scholars commonly describe states formed through consociational 
democracy as the product of growing concern among the elites within the country of 
the challenge of critical society fracture. Lehmbruch (2003), for example, argues that 
the consociational state is a state formed following the growing concern among the 
political elites of the challenge of strong sub-cultural segmentation. For this reason, 
many social scientists, especially the supporters of consociationalism such as 
McGarry and O’Leary (2006), argue that consociational power sharing is the most 
realistic option for a plural society as it can prevent ethnic conflicts from escalating. 
With the consociational focus on power sharing at the elite level, I argue that class 
hostilities may eventually become more important than ethnic hostilities when 
consociationalism is used as a mechanism for state formation. This is because the 
elites’s determination to protect their class interests as an elite within the state by 
maintaining the balances of power and managing conflicts often made the elites 
cooperate to ensure that ethnic cleavage remained the focus. But this often rebounded 
on them as animosity against them as an elite class. 
The growing determination among the elites to protect their class interests, 
Mahmudat (2010) argues, results in the intensification of ethnic manipulative 
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activities by the elites for their political benefits. I argue that this phenomenon is a 
direct result of a state formation using consociationalism principles as it requires 
each ethnic group to be represented by an ethnically based party, and these political 
parties usually form a post-electoral governing coalition of all ethnic antagonists 
(Horowitz, 2014) based on the principles of proportional representation and ordinary 
majority rule. Under these principles the ethnic party with the most number of seats 
is entitled to govern the country (Halim & Yusof, 2008) or in other words, to control 
the state. Most importantly, this system also allocates the posts of Prime Minister and 
most of the ministries to the elite of a political party representing the ethnic group 
that constitutes the majority of the country’s population. The political outcome of 
these principles is that the governing political elites are increasingly interested in 
manipulating social divisions for their political benefits through an election and thus 
ensure the state’s commitment to preserve social harmony and provide transparent 
governance. Significantly such elements provide the governing political elites with 
the opportunity to maintain power through the manipulation of an ethnic cleavage 
and at the same time deny the rights of others to rule the country because those 
others do not prevent, but rather encourage the governing political elites in 
manipulating the social cleavage. Therefore, despite Lijphat’s (1968) conviction that 
such a system can prevent ethnic conflicts from escalating, I would rather describe 
consociational democracy as a system that is always inclined to allow the governing 
political elites to use ethnicity as their tool to maximize tenure in office.  
Consociationalism in Lebanon4, for example, has made the governing political elites 
from both Christian and Muslim groups become more interested in using social 
4 The consociational power sharing mechanism in Lebanon has been implemented through ‘1943 
provision of the Lebanese National Covenant’.  
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division for their political interests. This phenomenon emerged because the 1943 
provision of the Lebanese National Covenant (Al-Mithaq Al-Watani) prioritized the 
political elites from the ethnic majority governing the country. The Al-Mithaq Al-
Watani set out the principles of Lebanese state formation that gave a slight advantage 
in government to the Christian groups, in particular, the Maronites, over the Muslim 
components of Lebanese society. Specifically, the presidency was always allocated 
to a Christian Maronite due to a population census conducted in 1962 that recorded a 
slight majority of Christian Maronites (Salamey, 2009). The implementation of Al-
Mithaq Al-Watani has been a self-perpetuating capture of the state politics by 
sectarian governing political elites using social cleavage or ethnic boundaries for 
their electoral victory but it lacks national accountability and undermines 
government commitment to the public good. This shows that the implementation of 
consociationalism in state formation in this particular country has made governing 
political elites from different ethnic groups more inclined to use ethnicity as a source 
to secure electoral victory by giving them the opportunity to retain office and control 
the state.  
Using ethnicity as a tool to secure electoral victory in turn has led to the 
strengthening of existing ethnic hostilities within the country. In Rwanda, for 
example, the governing political elites’ determination in utilising ethnicity to gain 
electoral office acquired through consociational mechanism led to the hardening of 
ethnic conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi tribes. This ethnic conflict resulted in the 
deaths of 800,000 people between 1990 and 1994 (Payam, 1996; Romeo, 2005). In 
the light of Rwanda’s experience, in some countries such as Kenya the masses 
became more supportive of political actors who strongly rejected the idea of 
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mobilizing political support using ethnicity as a way of preventing what had 
happened in Rwanda from taking place in their country.  
Nevertheless, the growing political support from the masses for political actors who 
oppose the idea of ethnic politicisation often leads to the decline in the significance 
of ethnicity in politics, and thus exposes the governing political elites to the 
possibility of losing power. I argue that when such a situation arises, the governing 
political elites are inclined to do whatever they can to maintain office through the 
formation or strengthening of existing federations. For example, in order to maintain 
its political dominance, the ruling Kenyan Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) led by 
Raila Odinga in 2010 decided to strengthen the White-African created federation by 
redrafting the Kenyan Constitution. The constitution amendment proposal was aimed 
at the creation of a more decentralized political system through the removal of a total 
political power from the hand of the President following the death of over 1000 
Africans who were pushed off their land by the existing president (McKenzie, 2010). 
Under this newly amended constitution Raila Odinga managed to retain office as the 
Prime Minister of Kenya. His success in retaining power was the result of strong 
political support from the various tribes such as the Kalanjin and Samburu who had 
sought change in the way the government treated them in terms of land ownership. 
This then suggests that the strengthening of federation tends to contribute to the 
success of ruling elites’ efforts to retain power.  
The success of the white-only Federal-Independent Party (FIP) to maintain power in 
the pre-independence Kenya also demonstrates the importance of a federation for the 
political survival of ruling elites. In this respect, the White African political 
dominance in Kenya through its principal objective, of protecting the ‘White 
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Highlands’ (Ajulu, 2002) decided to establish the Kenya federation in 1954. This 
newly created federation comprised of several provinces, except the Nairobi 
province. Each province covered several countries but the number of counties 
covered by each province varied. The Central province comprised of five counties 
(Nyandarua, Nyeri, Kirinyaga, Murang’a and Kiambu), the Coast province six 
counties (Mombasa, Kwale, Kilifili, Tana River, Lamu and Tata-Taveta), the Eastern 
province included eight counties (Marsabit, Isiolo, Meru, Tharaka-Nithi, Embu, 
Kitui, Machakos and Makueni), the North Eastern province three counties (Garissa, 
Wajir and Mandera) the Nyanza province six counties (Siaya, Kisumu, Homa Bay, 
Migori, Kisii and Nyamira), the Rift Valley province fourteen counties (Turkana, 
West Pokot, Samburu, Trans Nzoia, Uasin Gishu, Elyeyo-Marakwet, Nandi, 
Baringo, Laikipia, Nakuru, Narok, Kajiado, Kericho and Bomet), and the Western 
province four counties (Kakamega, Vihiga, Bungoma and Busia). With the creation 
of a federation, the FIP later transformed into the Progressive Local Government 
Party (PLGP) and quickly gained control over Kenya’s politics through the 
strengthened support from the local government.  
In order to gain strong support from the local government usually dominated by the 
local tribes, the PLGP decided to impose a new legislation on land tenure. Under this 
legislation, the tribes who tended to oppose the PLGP were dispossessed of their land 
and were confined to reservation areas. As a result, many tribes such as the Kikuyu 
lost their land, while the tribes with leaders who tended to support the PLGP such as 
the tribes of Kalenjin, Masai, Turkana, Giriama and Samburu were given the 
opportunity to remain in their land. This was the policy imposed by the Kenyan 
president in 2010, which led to the death of more than 1000 people forced from their 
land.  
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 1.4 The Federation 
The federation is a politico-constitutional system described by Lijphat as ‘a special 
form of segmental autonomy’ that can be applied in the context of territorial 
nationalities claimed by groups. This system can even exist in the non-territorial 
context (Elkins, 1995) such as in Belgium where groups were given autonomy over 
education policy for their members without any restriction by the territorial 
government. In other words, this system can be applied in the context of both 
territorial and non-territorial arrangements. In this research, however, I will 
concentrate only on the more traditional concept of a territorially based federation. 
This decision is driven by the need to analyze the significance of governing political 
elites in the maintenance of ethnic influence in the politics of plural society that uses 
consociational democracy for state formation through continuous effort to expand 
ethnic politics in the periphery.  
With regard to the territorially-based federation, Riker (1969; 1975), King (1982), 
and Bin (2011) assert that under this system several component regions managed 
under regional level governments and originally separated via political boundaries 
become united under a central government (also known as the federal government or 
national government). Considering that all component regions are united under the 
management of a central government, scholars of federalism argue that there are at 
least two levels of jurisdiction that operate concurrently within the country that is the 
federal and regional levels of governments. As Riker explained, “under federalism, 
activities of the government are divided between regional governments and a central 
government in such a way that each kind of government has some activities on which 
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it makes the final decision” (1975, p. 101). Riker’s definition was echoed by King 
who stressed that “federalism may be conveniently defined as a constitutional system 
which instances a division between central and regional governments and where 
special or entrenched representation is accorded to the regions in the decision making 
procedures of central government” (1982, p. 141). Therefore, with the administrative 
power generally in the hands of both central and regional government the federation 
is usually called a dual system of government.  
In such governments, however, the central or the federal government usually holds 
the significant role in managing the whole federation as many key aspects of national 
administration, such as finance, education, military, foreign affairs, and national 
resources are under the control of the central government. This, in turn, brings the 
political and socio-economic activities of the sub-nations or the regional members of 
the federation under the control of the central government (Boadway, 2006). Despite 
the significance of the central government in the political and socio-economic 
activities at the sub-national level, the law of many federation countries, for example 
Brazil, stipulates that all parties within the sub-national jurisdiction get social, 
political and economic security protection from the central government (Rezende, 
2002). Torhallsson and Wivel (2006) argues that such a promise tends to become the 
key factor driving the governing elites of what they call ‘small states’ such as Wales 
and Ireland in the United Kingdom to eventually decide to agree to the idea of 
establishing regional based political union or in other word a federation between 
their territory and other territories.  
While Torhallsson and Wivel (2006) – base their theory on the very illuminating case 
of the small states of Europe, it is also important to stress that the formation of a 
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regional based federation can become a tool for maintaining power focused on 
ethnicity among the governing political elites who have proposed and/or are always 
interested in such a political union framework. The prospect of maintaining power is 
particularly important for the governing political elites as the territorial expansion 
through the federation framework can contribute to the increase of their political 
support and the preservation of traditional status of their ethnic group. Such a 
prospect, in my mind, usually takes place when the governing political elites 
successfully suppress the ethnic identity of people in the new territories by requiring 
them to identify themselves as part of an ethnic group to which the governing elites 
belong, in the name of nationalism. This is especially true when the principle of what 
Lijphat (1968) called the ‘proportionality-based representation within the grand 
coalition’ is used as the very basis for state formation as it usually required the 
political elites of the ethnic majority to dominate the country’s power base. In fact, 
with such a requirement, it is not a surprise when the governing political elites 
eventually encourage the formation of a federation because the preservation of ethnic 
majority status via the federation bolsters their effort to legitimize their grip over 
both the politics and administration of the country. It is a situation that Luping (1985) 
describes as prevailing in those new federation countries where the governing 
political elites manipulate the territorially based federation to facilitate their effort to 
maintain office focused on ethnicity. While in agreement with Luping (1985), I also 
contend that the formation of a federation often paves the way for more aggressive 
effort among the governing political elites to preserve or even strengthen the 
influence of ethnicity over national political activities. Arguably, the reason is that 
after the establishment of a federation it becomes crucial for the governing political 
elites to accelerate the integration of the politics of the sub-nations with politics at 
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the national level. In the United Kingdom, for example, where ethnic identity in 
Wales, Scotland and Ireland was suppressed in the name of British nationalism 
(Crick, 2008) the people of Wales, Scotland and Ireland eventually came to resent 
English dominance of the national government. This in turn led to the strengthening 
of ethnic politics in those countries.  
In such conditions, the people of the sub-nation usually become more interested in 
opposing the central government. This, in turn, leads to what Yusoff (1999) calls 
‘centre-state conflict’, a political phenomenon in which the sub-nation leaders rise up 
against the central leaders on issues such as state autonomy, control over natural 
resources and the introduction of various policies that are incompatible with their 
norm of life. Despite the uneasy relations, the central government is still capable of 
dominating the sub-nation through what Gladney (1998) calls ‘making majority’. 
With regard to the making of the ethnic majority, Gladney pointed out that the 
majorities are no exception as they too “are made, not born” (1998, p.1). In fact, he 
stresses that numerically, ethnically, politically, and culturally, societies make and 
mark their majorities under specific historical, political and social circumstances. In 
China, Fiji, Japan, Korea and Australia, for example, each ethnic majority in these 
countries emerged as a result of their own historical, political and social 
circumstances. Such development especially takes place when the governing 
politicians, in the name of nationalism, decide to reclassify the population based on 
census definition of ethnic categories (Orgad, 2015; Gladney, 1998), manipulate 
religion and migration (Mohamad, 2010; Sadiq, 2005), or implement a national 
policy that facilitates ethnic categorization (Ibrahim, 2013). In Fiji, for example, 
ethnic Fijians became the ethnic majority due to the Fiji government move to 
reclassify Fiji’s population based on the census definition of ethnic categories, 
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migration patterns, and the implementation of affirmative action policy. Moreover, in 
Australia, the implementation of the White Australian policy in 1901 contributed to 
the maintenance or making there of the ethnic majority, the White Australian or the 
European Australian. In some countries, especially in Southeast Asia, such moves 
can be seen as part of the governing politicians’ effort to maintain power. 
 
1.5 The Theoretical Framework 
In light of this critical examination of the concepts of plural society, consociational 
democracy and federation in facilitating the political elites’ effort to spread ethnic 
politics throughout the country, it is now possible to formulate a theoretical 
framework for the study of the role of the federal leaders based in West Malaysia in 
expanding ethnic politics to the periphery state of Sabah. The consociational 
democracy system shows that the legitimacy of any political party to govern the 
country is based on proportional representation and ordinary majority rule principles, 
by which I mean any political party that manages to win more seats during an 
election is entitled to rule the country. Similarly, under such conditions, the federal 
regime is also able to maintain power if it can win more seats during the general 
election. Under these conditions competition among different political parties is 
usually intense5, and in ethnically heterogenous democratic states - the plural society 
5 Intense political competition here not necessarily occurs between two or more political parties of 
different ethnic groups but it also occurs between leaders of the same ethnic group. The political 
competition between leaders of the same ethnic group often led to the growing opposition towards 
central government. Concerning this aspect, I am in disagreement with Inman when he explains that 
“once an ethnic group has political control of a federal unit, there is no reason to believe that greater 
intra-ethnic political competition through proliferation of ethnic political parties will lead to rebellion 
against the central government” (2013, p. 29). In fact, when the leaders of one particular ethnic group 
gain total control over the central government, their rival which also the leader of other ethnic group 
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- the political elites find it expedient to capitalize on ethnicity in the pursuit of 
political power and private interests (Sambanis, 2001). The reason is that under the 
consociational democratic system the political elites are required to obtain large 
enough voting blocs or ‘minimum winning coalitions’ to maximize their opportunity 
to achieve such objectives. Such requirements often drive the political elites to 
emphasize the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ narrative. However, to do so the political elites 
must consider what Horowitz (1985), Fearon and Laitin (2000) and Lynch (2011) 
described as constructing and reconstructing ethnic identities. Through the creation 
of new ethnic identity, they are able to instigate more antagonist attitudes among the 
ethnic group members because in such a plural society interethnic relations are 
usually prone to hatred and conflict as there is no ‘common social will’ among the 
ethnic groups (Sanders, 2002; Pham, 2005; Guan, 2009). Both reactive theory and 
competitive theory seek to explain this phenomenon.  
The reactive theory proposes that ethnic identity becomes more segregated within a 
particular society due to the determination of political leaders to change the rule of 
political and economic relations (Hechter, 1975). This determination intensifies when 
they realise that their group status is deteriorating (Zoltan, 1998) and at the same 
time their political opponent threatens their existence. As ethnic identity is created 
based on their determination to change the rules of the game, this theory suggests 
that this new social identity tends to become a significant instrument for political 
mobilization.  
or even the leader from their own ethnic group remain interested in the state power, thus constantly 
involved in competing for the state power.  
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The competitive theory suggests that ethnic identity is indeed socially constructed, as 
well as emphasizing the fact that ethnicity can be an important instrument for political 
mobilization due to its unifying power. As Bell put it “ethnicity is best understood not 
as a primordial phenomenon in which deeply held identities re-merge, but as a 
strategic choice by individuals” (1975, p. 171). Moreover, in explaining this theory, 
Ozlak (2006) argues that ethnic identity is an effective instrument for mobilization 
with the aim of increasing a group’s access to political resources. This is especially 
true in the case where both disadvantaged and well-established groups are 
increasingly determined to advance their socioeconomic status following the 
dominant group’s attempts to impose its supremacy over their competing groups 
(Zoltan, 1998). In this case, competitive theory asserts that to achieve such an 
objective the group usually sees the strength of ethnic solidarity and mobilization as 
crucial in opposing the dominant group. As a result, they begin to construct or 
reconstruct ethnic identity for political mobilization.   
Based on these theoretical explanations of ethnicity, it is now clear that ethnic 
identity is a social identity that can be constructed by the political actors for a 
specific objective such as the retention of power. This, in turn, highlights the 
incompatibility of primordial views of ethnicity that see ethnic identity as a social 
identity that is fixed, once it is created (Bayar, 2009). It confirms the constructivists’ 
view of ethnic identity as a social identity defined by Wimmer (2008) as a socially 
constructed and fluid entity that can be formed through various means including 
conquest, colonization or immigration. In this regard, the constructivists assert that 
ethnic identity is malleable and dynamic rather than innate and unchanging and 
dependent on social, political, and historical forces (Chandra, 2012; Blanton, 2015). 
Indeed, ethnic identity is constructed and reconstructed because it is a social identity 
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that is formulated and even changed when an individual is affiliated with a particular 
group of people influenced by political activities. Barth (1969) saw the importance of 
creating boundaries that enable groups to distance themselves from one another 
mainly for their group interests, especially in the context of national political and 
economic power.     
It is also important to recognize the fact that the success of federal leaders to expand 
ethnic politics to Sabah does not take place devoid of specific strategies. I argue that 
there are both direct and indirect strategies adopted by the federal leaders to expand 
ethnic politics to Sabah. These include the implementation of West Malaysia’s model 
of government based on ethnic segmentation, the initiation of demographic change 
through the manipulation of cross-border migration, the reclassification of the 
indigenous population via conversion of non-Muslim indigenous people to Islam, 
and the implementation of affirmative action policies designed to prioritize the 
Malays over other ethnic groups in Sabah. Of these, the implementation of West 
Malaysia’s model of government in Sabah represents the direct method, while 
initiating demographic change and implementing affirmative action policies 
represents indirect strategies used by the federal leaders to expand ethnic politics to 
Sabah.   
Similarly, both direct and indirect strategies have been used by the federal leaders to 
expand ethnic politics in East Malaysian state of Sarawak. Nevertheless, unlike in 
Sabah, the federal leaders relied on the implementation of West Malaysia’s model of 
government (Chin, 2014b) and affirmative action policies (Ibrahim, 2013), and the 
reclassification of indigenous population through conversion of non-Muslim 
indigenous people, in particular the Ibans to Islam. In the process, however, cross-
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border migration has not been adopted by the federal leaders as a method to expand 
ethnic politics in Sarawak. It is thus fair to say that the strategies used by the federal 
leaders to expand ethnic politics have been somewhat less complex in Sarawak than 
in Sabah as they have been able to so for their own interest. Jehom (2002) and Jayum 
(1994) even described ethnic identity construction and reconstruction in Sarawak as 
not necessarily the result of such strategies but largely influenced by colonial 
knowledge. According to them, colonial policies had reinforced ethnic identification 
in this state in relation to the rural areas and agriculture, with regional cleavages first 
emerging in the Brooke period (1842-1868) and continuing to divide the people of 
Sarawak today. As a consequence, ethnic contestation has been less significant here 
than in Sabah and far less compared to West Malaysia (Jehom, 2002). With  little 
ethnic contestation in Sarawak, studying ethnic identity construction and 
reconstruction in Sabah provides a chance to recognize the significance of the 
political elites’ role in the expansion of ethnic politics to the periphery state.  
Before we can analyze this issue any further, we need to understand the origin of 
ethnic politics in Malaysia and ask why the federal leaders based in West Malaysia 
became interested in expanding ethnic politics to Sabah? This requires us to first 
understand the development of ethnic politics in West Malaysia. West Malaysia6 is a 
region where political competition and collaboration has always been exclusively 
along ethnic lines. This started under Malay Sultan rule, nurtured under the colonial 
rule and strengthened under the Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Bersatu (United 
Malays National Organization, UMNO) – Barisan Nasional (National Front, BN) 
6 West Malaysia is a Malaysia region where most of the Malaysian states which consists of Selangor, 
Melaka, Negri Sembilan, Johor, Pahang, Perak, Kedah, Penang, Terengganu, Kelantan, and Perlis are 
located. The other two remaining states namely Sabah and Sarawak, and Labuan, the third federal 
territory of Malaysia are located in Borneo Island and usually known as East Malaysia. Both West 
Malaysia and East Malaysia are separated by South China Sea.  
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rule. The political competition and collaboration in this region between the Malays 
and the non-Malays (Chinese and Indians) were strongly characterized by tensions. 
This phenomenon is described by Nash (1989) as the politics of confrontation and 
accommodation between major ethnic groups. In line with such a description, 
researchers have analyzed ethnic politics in plural societies plagued with prolonged 
tension by not focusing on one single ethnic group. Two such analyzes are by Ayatse 
and Akuva (2013), and Gahnstorm (2012). They have analyzed ethnic politics in 
Nigeria and Tanzania respectively with no significant emphasis on one single ethnic 
group. In West Malaysia and in Malaysia as a whole, however, ethnic politics is 
largely influenced by Malay nationalism. This suggests that analyzing ethnic politics 
in this country by focusing on a single ethnic group can be valuable. Accordingly, in 
discussing the reason why ethnicity became the foundation of political activities, and 
in particular the politics of confrontation I begin with the examination of Malay 
identity creation in West Malaysia and the growing determination among the Malays 
to safeguard their ethnic group superiority as the reason behind the maintenance of 
ethnic priorities in the politics of Malaysia. It is followed by the examination of the 
role of the Malay governing political elites or the Malay federal leaders based in 
West Malaysia in the development, escalation and diffusion of ethnic politics in 
Sabah. 
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1.6 Studying the Federal Leaders’ Role in the Expansion of Ethnic Politics 
In order to analyze the significance of federal leaders in the expansion of ethnic 
politics to the periphery state of Sabah, I have decided to employ the ethnohistorical 
approach, an approach that integrates both historical and ethnographic approaches. 
My decision to employ this approach is driven by the fact that it is always important 
not only to reconstruct the history of ethnic political activities in West Malaysia and 
specifically in Sabah but also to show how present day people in Sabah live and 
express their ethnic identity.  
This approach allows me to combine two key components of data collected during 
my fieldwork visits from December 2013 to July 2014 and from December 2015 to 
January 2016 in Sabah, Malaysia. The collection of both historical and ethnographic 
data was needed in order to achieve a deeper understanding of the research questions, 
taking into consideration the complexity of the ethnic politics in Sabah. The reason is 
that combining different data collection techniques, according to Husung (2016) and 
Sandelowski (2000), provides the opportunity to gain an increased insight into how 
the federal leaders based in West Malaysia expanded ethnic political activities in 
Sabah in a way that led to growing ethnic conflict there.  
The historical collection consisted of researching academic publications, 
historiographic and various types of mediated text such as public speeches by 
politicians and authorities, magazines, newspapers and interviews with key political 
figures. Collecting this historical information was considered a favourable way to 
describe, explain and understand actions or events that occurred sometime in the past 
(Johnston, 2014; Noor Rahmah & Yusof, 2008). This resulted in the reconstruction 
of what happened during a certain period of time as completely and accurately as 
30 
 
possible. Most of the historical information on which this thesis is based was 
gathered during my stay in the capital city of Kota Kinabalu in Sabah, where I had 
served as an academic in the Universiti Malaysia Sabah (University Malaysia of 
Sabah, UMS) for more than five years preceding the fieldwork. During the fieldwork 
I searched historical and archival material about ethnic politics development in local 
libraries, archives and museums, and collected information by interviewing Sabah 
political figures. While concentrated on interviewing Sabah political figures, the 
West Malaysian politicians’ view on how and why the Malay elites would expand 
ethnic politics in Sabah has also been obtained indirectly to minimise what 
McCambridge, Witton and Elbourne (2014) call ‘Hawthrone effect’. The concept of 
Hawthrone effect refers to a situation where the research participants modify an 
aspect of their behaviour in response to their awareness of being observed or being 
part of the group being observed, a phenomenon that inclines participants away from 
an accurate or truthful response (Carter & Libinsky, 2015; Adrian, 1986; Martin, 
1962). Therefore, to obtain the West Malaysian politicians’ view on the research 
questions, I thus had to rely on historical documents and newspapers, which is where 
most press releases from the ruling politicians and the oppositions are publicised. 
Such a move has not only contributed to the acquisition of the required information 
but is also a considered way of reducing cost and time. It is also important to 
emphasise that the decision to concentrate on Sabah political figures provides an 
opportunity for me to conduct the interviews easily. Being a local myself and more 
specifically an indigenous person of Sabah gave me an advantage of prior knowledge 
and allowed me to conduct interviews easily with local political figures. As a local 
person of Sabah I did not encounter any communication problems with the 
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informants while conducting interview sessions because like me they speak Bahasa 
Melayu (Malay language).   
In addition this thesis is also based on ethnographic enquiry. The ethnographic 
component consists of interviews with local informants. During the fieldwork in 
Sabah, I spent about two weeks in each of a number of areas where my key 
informants live, such as in the village and urban areas in the district of Kudat, 
Sandakan, Keningau, Tawau, Lahad Datu, Tambunan, Tuaran and Penampang. In 
most cases I was already familiar with these areas and had good information about 
the way the people in these areas lived and expressed their ethnic identification 
through political activities. So I availed myself of the help of my friends and through 
them met key informants in multiple ways such as while visiting friends in the 
hospitals, or their house and gerai (stall), or while having breakfast, lunch or dinner 
in restaurants or village bars, or while shopping at the pasaraya (supermarket) in the 
nearby town and at the tamu (traditional weekly market). Other than that, I also met 
my key informants during Pesta Kaamatan (annual Kadazandusun’s traditional 
harvest festival), majlis perkahwinan (wedding ceremonies), Chinese New Year, 
Christmas, and various pesta keramaian kampung (village festivals). During these 
occasions, I talked to at least a hundred people from different tribal backgrounds, not 
only indigenous but also non-indigenous who had been affected by the ethnic politics 
of Sabah.  
In addition I decided to conduct in-depth interviews with thirty-five key informants 
including eleven politicians, fourteen government officials, five ordinary native 
citizens and five immigrants who had become citizens of Malaysia. These key 
informants were carefully selected based on the criteria of being the persons with 
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first-hand knowledge about the association between Sabah politics and the governing 
political elites as well as being part of a particular ethnic group or community within 
Sabah. I thus ensured that their view was the most credible over others. They 
comprised twenty-five male and ten female informants. In terms of ethno-religious 
identity, among the key informants, seventeen individuals were Muslims and 
eighteen individuals were non-Muslims. The Muslims comprised twelve Muslim 
bumiputras and five Muslim non-bumiputras, the non-Muslims comprised thirteen 
non-Muslim bumiputras and five non-Muslim non-bumiputras. All the key 
informants were aged between forty and seventy years old. The reason why all key 
informants of this study were in that age range, as Minocha, Hartnett, Dunn, Evans, 
Heap, Middup, Murphy and Roberts (2013) explain, was because they generally 
spoke clearly, were sincere, helpful, and  able to link the past with the present due to 
their first-hand knowledge on many issues. 
The interview sessions with the key informants were crucial as they provided me 
with specific information about the development, escalation and diffusion of ethnic 
politics in Sabah. The interviews were held wherever the key informants felt 
comfortable such as in their home and office. They were conducted as informally as 
possible to create a more relaxed atmosphere. Most importantly, a set of ethical 
considerations were followed in this research. The main ethical principles of the 
study were autonomy, voluntary participation, anonymity and confidentiality. The 
principle of autonomy and voluntary participation ensured that the participants had 
the choice to participate in the study or to terminate their participation. In addition, 
the participants had the choice to refuse to answer some questions. According to 
Bryman and Bell (2015), Stewart, Shamdasani and Rook (2007), and Douglas, 
Robert and Thompson (1988), interviews with participants must meet the general 
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protocol and procedures for interviewing and oral history. Such protocol and 
procedures were needed because “all social research involves consent, access and 
associated ethical issues” (Punch, 2000, p. 75). For this reason, before any interview 
was conducted, informed consent was obtained from the key informants using either 
oral or written consent form. Specifically, each key informant of this study was 
informed in advance about the objectives of the study. In addition, each key informer 
was also informed that their participation was voluntary and they had the right to 
terminate their participation in the research, as well as choose not to answer any 
particular question.  
The principles of anonymity and confidentiality ensured that the researcher always 
protected the right to privacy or secrecy of the key informers. To ensure this, 
information sheets and consent forms were used to explain that any information that 
the key informants provided would be kept confidential. The key informants in this 
research project, therefore, were notified in advance that any information they 
provided would be kept in a secure location, their name and any recorded interaction 
would be kept confidential, to the extent that the law allows.  
My approach to ethnographic fieldwork in this study is based on the concept of 
‘experiment of experience’ put forward by Barlocco (2014). The concept of 
‘experience experiment’ is a way of analyzing other people’s experiences, views, 
analogies and emotions about any issues through the shifting of various observations 
in the consciousness of the researcher, which constitutes the deepest and most 
meaningful form of knowledge. It is a way of understanding other people’s 
experiences through the will and ability to connect with them as somebody seeking 
the necessary knowledge about the issues under investigation. In this case, despite 
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being a local of Sabah, I started as somebody without a clear understanding of ethnic 
politics in Sabah. Because of this position, I ended up relying mostly on the 
knowledge generated through interaction with the informants, particularly the key 
informants. My reliance on the knowledge generated through interaction with the 
informants thus put me in the position of not fully understanding the ethnic politics 
in Sabah. Nevertheless, with the knowledge of Sabah’s ethnic politics gained through 
this ethnohistorical approach I managed to solve this limitation.  This experience, in 
my view confirms Nonini’s (2015) view of the importance of integrating both 
historical and ethnographic approach in the study of ethnic politics, even if he never 
directly mentioned ethnic politics in his study. I would, therefore, argue that 
employing an ethnohistorical approach to integrate both historical and ethnographic 
approaches remains vital to the study of ethnic politics because it helps to reconstruct 
the ongoing history of such phenomena.   
 
1.7 Thesis Outline 
Chapter 2 examines the origin of ethnic politics in West Malaysia, showing how a 
plural society was produced by the colonial power in this part of the Federation of 
Malaysia as a foundation of ethnic politics in this country. The chapter starts with a 
brief outline of the creation of plural society and ethnic identities among the people 
of West Malaysia (Malaya) before 1957 (colonial era). This chapter then discusses 
the growing importance of ethnicity-infused characteristics in the political activities 
of West Malaysian (Malayan) people.  
35 
 
Chapter 3 examines the continuity of ethnic politics and the underlying reason why 
such socio-political activity persisted in post-colonial Malaya renamed West 
Malaysia at the establishment of Malaysian federation in 1963. The chapter also 
presents an analysis of how state-ethnic politics led to the creation of the Malaysian 
federation, and the reason why the politicians and state bureaucracy from UMNO, as 
the backbone of the Malaysian state, were interested in expanding ethnic politics to 
Sabah. The discussion of this issue especially focuses on the role of ethnic politics in 
UMNO-BN federal regime survival.  
Setting the scene for in-depth analysis on the expansion of ethnic politics to Sabah, 
Chapter 4 reveals how the federal leaders’ decision to ‘export’ the West Malaysia’s 
model of government based on Malay-Muslim supremacy has contributed to such a 
phenomenon.  
Chapter 5 details the federal leaders’ significant role in the expansion of ethnic 
politics to Sabah by focusing on their contribution to the change of Sabah’s 
demographic structures. It analyses the decision of the Malay leaders of the UMNO-
led federal government to increase the Malay-Muslim population’s numerical 
advantage over other ethnic groups in Sabah through legalizing the immigration of 
illegal migrants from neighboring countries such as Indonesia and Philippine, and the 
conversion of non-Muslim indigenous people to Islam. It also discusses the reactions 
of local leaders and the masses in Sabah to such activities based on archival facts and 
interviews with the informants.    
Chapter 6 presents an analysis of the salience of affirmative action policies in the 
expansion of ethnic politics to Sabah. Specifically, it reveals the impact of federal 
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leaders’ decision to implements these affirmative action policies designed to 
prioritize the Malay bumiputra over the other ethnic groups.  
Chapter 7 presents the conclusion of the study by reiterating the key arguments and 
findings of the study. This concluding chapter emphasizes the role of the federal 
leaders based in West Malaysia in the development of ethnic politics in Sabah for 
their political survival. This chapter also evaluates further work that might be done to 
support the findings of this study on ethnic politics in contemporary plural societies, 
even as ethnic politics is declining throughout the world (Newman, 1991; Bai, 2010). 
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 Chapter 2: The Origin of Ethnic Politics in West Malaysia 
 
2.1 Introduction  
An examination of the origin of West Malaysia’s ethnic politics is important to 
discover why federal leaders based in this part of the Federation of Malaysia were 
interested in expanding such politics to Sabah. West Malaysia is ethnically 
fractionalized. Shaffer (1982) and Hirschman (1986) described it as a laboratory for 
the study of ethnic politics in Malaysia. West Malaysia is also described by Shamsul 
(2001) and Im (2013) as the ‘Malay dominated plural society’. This is reflected in the 
fact that inter-ethnic relationships in this land have been polluted by ethnic 
chauvinism, and such sentiments are especially strong among the Malay as the 
dominant ethnic group who jealously safeguard their own interests in order to 
preserve their dominance. This hampers the progress of liberal democracy while it 
consolidates ethnic politics in Malaysia.  
This chapter traces the origin of ethnic politics in West Malaysia by focusing on the 
role of the British colonial power in this respect. Berman (1998) refers to ‘a 
continuing historical process which mostly associated with the colonial era’. The 
colonial legacy of bureaucratic authoritarianism, patron-client relationships, complex 
ethnic fragmentation and competition persisted in post-colonial Malaya and later 
Malaysia. A patron-client relationship characterized the state-society linkage and has 
significantly contributed to the elites seeking state power using ethnicity. These 
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elites, as the main architect of ethnic chauvinism in this country, invoke 
ethnocentric7 sentiments to mobilize support for their political interests.  
This chapter also discusses the early history of Malayan society and the creation of 
Malay ethno-religious identity. The discussion reflects the conventional 
interpretation of the Malay ethno-religious identity founded upon the supposedly 
inevitable political domination by the royal ruler of a kerajaan (state) described by 
Milner (1982) as the Raja or what the Malay world in recent times calls the Sultan. 
Milner argues convincingly that the creation of Malay ethno-religious identity is a 
cultural continuum where political life was dominated by the traditional value and 
attitude towards the Raja. The Raja is not only the key institution in the Malay world 
but the only institution to which his subject gives unwavering loyalty, thus 
suggesting the significant contribution such institutions could play in the unique 
Malay ethno-religious identity. Milner’s (1982) work is based on what I believe is 
very illuminating effort to define the Malay world. A lack of such definition is a 
limitation of Khan’s (2006) work, in which he defined the Malay as a village-cum-
agriculture-oriented people but does not define who exactly were the ‘Other Malays’. 
Both attempt, in my view, the essential task to reach a deeper and fuller 
understanding of the Malayan society.  
This is followed by a discussion on the creation of West Malaysian plural society as 
the model of society adopted by the colonial power to manage the different ethnic 
groups. Given that the West Malaysian society was characterized by strong ethnic 
disparities, this section will also discuss how British contributed to the growing 
importance of ethnicity not only in politics but also in the social arena. The chapter 
7 Ethnocentrism refers to the belief that they are better than the other or is superior to the others.  
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ends with a discussion on the formation of ethnic based political parties as well as the 
birth of West Malaysian inter-ethnic political coalition and consociationalism.  
 
2.2 Early History of West Malaysia and the Creation of Malay Ethno-Religious 
Identity  
The capital of West Malaysia8, also known as Peninsula Malaysia, is Kuala Lumpur, 
a city at once home to the executive and judicial branches of the federal 
government9. The main ethnic groups here are Malays, Chinese, Indians and the 
Orang Asli (Lye, 2001). Orang Asli (means ‘original people’ or the first people) 
comprises the earliest ethnic group to live in this land. According to Hood (2006), 
before 2500BC, Tanah Melayu (Malay World or Malaya) was inhabited by Orang 
Asli as probably the earliest populations of West Malaysia. This Orang Asli 
population consists of various tribes such as Negrito and Senoi (Michale & Chuen, 
2012) who each have their own language and culture. Despite that, they live side by 
side in harmony and actively interact with each other either socially or culturally. 
Such interaction commenced when the Proto-Malay arrived around 2000BC from the 
Nusantara region (Malay Archipelago) and the Malay-Deutro in 1500BC from 
Yunan (Thiessen, 2012). The establishment of the Malay kingship from Majapahit as 
the last Indianized kingdom in East Java of Indonesia in 13th century led to the social 
and economic deprivation of Orang Asli due to their small numbers and their 
inability to compete with the new comers. 
8 West Malaysia consists of Selangor, Melaka, Negri Sembilan, Johor, Pahang, Perak, Kedah, Penang, 
Terengganu, Kelantan, Perlis, and Kuala Lumpur and Putrajaya. East Malaysia consists of Sabah, 
Sarawak and Labuan, the third federal territory of Malaysia. They located in Borneo Island and both 
West Malaysia and East Malaysia are separated by South China Sea.  
9 In 1999 executive and judicial branches of federal government were moved to Putrajaya. However, 
some of sections of the judiciary remain in the capital city. 
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The 14th century, therefore, witnessed the creation of social division within the 
Malayan society following the introduction of ethnic identity and Islam among the 
Malays. Mutalib (1999) argues that the idea of Malays as Muslims was driven by the 
belief in universal brotherhood or Ummah, and thus Islam became synonymous with 
ethnicity (Frith, 2000). Ethno-religious identity became prominent in Malaya 
following the arrival of Arab and Indian-Muslim traders in the 13th and 14th 
centuries. Even though they were traders they also functioned as Islamic missionaries 
through their dakwah (Islamic missionary works). They used the practices of sufism, 
an Arabic word which means ‘the apprehension of divine realities’ (Nicholson 1914, 
p. 1). These practices highlighted the mysticism of Islam founded on the belief that it 
is possible to have “direct communication with Allah (Arabic word of God) under the 
guidance of charismatic leaders” (Trimingham, 1998, p. 1). This mystical aspect of 
Islam encouraged the Malays to embrace Islam while preserving some continuity 
with pre-Islamic cultural elements. The Malays perceived sufism as supporting their 
existing culture because it “did not challenge local animist belief” (Salim, 2015, p. 
25). The massive conversion into Islam among the Malays took place in the early 
14th century.   
The mass conversion of the rakyat (literally means the commoners) however was 
preceded by the first Malay Sultan (King), Sultan Megat Iskandar Shah, a former 
Hindu by the name of Parameswara, in 1303 following his marriage to a princess of 
Samudera Pasai, the ancient Muslim port kingdom on the north coast of Sumatra, 
Indonesia (Nasiruddin & Tibek, 2013; Borham, 2002; Groeneveldt, 1977). The 
rakyat were motivated to embrace Islam because of the advantage that came with 
identifying themselves with the Sultan’s religion and the belief that without rakyat, 
there would be no Sultan, and without the Sultan there would be no rakyat (Embong, 
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2014). This in turn made Islam very important in Malaya especially following the 
incorporation of Islamic principles into Malay traditional law and administration.  
The importance of Islam in the Malay world can be seen in their ‘unwavering loyalty 
and tenacity’ in adhering to Islam (2012, p. 64). This sense of loyalty to Islam 
brought new dimension to the relationship between the Sultans and the rakyat. Their 
adherence to Islam has encouraged the rakyat to remain strongly loyal to the Sultans 
who are seen as the head of Islam. Although loyalty to the Sultan is not like their 
loyalty towards Allah (God) and His Prophet, Islam required all Muslims to give 
unwavering loyalty towards their leaders in the context of governance of the country 
and for the maintenance of harmony within the community. Yassin and Dahalan note 
that “as long as the leaders’ orders do not conflict with Islamic policy, give benefits 
to others, give protection to Islam and its followers and do not bring any loss to 
Islam, the leaders’ order must be respected and obeyed. Therefore pledges of 
allegiance in makruf (good deeds) have been shown a lot in the lives of Prophet 
Muhammad and his companion” (2012, p. 71).  
Al-Kandahlawi (2011) also pointed out that Muslims are required to be obedient to 
their leaders just like the companions of Prophet Muhammad. Thus, Malay believes 
that loyalty to the Sultan is vital and this has led to the development of solidarity 
between not only the Sultans and the rakyat but also among the rakyat as the rulers’ 
subjects (Lee, 2008). Such solidarity, therefore, made Islam an exclusive religion for 
the Malay community. As a result, Malay ethnic identity can no longer be separated 
from Islam. Ever since this identification has constantly been used to lump together 
people of various different cultural and regional backgrounds through conversion. 
Andaya and Andaya (1984) argue that after the conversion of the Malay Sultan in the 
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14th century, Islam formed an important part of Malay social identity to the extent 
that to become Muslim also meant to masuk Melayu (to become Malay or to embrace 
Malayness) and those who decided to give up Islam were usually regarded as 
rejecting their Malayness. Admittedly, one who converts would not automatically be 
eligible to become Malay. For example, non-Malays such as Arabs and indigenous 
people who convert through intermarriages can choose to become Malay or remain 
as Arabs.  
It is important to stress here, however, that many Muslim converts have refused to 
change their ethnic identity to keep their traditional social identity (Wu, 2015; Sabri, 
2012, Lam 2004). The Orang Asli of the Jakun and Senoi in particular tended to 
retain their ethnic label and prefered to be called Jakun-Muslim, Senoi-Muslim or as 
Orang Asli mualaf10. But in general, as Muhamat (2014) observes, the Muslim 
converts often reject their previous customs and way of life as they adapt their social 
norms and values in line with Islam as a dominant religion, particularly in regard to 
specific observances such as prayer, fasting, ritual, alcohol prohibition and eating 
only halal (literately means permissible to use or engage or eat or drink) meat.  
This process is what Benjamin (2002) calls assimilation into the dominant religion 
involving various tribes within Southeast Asia. Other academics such as Miller 
(2010) described this as a process of civilization as well as a territorial and 
commercial expansion strategy of the Malay rulers. The Malay rulers used Islam as a 
means of making Malaya, in particular Malacca a center of economic and religious 
activities within Southeast Asia. The transformation of Malaya from just a trading 
stopover for traders from various parts of Asia and the Middle East to a centre of 
10 The concept of Mualaf is an Arabic word for convert. 
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economic activities and Islamic learning and dissemination encouraged the 
development of Malayan public administration and politics. The Sultan’s decision to 
introduce a set of laws as written legal documents and the introduction of public 
administrative ranks heralded the modernization of Malayan public administration 
and politics. The newly introduced laws were Undang-Undang Melaka (Laws of 
Malacca), Undang-Undang Laut Melaka (the Maritime Laws of Malacca) and 
Hukum Adat (Customary Law), the newly created public administrative positions 
were Bendahara (advisor to the Sultan), Penghulu Bendahari (state treasurer), 
Temenggung (chief of public office and state security), Laksamana (head of navy and 
also chief emissary of the Sultan), and Shahbandar (harbor masters). To guide the 
Malayan public administration and politics, the concept of daulat (sovereignty)11 and 
derhaka (treason) was introduced to strengthen the Malay rulers’ position or in other 
words the Malay rulers’ domination over Malayan public administration and politics 
(Gillen, 1994; Andaya & Andaya, 1984). As a result, the position of the Sultan as 
monarch was strengthened. Following the consolidation of their position within 
Malay society, by the 15th century many Malay Sultanates emerged throughout the 
Malay Peninsula, Sumatra and Borneo (Miller, 2010).  
Their emergence, in turn, led to an increase in prestige or social status of not only 
Malay rulers but also the Malay commoners. When this happened, people from 
different ethnic background such as Orang Asli, Arabs and Indians assimilated into 
Malay culture voluntarily through Islamization and began to identify themselves as 
Malays. Arguably, the converts’ decision to identify themselves as Malays was 
driven by the need to improve their social status.  
11 The concept of daulat refers to calls for great respect and loyalty to the Malay rulers (Gillen, 1994, 
p. 2). 
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However, during the pre-colonial period, the focus was on the strengthening Malay 
rulers’ political and economic privileges. The rakyat mainly used it for the purpose 
of ethnic identification. For this reason, the use of the term Malay to refer to one’s 
social identity without reference to any political and economic privileges did not 
create boundaries as a source of contention among the rakyat in the pre-colonial 
Malaya. As a whole, peace existed among citizens from different ethnic groups as 
shown for example in traditional Malay elites and the early non-Malay (Orang Asli) 
working together for mutual gain (Lee, 2008). This showed that ethnicity was not 
necessarily significant in the politics and public administration of pre-colonial 
Malaya. But, when the colonial power arrived in this region such identification did 
become significant in Malayan politics and public administration due to the arrival of 
different ethnic groups in Malaya and their differentiation by the colonial authorities.     
The British decision to import labor from China and India in the 1920s led to the 
creation of a multi ethnic state of the type which Furnivall (1969) described as plural 
society, a society composed of different racial groups living side by side under a 
single political administration, but not interacting with each other except through 
economic transactions. As they do not interact with each other, strong ethnic 
cleavage marked by different religions eventually became a characteristic of the 
Malayan society. The following section discusses the impact of British 
administrative on ethnicity in Malayan politics.  
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 2.3 British Colonialism: Towards the Importance of Ethnicity in Malayan 
Politics and Public Administration 
Western colonial powers brought profound changes to Malayan (Tanah Melayu or 
Alam Melayu) politics and public administration (Rahim, Mustapha & Lyndon, 2013, 
pp. 36). The British modernized Malayan politics and public administration by 
introducing a colonial bureaucratic model and improved legal practice by creating 
courts and rule of law. These new administration model and legal institutions became 
the guiding principle in modernizing Malayan politics and public administration that 
replaced the traditional state administration. However, despite positive changes, the 
colonial powers left legacies that became a thorn in the flesh of the post-colonial 
government. The instrumentalization of ethnolinguistic and/or religious cleavages in 
various areas such as administration, economics and education in order to 
differentiate their political and economic interests (Ziltener & Künzler, 2013, p. 298) 
segregated the Malayan people according to ethnic lines. This legacy led to the 
destruction of the Malay world. In Hikayat Abdullah, Munshi Abdullah asserted that 
the changes brought by the Europeans were a “destruction of the old world and the 
creation of a new” (Hill, 1970, p. 126 as quoted in Rahim, Mustapha, Ahmad & 
Lyndon, 2013, p. 36). This was because the introduction of such policies not only 
prevented the Malayan citizens from socially interacting with each other but it also 
showed hatred among the people of Malaya as a result of what Lee (1997) describes 
as ethnic disparities. These were characterized by religious differences following the 
government intention to make Islam a key element of Malay ethnic identity and this 
later came to characterize Malayan politics. 
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Though Malaya was colonized by Portuguese (1511-1641), Dutch (1641-1842) and 
British (1842-1957), it was the British that brought to the fore ethnic identity and in 
particular Malay ethno-religious identity. Arguably, both Portuguese and Dutch came 
to Malaya solely for economic reasons and did not meddle in local politics and 
public administration as they confined their power to Malacca. In contrast, the 
British were invited by the Sultans to be involved not only in their economic life but 
also in political and public administration for protection against multiple external 
threats. This move stemmed from the Sultan’s awareness of the fact that most 
Malays were poor, illiterate, tied to kampung (village) and generally engaged in 
either subsistence farming or fishing (Wigdor, 2013). Therefore, the Sultan 
eventually asked the British to help improve the socio-economic conditions of 
Malaya, in particular the Malays. At the same time, the Sultan also faced threats from 
Siam (Thailand), the lanun (pirates) of Sulu who infested the straits of Malacca and 
the Portuguese who frequently disagreed with the Sultan’s decision. This in turn 
inspired the Sultan to meet and negotiate with Francis Light as the British 
representative in 1771.  
As a result of these negotiations the Sultan agreed to allow the British to build a 
trading post in Kedah (located in the northern west part of Malaya), and the British 
agreed to protect the Sultan from existing threats. Thus the British became the 
colonial power heavily involved in Malayan politics and administration. But the 
significant involvement of the British in Malayan politics and public administration 
began only when it signed the Pangkor agreement with Perak ruler on January 20th, 
1874. Before the signing of the agreement, the British played only the role of the 
protector of Malay sultanate. Nevertheless, as the agreement gave the British power 
to advise the state authorities, it gained an influence over Malayan politics and public 
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administration (Yaakop, 2010, p. 44). A similar agreement was signed by the British 
with Selangor and Negri Sembilan in the same year (1874), and Pahang in 1888. The 
British played an advisory role in these via the appointment of a state advisor called 
Resident. This provided the Britishwith the opportunity to exert a more direct control 
over the states’ administrative and economic activities and to boost development in 
the Peninsular states. 
The rapid economic development, then, became the pull factor for the arrival of 
Chinese and Indian immigrants to work in the mining and rubber plantation sector 
respectively (Shuid, 2001). This was the beginning of the creation of plural society in 
Malaya. Although there are records of Chinese and Indians traders in the Malaya 
regions since the fourteenth century (around the year 1349), they did not settle in 
Malaya. However, during British rule between the 18th and 20th centuries the 
immigrants were encouraged by the British to stay in Malaya to consolidate the 
latter’s economic interests (Shuid, 2001; Abdullah, 1989; Roff, 1967). The Chinese 
preferred not to return to their homeland due to political and economic instability 
there, while poverty forced the Indians to make Malaya their country (Othman, 2002; 
Deraman & Abidin, 2003). Thus, a new Malayan society comprising not only Orang 
Asli and Malays, but also immigrants from China and India emerged. Towards the 
end of the British colonial era the population of Malaya was 4,893,000, made up of 
49% (2,418,000) Malays (including the Orang Asli), 38% (1,871,000) of Chinese 
and 11% (531,000) Indians (Hirchman, 1980, p. 111).   
The state administration was modernized through the introduction of modern law by 
the Resident. In 1895, the first federation12 called the Federated Malay States, also 
12 The central government of first federation of Malaya was in Kuala Lumpur. 
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known as Protected Malay States, consisting of four Malay states (Selangor, Perak, 
Negri Sembilan and Pahang) came into being. The Resident’s effort to modernize the 
state administration led to the expansion of British indirect rule throughout Malaya. 
In 1910 Kedah, Kelantan, Terengganu, Perlis and Johore also signed separate treaties 
with British and became part of the federation known as the Federation of Malaya. 
The Federation of Malaya included all states within Peninsula Malaya. The 
expansion of British rule throughout Malaya indicated its growing influence over 
Malayan politics and administration.   
However British rule was largely indirect. According to Arifin (2014), the British 
role was confined to that of ‘guardian’ and ‘advisor’, and they did not interfere in 
culture or religion, the sovereignty of the Sultan, or the independent status of the 
Malay states. As a guardian and advisor, the British dominated the Malay states in 
terms of politics, public administration, and economic activities. However, athough 
the British dominated in politics, public administration and economy, they did not 
encroach on the Malay states’ autonomy. The Malayan natural resources that 
included tin and rubber were vital to fuel and sustain the British Empire as they 
contributed to their foreign exchange earnings (Jomo & Rock, 1998). Therefore, it 
was inevitable that the British government implemented a policy to reduce the 
concentration of power in the hands of the Malayan governments (who might 
mobilize support to oppose the British administration). To facilitate this indirect rule 
and help control the masses, the British adopted a divide and rule policy (Sua, 2013). 
The aim of this policy was to divide the Malayan population to preserve its interest in 
the country especially its economic wealth through continuous control over its 
natural resources in Malaya.  
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The British made sure the Chinese and Indians were confined to tin mining and 
rubber estates respectively. The Malays were encouraged to focus on their traditional 
economic activities such as small scale planting and livestock farming and fishing 
and remained confined to their rural villages. The Malay elites, on the other hand 
retained their traditional political and public administration positions. The 
implementation of such a policy led to a socio-economic imbalance between the 
Malays and the non-Malays. Economic power was concentrated in the hands of the 
Chinese who had gained first-hand economic management knowledge and 
experience from the colonial government. They gained control over various 
economic sectors such as manufacturing, mining, medicine, commerce, engineering, 
construction, accountancy, and administrative and managerial position. As a result 
the non-Malay socioeconomic standing, especially that of the Chinese, improved 
significantly.  
In contrast, although the political and public administration position of the Malay 
elites was enhanced rather than reduced due to the British decision to acknowledge 
the sovereignty of the Malay ruler and by providing posts and pensions for Malay 
princes (Stockwell, 1977), the ordinary Malays were not given a chance to improve 
their socioeconomic standing and life chances, and were left mostly to concentrate on 
agricultural sectors. This condition led to a crack in ethnic relations as well as 
highlighted class disparity among the Malays as well as their elites. The creation of 
top-ranked political and administration position such as Bendahara and Laksamana, 
and the maintenance of low-ranked political and public administrative position 
including Penghulu (Village Head) reflected the consolidation of class division 
among the Malay elites. This colonial practice of divide and rule also led to fears the 
non-Malays, in particular the Chinese, who had become more dominant in economic 
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aspects might come to control them politically (Yaakop, 2014, p. 57), a condition 
described by the Malays as a threat to their traditional supremacy status (Yeoh, 2006, 
p. 9). This drove a wedge between the Malays and non-Malays as the Malays, 
especially the Malay elites, believed that Malaya was a Malay country and that it 
should be ruled by the Malays (Yaakop, 2014, p. 56). Even though it appeared that 
the majority of the Chinese and Indians worked as laborers in tin mining and rubber 
plantations respectively, the Malay elites became aware of the influence of non-
Malays in in the economic arena. The fear was that this would lead to their gaining 
political and public administrative power, thus marginalizing the Malay elites. 
More directly, the role of the British administration in nurturing the belief that 
Malays were rightful owner of the Tanah Melayu and in categorising the immigrants 
from mainland China and India as Chinese and Indians rather than by their dialects 
as Hakka, Cantonese and Mandarin or Sikh, Tamil, Punjab and Telugu build up 
hatred among the Malays against the non-Malays. The colonial definition of Malays 
as “a person belonging to any Malay race who habitually speaks the Malay 
language….and professes the Muslim religion” (Rogers, 1969, p. 931) instilled a 
sense of Malay ownership towards Malaya among the Malays, thus making them 
view the Chinese and Indians as outsiders even if most of them were born in Malaya 
(Hirchman, 1987). Yaakop argues that “Malays believe that Malaya is a Malay 
country and that it should be ruled by the Malays” (2014, p. 56). Such belief was 
strengthened following the British decision to prevent the Chinese and Indians from 
participating in Malayan politics and public administration. Even though the Malay 
Rulers had welcomed the non-Malay, especially the Chinese leaders, to become 
members of state councils, the British insisted that only Malay aristocrats and their 
colonial advisors should be allowed full participation in political and administration 
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roles (Hirschman, 1986). This policy of keeping non-Malays as well as the Malay 
rakyat out of the administration, as Hirchman (1986) and Purcell (1965) argue, led to 
the growing of interest among the Malay elites in constantly dominating the Malayan 
politics and administration as well as preventing the non-Malays from taking over 
such roles. This therefore suggests that the British refusal to recognize Chinese and 
Indians as citizens of Malaya prevented them from participating in Malayan politics 
and public administration and facilitated its divide and rule policy reinforcing 
xenophobia among the Malay elites (Hirschman, 1986, p. 353).   
It is important to note here, however, that despite the British decision to keep the 
non-Malay out of politics, the traditional Malay administration began losing their 
influence in the state political and economic administration. The Malay leaders 
including the Sultan (King), Bendahara (Sultan’s Advisor), Penghulu Bendahari 
(State Treasurer), Temenggung (Chief of Public and State Security), Laksamana 
(Chief of Navy and Emissary of the Sultan), and Shahbandars (Harbor Master) lost 
their administrative function following the strengthening of the British political and 
public administrative role in Malaya. In fact, by the late 18th century the political and 
public administrative functions were largely performed by the British Resident. It 
was only the Penghulu (Village Headman) who was the lowest in the hierarchy who 
retained any significant degree of functional capacity (Hamid, 2007, p. 374). The 
loss of the traditional leaders’ influence in the state administration was the direct 
result of the British decision to reduce the Sultans’ and the Malay nobility’s active 
role in state administration and economic development through the creation of 
Federated and Unfederated Malay states. The Federated Malay States of Perak, 
Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and Pahang were established in 1895 headed by a British 
Resident General who managed all political and administrative. As for the 
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Unfederated Malay States of Johore, Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis and Terengganu 
established in the same year (1985) the Malay rulers were given the right to appoint 
their own cabinet, but they were still required to consult with the British Resident 
first before they made a decision. This requirement led to the erosion of power and 
influence of the rulers in the state administration as they followed the advice of the 
Resident especially in the political and economic arenas. As Suwannathat-Pian 
observes, this reduced the Ruler and the Malay nobility “to an unhealthy status of 
frustrated and spoiled pensioner some of whom found no meaningful outlets for their 
abilities and energy except in unproductive activities” (2009, p. 110). In a similar 
vein, Funston (1980) argued that the British wide ranging administrative reforms 
resulting in the traditional Malay state existing only in form, not in substance. This in 
addition to their concern about the Chinese economic influence made the Malay 
elites feel threatened, and thus focused on protecting their ethnic interests, that is the 
perceived Malay superiority status. 
The desire among the Malay elites to safeguard their ethnic interests became even 
more pronounced following the British decision to implement a vernacular 
educational system to facilitate its divide and rule (or ‘divide et impera’). This 
educational system replaced the existing traditional Islamic education system, the 
Sekolah Pondok (Islamic boarding school), and was aimed at controlling the 
Malayan people by educating them differently. It was designed primarily to preserve 
the traditional feudal structure of the Malay society (Sua, 2013). The British 
implemented a dual system of education for the Malays: one for the Malay 
aristocracy and the other for the ordinary Malay. The Malay aristocracy was 
provided with an elitist English education to turn the traditional elites into their 
allies. By doing so, the British gained the much-needed political legitimacy among 
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the Malays in general. As for the rakyat (Malay masses), the British deliberately 
attempted to maintain their status as rural peasantry through the provision of a rural-
based education. They were only provided with an elementary Malay education that 
did not go beyond the secondary level. The Malays who wanted to study in the 
English school were required to undergo four years of Malay primary education. 
However, the immigrants (Chinese and Indians) were not required to undergo the 
same procedure. This gave immigrants the advantage in gaining an English education 
through the establishment of Penang Free School (Penang), Malay College Kuala 
Kangsar (Perak) and Malacca High Scholl (Malacca) (Sua, 2013). 
To complicate the matter further, most of the schools were established by the 
Christian missionary groups. Malay parents refused to send their children to the 
Christian schools. Hamid pointed out that the main reason for this was “because the 
Malays deeply distrusted the British intentions in founding them, which could be 
used as an instrument for propagating Christianity” (2004, p. 28). The Malay fear of 
Christianization further deterred them from attending these schools following the 
British decision to privatize the legal role of Islam. As Hamid put it, “Islam was 
effectively privatized, becoming equated in the minds of many with politically 
insignificant rituals. In their desire to reap maximum material benefits for their own 
selfish ends, the Malay signatories of treaties with the British willingly submitted to 
the latter’s parochial view of religion, hence divesting Islam of its socio-political and 
legal content” (2004, p. 25). In this regard, the British had introduced the secular 
concept of separation between Islam and state administration which was alien to the 
Malay ideological view. As a result the legal role of Islam in Malaya was no longer 
under the jurisdiction of the state but largely under the control of individuals, and in 
consequence the influence of Islam in Malayan education slowly eroded.  
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In accordance with these decisions, the teaching of the Malay language in jawi 
(Arabic script) was replaced by rumi (Roman alphabet.). This weakened the lesson in 
Islam because the Al-Quran (religious text of Islam) is written in Arabic similar to 
jawi. This put Islam in an inconsequential position, deepening distrust among Malays 
towards the colonial power and the non-Muslim Chinese and Indians. The 
secularization of education and the privatization of the legal role of Islam were 
regarded by the Malays as a threat to Islam as both undermined the traditional 
Islamic education system.   
When this happened the Malays began to realize how much they had been left behind 
economically, and how they had to depend on the British even in the administration 
of their own religion (Yegar, 1984, p. 200). This stirred ethno-religious sentiments 
and their attempts to safeguard their interests led to antagonism towards the non-
Malays and non-Muslims. This marked the beginning of the role of ethnicity in pre-
independence Malaya. Since then, ethnic politicization and disparities became a 
feature of Malayan politics.  
Thus, arguably the role of ethnic identity in Malayan politics and public 
administration was the inevitable result of the British divide-and-rule policy that had 
(Cheah, 1992) led to the heightening of ethno-religious sentiments and antagonism in 
Malaya. There was increased fear and mistrust among Malays, Chinese and Indians 
(Abraham, 1977) due to the absence of integration. According to Hirschman (1986) 
even in towns where there was the potential for inter-racial contact, residential areas, 
market places and recreational space were typically segregated along racial lines 
precluding inter-ethnic interaction Malays tightened their political grip to protect 
their superior status. This was the focus of UMNO, formed in 1946, a political party 
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aimed at uniting the Malay aristocracy and rakyat, and most importantly embodying 
the rise of ethno-nationalism among the Malays.  
 
2.4 The Formation of UMNO: The Rise of Malay Nationalism 
The need to ensure Malay elites’ political supremacy led to growing ethno-
nationalism among them, and this made ethnicity a factor in the political activities of 
pre-independent Malaya. Ethnic consciousness among the Malays was largely a 
defence mechanism that emerged when the Malay elites began questioning the 
colonial administrative practice in Malaya. As explained earlier, it was the 
marginalization of Malay rulers, a symbol of Malay-Muslim political supremacy, 
that provoked Malay leaders to criticize the British and consolidate their political 
power. The Malay perjuangan (struggle) to reinforce, and thereafter maintain Malay 
political supremacy began by their rejection of British’s post-World War II (WWII) 
Malayan Union (MU) proposal that conferred equal citizenship rights to all Malayans 
regardless of whether they were Malays, Chinese or Indians. Under this citizenship 
proposal, all the immigrants were to be automatically granted citizenship. This was 
quickly described by the Malay elites as an attempt to erode their superiority.  This 
unhappiness led to political mobilization among the Malay masses and culminated in 
the founding of United Malays National Organization (UMNO), a Malay-based 
political party.   
UMNO symbolized Malay nationalism and its establishment was widely regarded by 
scholars as a result of the Japanese occupation in Malay. Wahid (1970), for example, 
argued that the development of Malay nationalism was encouraged by the Japanese. 
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The Japanese occupation of Malaya during WWII (1941-1945) ended British 
political and economic domination in this region. This was an indication to the 
Malays that the British were not invincible. As Wahid (1983) and Shaffer (1982) 
observed the Japanese army destroyed the myth of British and ‘White’ invincibility. 
Moreover, the Japanese rule largely favored the Malays over other ethnic groups. In 
this respect, although the Malay states’ autonomy ended as they came under the 
control of Japanese emperor, the treatment of Malay rulers improved tremendously 
after the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Tojo Hideki to Malaya in July 1943. Tojo 
praised the Malay traditional leaders and in the Niponisation of Malay society 
appointed the Malay ruler as the Vice-President of the new state advisory council, a 
council that was intentionally created by the Japanese administration to give voice to 
local opinion on state matters. The advisory council was set up to seek the Malay 
rulers’ support towards creating the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere (Daito 
Kyoeiken) free of Western powers and their influence.  
The Japanese also decided to implement a pro-Malay civil service. This meant a 
large number of non-Malays who employed by the British as it civil servants were 
replaced with Malays13. The Malay masses who benefited very little under the 
previous administration (British) were also encouraged by the Japanese to become 
administrators. Following this, the Malay officials increased rapidly and it was the 
first time Malays were given administrative role by an expatriate power in the 
government of the day. Moreover, in the 1943 Islamic Conference, a conference 
initiated by the Japanese authority, the position of Islam improved through the 
recognition of Pacific War as a jihad or the Islamic holy war (Suwannathat-Pian, 
13 During WWII, the non-Malays, in particular the Chinese were discriminated by the Japanese. It was 
because they supported the British to fight against Japanese as a directive from Chiang Kai-Shek, the 
Chinese President.   
57 
 
                                                          
2009). This inculcated the spirit of nationalism among the Malays because it was the 
first such recognition on the importance of Islam in Malayan states by the colonial 
power. The position of Islam was further enhanced by the reintroduction of religious 
school and the establishment of state religious council. Simultaneously, the 
opportunity to continue higher studies in Japan was given to Malay youths which 
boosted their self-confidence. As a result, they begun to feel a sense of belonging and 
believed that they were the rightful owners of the country. It eventually enabled the 
Malays to stand up against post-war colonial power because the pro-Malay policy of 
the Japanese had unintentionally strengthened the Malays belief as the rightful 
owners of Malaya, sharing one language and one religion. This attitude led to the 
emergence of pro-self-government or nationalist sentiments among them.  
However, this was short lived as in 1945, the British returned to Malaya after the 
defeat of the Japanese army in the hands of the Americans. This was viewed with 
alarm by the Malays and once again they felt threatened when the British colonial 
Office in London tried to gain full control of Malaya. This was seen as a great 
disaster mainly because it implied their loss of ethnic superiority. As a matter of fact, 
Braddell14, argued that some British officials reckoned that the Japanese occupation 
as “a God-sent chance to clear up all the country troubles” (as quoted in Ariffin, 
2014, p. 2). It was because before the WWII the British have never gained full 
control of Malaya due to autonomy granted to Malay states. Thus, the Japanese 
occupation had created an opportunity for the returning British colonialist to gain full 
control of Malayan politics and economy effectively ending their autonomy. Though 
14 Braddell R.S.J. was a prominent lawyer in Singapore (1880-1966), Chief Justice of the Federated 
Malay States (1913-17) and the first attorney general of the Straits Settlements (1986-1982). He was 
also a joint editor and a contributor to Singapore’s centenary celebration publication, One Hundred 
Years of Singapore, as well as the author of numerous legal and historical publications (Jia & Ong, 
2008).  
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the Malays were given opportunity to work as administrators, as explained earlier, 
during the Japanese occupation any decision relating to state administration was 
subject to Japanese emperor’s approval and that the Malay administrators who 
included the Sultans have not say to such decisions. This therefore suggests that the 
Japanese occupation in Malaya have indeed reduced the autonomy of the Malayan 
states.  
The returning British proposed the establishment of the Malayan Union (MU) in 
1946 aimed at centralizing politics and public administration. Nevertheless, the 
return of British colonialist to Malaya through the introduction of Malayan Union 
(MU) in 1946 was regarded by the Malays as a means of returning to the pre-war era, 
a dark era for the Malays. The objective of MU was to gain full control of the 
Malayan politics and economy by transferring the sovereignty of the Sultans to the 
British Crown and confer equal citizenship rights to the non-Malays, a plan that 
effectively overturns any past privilege and protection given to the Malay race and 
religion (Hamid, 2007, p. 385). Therefore, the Malays perceived British MU as a 
threat to their position and political future (Arifin, 2014, p. 6), and the dignity of 
Islam and Muslims (Hamid 2007, p. 375). Rahim, Mustapha, Ahmad and Lyndon 
(2013) observed that this was because MU envisaged concentration of power under 
the hands of a central government15 but because the union was against Malay 
interests. The union was perceived as favoring the Chinese and other non-Malays as 
the British believed that the non-Malays (Chinese and Indian) had remained loyal to 
the colonial power during WWII. During the Japanese occupation, the non-Malays 
were engaged in an armed battle against the Japanese through Malayan People Anti-
15 The Malayan Union main idea was to simplify the British-Malaya administration through the 
incorporation of all Malay Peninsular states under a single, central government.    
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Japanese Army (MPAJA) and Malayan Communist Party (MCP) as the Japanese 
kempeitai16. Both MPAJA and MCP leaders then decided to co-operate with the 
returning British and adopted a constitutional line of struggle (Yaakop, 2010, p. 46). 
In contrast, the British regarded the Malays as disloyal to the colonial power as they 
had strongly associated with the Japanese administration.   
Moreover, the introduction of MU was actually in line with the non-Malay plea for 
equal rights. The non-Malays demanded the British administration recognize them as 
citizens and be given opportunity to serve in the public service like the Malays. They 
wanted to be given the same treatment as the Malays as they have sworn their 
allegiance to the Malay states. Thus, perhaps as to recognize the non-Malay and to 
punish the Malay for being pro-Japanese during WWII, the MU idea was first 
expressed on October 10th 1945 in a brief statement in London by the British 
(Yaakop, 2010, p. 49). The pro non-Malay policy of MU and the demand by the non-
Malays for equality led to xenophobia among the Malays (Muhammad (2000) who 
looked it as a threat to their Malay supremacy.  
This was aggravated by the dramatic increase in the number of non-Malay 
population in most of the Malay states (Muhammad, 2000, p. 50). For example, the 
1931 population census showed the Chinese population in Selangor (45.3%) was 
twice that of the Malays (23.1%) while in Perak, Malay accounted for only 35.6% of 
the population, while the Chinese made up 42.5% of the population (Muhammad, 
2000, p. 50; Mustapha, 1999, p. 177). The Malays vehemently opposed the 
implementation of MU and demanded self-rule. This movement for self-rule that 
symbolized the beginning of Malay nationalist sentiment was initiated and led by 
16 Kempeitai is a Japanese word, to the military police, an arm of the Imperial Japanese Army. It was 
largely regarded as a secret police and was not a conventional military police. 
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Islamic-educated, Malay-educated and English-educated intellectuals and culminated 
in the founding of Partai Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya (Malay Nationalist Party, 
PKMM) in October 17th, 1945 (Soh, 2005, p. 13). This new political party was 
associated with Islam as the religious-educated intellectuals believed that it was vital 
for their struggle to create Indonesia Raya or Melayu Raya (independence of Malaya 
within greater Indonesia or greater Malaya), an independent movement which 
envisaged a political merger with Indonesia (Roff, 1970). The PKMM sought unity 
with Indonesia as the leaders believed the creation of a so-called Malay speaking 
world will strengthen Malaya and Indonesian resistance against colonialism and 
enable them to achieve independence early (Angus, 1973). Accordingly, the PKMM 
was instrumental in cultivating anti-British sentiments through publication of their 
journals such as Al-Iman, Neraca and Saudara and emphasizing unity among 
Muslims.   
The intellectuals began campaigning against MU and demanded self-government by 
forming voluntary Malay Associations in various parts of the country such as Johor, 
Selangor and Melaka. The struggle of these associations therefore is centered on self-
government and requesting the British colonial power to protect the special position 
of Malays and Islam. However, the British refused to entertain the MNP and Malay 
Associations’ protest against the MU as well as their bid for the independence of 
Malaya. As a result, on March 1st 1946, the Malay Associations led by Dato’ Onn 
Jafar and other Malay-Muslims political group gathered in a conference, called the 
Pan-Malayan Malay Congress, held in Kuala Lumpur to unite the Malays against the 
MU. Following this, Pan-Malayan Malay Congress gathered on May 11th 1946 in 
Johor Bahru, Johor. At this conference, the Malay Associations and other Malay-
Muslims political groups established a political party, the Pertubohan Kebangsaan 
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Melayu Bersatu (United Malay National Organization, UMNO), to represent the 
Malays. Under its slogan of Hidup Melayu or ‘long live the Malays’, UMNO was led 
by Dato’ Onn Jafar, the Chief Minister of Johor (Rahim, Mustapha, Ahmad & 
Lyndon, 2013, p. 40) as the Pan-Malayan Malay Congress successor to oppose the 
MU proposal.  
The UMNO leaders refused to attend the MU installation ceremonies and the British-
Malaya Advisory Council meetings. At the same time, the UMNO leaders urged the 
Malay aristocracy and the rakyat to work together to protest against the MU so that 
the British would grant self-government for Malaya as they declared that Malaya 
belongs to the Malays. This declaration was acknowledged by the Raja of Perlis, 
Tuanku Syed Putra Jamallulail, during his speech at the 1949 UMNO annual meeting 
in Penang. He said, “Malaya belongs to the Malays” (Suwannathat-Pian, 2009, p. 
126). Following the declaration, the UMNO leaders then publicly promised the 
Malay masses that they “do not want the other races to be given the rights and 
privileges of the Malays” (Ongkili, 1985, p. 47). The Malay elites and Malay rakyat 
collectively decided to terminate their participation in the British-Malaya 
government bureaucracy and politics.  
Since then, UMNO effort to unify the Malays to oppose the MU scheme intensified 
which subsequently prompted the British administration to pursue confidential 
consultations with UMNO representatives and the Malay rulers as a preparation for 
self-government through the formation of an Anglo-Malay Working Committee. The 
Working Committee’s role was to draw up one alternative socio-political 
arrangement that was acceptable to Malays17. It proposed an alternative socio-
17 See Malayan Union (1946). 
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political arrangement namely the federation of Malaya, with increased safeguards for 
the sovereignty of Malay rulers and the special position of the Malays, and more 
restrictive citizenship requirements. The Federation of Malaya came into existence 
on February 1st 1948.  
It, however, triggered opposition from Malays and non-Malays who were frustrated 
with the British decision to retreat from its promise for the creation of a federation 
that “welds together the different peoples in Malaya into one united nation” (Hing, 
2009, p. 63). In opposing the non-democratic and communally divisive nature of 
federation due to the consolidation of ethnic division and Malay privilege, in early 
1946 a multiracial but largely non-Malay-dominated Pan Malayan Council for Joint 
Action (AMCJA) was formed. It was followed by the creation of Pusat Tenaga 
Rakyat (Centre of the People’s Power, PUTERA) in early 1947 by several 
progressive and left leaning Malay organizations. These political and civic 
organizations coalesced into the PUTERA-AMCJA in mid-1947 to demonstrate that 
united political action on the part of all ethnic groups in Malay was feasible through 
the promotion of an alternative foundation for the new Malayan federation namely 
the People’s Constitution. Under this alternative arrangement, the PUTERA-AMCJA 
proposed a system of equal rights, with no distinction between ethnic communities, 
and retained Malay as the official language, allowing other languages to continue to 
be used in the short-run. This alternative arrangement also deliberately stripped of 
any religious connotation the conceptualization of the term Malay.      
Equal rights and the new conception of the term Malay were recognized by the non-
Malays. For their part, the Malay elites in PUTERA-AMCJA such as Burhanuddin 
Al-Helmy and Ibrahim Yaakob, were willing to oppose the UMNO conceptualization 
63 
 
of Melayu which referred to ‘one who habitually speaks the Malay language, 
conforms to Malay custom, and professes Islam’ by suggesting that the concept of 
Melayu needed to embrace Chinese, Indians and other regardless of religion, 
language or customs. Both Burhanuddin and Ibrahim also used Bauer’s (1907) 
definition of nation that stressed the distinction between ethnicity and nationality by 
proposing the creation of a unitary political entity called Malaya Raya (Greater 
Malaya). According to Burhanuddin, any individuals who were willing to sever ties 
with their original nationality and “totally commit allegiance to, as well as fulfill the 
conditions and demands of, Malay nationality (kebangsaan Melayu)….[could 
become]… Malay national, in the political sense” (Tan, 1988, p. 18). Therefore, the 
very basis of the creation of Malaya Raya, as Noor argued was the “willingness to 
de-racialise the divisions...between Malays and non-Malays by insisting upon a 
broader conceptions of Malay culture which encompasses the different cultural 
groupings of the Archipelago” (2002, p. 93).  
The PUTERA-AMCJA proposal of People’s Constitution, however, was rejected by 
the British. The British believed that any person born in Malaya automatically 
became a citizen and the use of the term Melayu as a nationality was farcical. In fact, 
the British, as Omar (2009) argued, stressed that such a proposal would allow 
blackmailers, gang robbers, murderers and other criminals (who were mainly non-
Malay) to become the citizens of Malaya and be identified as the Melayu (Malay). 
Most importantly, the British also opined that the Malay elites would not agree that 
non-Malays could be referred to as Melayu and that non-Malays themselves would 
not agree to have themselves designated as Melayu.  In a similar tone, Onn and the 
rest of the UMNO hierarchy also argued that the idea of Melayu as a nationality 
could jeopardize the agenda of safeguarding the privilege of Malay as an ethnic 
64 
 
majority. In this regard, it is important to stress that their strong opposition towards 
PUTERA-AMCJA’s suggestion of the term Melayu to include Chinese and Indians 
was driven by their determination to ensure a clear boundary between Malays and 
non-Malays and consolidate their political interests (O’Shannassy, 2012, p. 95). As a 
result, in January 1948 the Federation of Malaya agreement was signed by both 
British and UMNO leadership18 and effectively ended the MU on January 31st 1948. 
Most importantly it effectively ended the PUTERA-AMCJA conceptualization of 
what the term Melayu (Malay) should mean.   
 
2.5 The Birth of Inter-Ethnic Political Coalition and Consociationalism 
The creation of Federation of Malaya based on the Revised Constitutional Proposal 
of Anglo-Malay Working Committee marked the beginning of an armed rebellion in 
Malaya. The key factor that ignited the revolt was the ethnic issue, specifically 
Malay special privileges. The communists and radicals, among them the leaders of 
the PUTERA-AMCJA, launched an armed attack and exploited the grievances and 
communal fears in order to lure rural Malays away from UMNO (Stockwell, 1977, p. 
500). The Malay elites of UMNO became increasingly fearful of the growing non-
Malay influence. This in turn drove the Malay elites of UMNO to take necessary 
measures to preserve their privilege. In achieving this, the Malay elites of UMNO 
defended and championed Malay and Islam by making early independence an 
UMNO primary and steadfast goal.  
18 Based on this political framework, the sovereignty of the Malay rulers (Sultans) were restored and 
the citizenship rules tightened in which one can only qualify for Malayan citizenship if one has 
resided in Malaya for 15 years, able to speak English or Malay, declare Malaya as their permanent 
settlement, and confirmed as having good character.  
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The UMNO reorganized itself following the resignation of Dato Onn Jafar as the 
president in 1951 as a result of opposition among the Malay elites within UMNO 
against his proposal to collaborate with other ethnic based political parties. Baginda 
(2016) and Ong (1998) in explaining this stressed that by early 1950 Dato Onn Jafar 
had become increasingly disgusted with what he considered UMNO communal 
politics and became more focused on ending the growing uneasy relationship 
between Malays and non-Malays. He called for party membership to be opened to all 
Malayans irrespective of their race. He also suggested that UMNO be renamed the 
United Malayans National Organization. However, his suggestion was rejected by 
majority of the Malay elites within UMNO. As a result, Dato Onn resigned from 
UMNO on August 26th, 1951 to form the Independence of Malayan Party (IMP) 
which failed to receive sufficient backing from the people of Malaya.  
He was succeeded by Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj (hereafter referred to as 
Tunku), a Malay aristocrat. As soon as he was elected as UMNO’s president, Tunku 
announced his determination to achieve early merdeka (independence) by initiating a 
series of negotiations with the British administration. Nevertheless, as discussed 
earlier the British made self-government conditional on the various ethnic parties 
forming a political coalition to manage the country. On January 1952, Tunku as the 
new leader of UMNO held a meeting with Tan Cheng Lock as the leader of newly 
formed Chinese party called Malayan Chinese Association (MCA, renamed 
Malaysian Chinese Association). The ad-hoc meeting was aimed at forming a 
political alliance between UMNO and MCA to contest the Kuala Lumpur Municipal 
Council election (Hing & Ong, 1987; Gomez, 2010) on January 9th, and to prevent 
inter-ethnic crisis from worsening (Oong, 2000). The UMNO-MCA alliance 
demonstrated the possibility of a sustained inter-ethnic political cooperation in 
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Malay. This political collaboration differed from that of earlier PUTERA-AMCJA 
inter-ethnic cooperation that was based on political and economic equality among the 
citizens of Malaya. The UMNO-MCA alliance was based on political expediency 
and to facilitate the independence of Malaya. This political collaboration did not 
jeopardize the interests of Malays, rather it strengthened their political access as the 
alliance was UMNO led and dominated. In fact, MCA leaders “were willing to play 
junior partner to an UMNO that was prepared to accede to the Chinese citizenship 
demand” (Horowitz, 1985, p. 407).  
Despite the unhappiness regarding Malay special privileges, political collaboration 
between the Malays and the Chinese, or to be more specific  between UMNO and 
MCA, resulted in the success of the UMNO-MCA alliance; the alliance won 9 of the 
12 contested municipal council seats in 1952 (Yaakop 2014, p. 29). The remaining 
three seats were won by the IMP (2 seats) and an independent (1 seat). Encouraged 
by the success of the Kuala Lumpur Municipal Council election, the political alliance 
between the Malay and the non-Malay was expanded in 1954 to include the Malayan 
Indian Congress (MIC, renamed Malaysian Indian Congress in 1963). UMNO, 
MCA, and MIC cooperation resulted in the formation of the Alliance Party (Parti 
Perikatan, AP). The AP contested the 1955 first Malaya legislative council election 
in which it won a landslide victory, 51 out of 52 seats19. This led to the formation of 
National Executive Committee (NEC), the primary decision-making body of AP, 
comprising six representatives each from UMNO and MCA, and three from MIC.   
The victory of AP in this election and the formation of NEC convinced the British 
“that inter-communal coalition or organizationally distinct ethnic parties offering a 
19 The remaining seats went to Parti Islam Se-Malaya (Pan-Malayan Islamic Party, PAS). 
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common slate of candidates, and fully endorsed by UMNO leadership, could be 
electorally successful through the mobilization of Malay ethnic loyalties and votes 
for non-Malay candidates” (Kabner, 2009, p. 58). Also, the success of AP in winning 
almost all available seats left the British no choice other than to give Malaya the 
chance for self-government. Thus, on February 9th, 1956 the British finally agreed to 
grant it independence through the London Independence Treaty signed by Tunku and 
the British Government. Even so, when the independence of Malaya became 
inevitable, Britain requested that a new constitution be drafted before Malaya be 
officially declared an independent country. The Reid Commission was established to 
draft the constitution which led to political compromises between AP leaders who 
formally endorsed the concept of Malay special rights as per Article 153 of the 
Malayan constitution; in return the non-Malay would be granted equal citizenship 
rights which allowed them to join the public services, military and own land. 
Therefore, despite granting of equal citizenship rights, the Malay special privileges 
remained. The other concession made by the non-Malays was to agree that Islam be 
the official religion of the Federation (Article 3), Malay as the national language 
(Article 152), and the Sultans as head of states (Loh, 1982, p. 7). It was with this 
agreement that the constitutional contract was signed in 1957.  
The constitution was approved by the Federal Legislature, thus leading to the 
declaration of independence of Malaya by Tunku on August 31st, 1957. Post-colonial 
Malaya become a semi-democratic country based on ‘elite accommodation’, a 
governmental practice described by Means (1991) as a system that required 
mobilization of each ethnic group by its elite and in turn rank and file compliance for 
agreed policies. This democratic system became the very basis for Malayan and 
thereafter Malaysian consociationalism described by Vorys (1975) as a government 
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characterized by vertical mobilization of the Malays, Chinese, and Indian 
communities, and horizontal solidarity of the Malay, Chinese, and Indian political 
leaders. This became the driving force of ethnic politics in the newly independent 
state of Malaya.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the origin of ethnic politics in West Malaysia. In 
retrospective, it is clear that the arrival of Islam in pre-independent Malaya (West 
Malaysia) contributed to the construction of Malay ethno-religious identity which 
unified the Malay elites and the rakyat. At the core of the Islamic teaching is 
unwavering loyalty to the leaders, especially the Sultans. Safeguarding the elites’ 
privilege, which the rakyat equated with protecting the privilege of Malay as a 
whole, burned ever stronger over the years before independence, underlining the 
development of ethnic politics. The presence of the colonial powers made the Malays 
more protective of their imaginary superior status. The privileges granted to the 
Malays were designed to separate the citizens for mainly economic and political 
purposes. The colonial policies were all designed to increase the dependence of 
Malays on their elites and indirectly on the colonial power itself (Abraham, 1997). 
These administrative practices created mistrust among the different ethnic groups 
pitting the Malays against the non-Malays.  
The British administrative practices were driven by their economic interests secured 
through their divide and rule policy. This triggered Malays’ hatred against the non-
Malays, especially the Chinese. The British regarded the Chinese as immigrants and 
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not as citizens as they were brought in for economic purposes but this eventually 
resulted in the Chinese dominating the post-colonial West Malaysian economy. At 
the same time, the colonial power recognized the Malays as the ‘rightful owners’ of 
Malaya and ignored the fact that the Orang Asli were the prior inhabitants of the 
land. They privileged the Malays in the political arena, but systematically 
marginalized them economically. This provoked the Malay desire to take the 
necessary effort to consolidate their ethnic privilege and status not only in politics, 
but also in economics. This desire was consolidated following the Japanese rule over 
Malaya during WWII and their decision to apply pro-Malay policy both in political 
and economic arenas. Malay efforts to protect their ethnic privilege and status 
continued after WWII ended through their strong opposition to the returned British 
Malayan Union proposal. The strong opposition towards the Malayan Union that 
recognized the non-Malays as citizens was due to the Malay perception that they 
were being punished by the British for being pro-Japanese during the Japanese rule 
in Malaya. The founding of UMNO in 1946 reflected the rising desire among the 
Malays to protect their ethnic privilege and status, which also referred to Malay 
special rights. Both Onn Jaffar and Tunku Abdul Rahman vowed to protect the 
Malay special rights.    
Their feeling of superiority became the driving force to seek independence from the 
British. As Malay elites of UMNO held negotiations with the British for 
independence the British made it a condition that it would grant independence to 
Malaya only if the ethnic majority collaborated with all major ethnic groups. As a 
result, inter-ethnic political collaboration at the elite level and a constitutional 
contract between the Malay, Chinese and Indians was established resulting in the 
creation of a consociational system. This arrangement became the key-feature of the 
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political life in the post-colonial Malaya organized along ethnic lines. It 
characterized the post-colonial Malaya elite-rakyat relations.  
Thus, ethno-religious identity and the arrival of immigrants led to the creation of a 
plural society and the politicization of ethnicity. Ethnic politicization strengthened 
within the consociational democratic system. This led to increasing tension among 
the ethnic groups within the country. These are the central themes of ethnic politics 
in post-colonial Malaya that will be discussed in the following chapter. 
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 Chapter 3: Ethnic Politics in Post-Colonial Malaya (West Malaysia)  
 
3.1 Introduction  
Ethnic politics continued to define post-colonial Malaya renamed the Federation of 
Malaya in 1957 and after that became part of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963. 
The 1957 constitution set the basis for ethnic politics in a constitutional contract that 
recognized ethnicity as a legitimate parameter in political mobilization in the 
country. According to Vorys (1975), for example, the Malaya constitution recognizes 
ethnicity as a legitimate tool in political mobilization and in ongoing ethnic politics 
based on consociational principles in post-colonial Malaya. After all, under this 
political system, political leaders from different ethnic groups were required to form 
what Lijphat (1968) calls a ‘grand coalition’ to minimize interethnic political 
competition and avert ethnic conflicts from escalating (Leith & Solomon, 2001). 
Thus, post-colonial Malaya witnessed the establishment of a legitimate and solid 
Malay-led inter-ethnic coalition government that was later expanded to Borneo 
territories.  
This chapter analyses the continuity of ethnic politics that gained strength in post-
colonial Malaya (West Malaysia), and Borneo (East Malaysia). This chapter 
discusses the ethnic-based coalition government in post-colonial Malaya. This is 
followed by an examination of key issues behind the strengthening of ethnic politics 
in this region. The chapter ends with a discussion of the effort by the coalition 
government or to be more specific the Malay leaders to maintain power through 
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manipulation of the ethnic divide which resulted in the uneasy relationship between 
different ethnic communities. This laid the ground work for the elites to develop, 
escalate and diffuse ethnic politics in East Malaysia, in particular Sabah. 
 
3.2 Legitimacy of Ethnic Based Coalition Government in Post-Colonial Malaya 
The ethnic based coalition government was legitimized through the establishment of 
a Malay-led Alliance Party that was later renamed the Malay-led Barisan Nasional 
(National Front, BN) in 1973 comprising UMNO, MCA and MIC representing the 
Malays, Chinese and Indians respectively (Jesudason, 2001). The Malay elites of 
UMNO positioned themselves as defender of Ketuanan Melayu (Malay supremacy), 
which required them to retain the country’s ethnic edifice and through it the ruling 
party’s political survival (Balasubramaniam, 2006). In fact, UMNO advanced the 
idea of ethnicity as a formal sociological category to ensure steady political support 
from the Malays, rejecting the demands of MCA leaders such as Lim Chong Eu and 
Tan Cheng Lock to increase MCA’s seats from 28 to 40 (out of a total 104) in the 
1959 election. This was to ensure most seats to UMNO, thus strengthening Malay 
dominance over other ethnic groups as desired by the Malay commoners (Wade, 
2009).  
Despite this decision, Tunku eventually allocated 31 seats for MCA and 4 for MIC. 
The remaining 69 seats, however, were allocated to UMNO to allow a two-third 
majority of seats for the Malays within the coalition. This distribution of seats led to 
the victory of the UMNO-led coalition which managed to secure 74 out of 104 
contested seats, allowing the coalition to win a two-thirds parliamentary majority 
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with UMNO successfully winning 52 out of 69 contested seats, and MCA and MIC 
won 19 and 3 respectively. The victory gave Tunku confidence to fully promote 
preferential policies for the Malays through the amendment of the constitution. 
Tunku’s determination to pursue preferential policies for the Malay was reflected in 
the 1962 amendment of the constitution, namely paragraph 2(c) of the 13 schedule, 
which states that “the number of electors within each constituency in a state ought to 
be approximately equal except that, having regard to the greater difficulty of 
reaching electors in the country districts and the other disadvantages facing rural 
constituencies, a measure of weightage for area ought to be given to such a 
constituency” (Government of Malaya 1962, p. 212). As it required rural weightage 
in the determination of electoral districts, the amendment provided a high 
representation of Malays in the parliament because the majority of the rural 
population were Malays.  
Therefore, 1960 marked the beginning of what Clark and Pietch (2014) called 
‘gerrymandering through the exercise of re-delineation of electoral boundaries’ to 
provide electoral advantage to the Malays (Wade, 2009). The redrawing of electoral 
boundaries by the Election Commision (EC) were instrumental in providing an 
electoral advantage for UMNO as the constituencies were Malay dominated 
(Pandiyan, 2016). In the constituency of Penang Selatan, for example, Malay voters 
numbered only 10,869 (35.17% of the 30,903 registered voters) in 1959, compared to 
the number of non-Malay voters (20,000 individuals; 64.83%). However, the number 
of Malay voters increased to 22,327 individuals (55.42% of the 40,291 registered 
voters) in the 1964 election, while the number of non-Malay voters declined to 
17,964 following the 1960 re-delineation. As a result, the UMNO candidate (Ismail 
Idris) won this constituency with a larger majority of 3,517 in 1964 (an increase of 
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3,259 majority compared to only 258 in 1959 election). Concurrently, UMNO’s 
coalition partners, especially MCA also benefited. The victory of MCA and MIC in 
various seats during 1964 election such as Ulu Kinta (Perak), Setapak (Selangor), 
Bandar Melaka (Malacca), Port Dickson (Negri Sembilan) and Alor Setar (Kedah) 
was the result of EC’s decision to redraw the existing electoral boundaries (Pandiyan, 
2016). 
This gerrymandering was instrumental for the victory of the coalition in the 1964 
election, securing 89 out of 104 contested parliamentary seats (an increase of 12 
seats). The UMNO captured 59 seats (an increase of 7 seats), and MCA and MIC 
won 27 (an increase of 8 seats) and 3 seats respectively. The increase in the number 
of seats won by the coalition largely contributed to the EC’s decision to re-delineate 
the existing electoral districts based on ethnic proportionality (Wade, 2009). As the 
number of seats won by the UMNO was greater than those of its coalition partners, 
the MCA and MIC, the Malay domination over Malayan politics strengthened.  
As to further strengthening the Malay domination, the term bumiputra literally 
meaning ‘son of the soil’20 coined by the ruling party referred to native Malays as 
sole inheritors of the land – the legitimate inhabitants (Derich, 2002, p. 47). Although 
the concept of bumiputra, as Siddique and Suryadinata (1982) noted, first appeared 
in the Malayan newspaper Seruan Azhar in June 1927 through an article written by 
Lufti titled Memereksa darihal bumiputra dengan bangsa asing (Examining the 
relationship between bumiputra and foreigners), the use of this term became popular 
only after the Malay leaders of UMNO began to extensively use it in their politically 
driven agenda. The Malay-led government decision to hold a series of Malay 
20 The concept of bumiputra is derived from the Malay words bumi (earth or land) and putra (son).  
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Economic Congress during the early years of independence led to the first bumiputra 
Economic Congress in 1965, which reflected the determination among Malay leaders 
who dominated the Malayan government to popularise and formalize the use of term 
bumiputra.  
Local academics often portray the congress, which was initiated by Razak Hussein, a 
Deputy Prime Minister of Malaya at that time, as held mainly to promote Malay 
capitalism following the growing pressure from Malay middle class for a greater 
share of the country’s wealth (Andaya & Andaya, 1982). It appeared, however, that 
the move was actually the Malay leaders’ way of distinguishing further the Malays as 
the indigenous people and the non-Malays as the non-indigenous members of 
Malayan society. Arguably, the reason for this was the fear of being subordinated to 
the non-Malays (Mauzy, 2006). The social label of bumiputra accorded and 
safeguarded the Malay special position within the Malayan Federation, inferring that 
other ethnic groups, labelled by the government as non-bumiputra were required to 
respect such a status (Chye, 2010). The constitution drafted by the Reid Commission 
released on February 21st, 1957 allowed this to happen by stating that “provision 
should be made in the Constitution for the safeguarding of the special position of the 
Malay and the legitimate interests of the other communities” (Ratuva, 2013, p. 72).  
This concept of ‘son of the soil’ or the ‘original people’ recognised the socio-
political status accorded to the Malays over other ethnic groups by the British since 
1771, even though the Orang Asli were the real original people in Malaya and many 
Malays themselves had migrated from Indonesia (Crouch, 2001). It was also a socio-
political status which was once used by the British to propagate the idea that the 
Malays as the ‘son of the soil’ were in need of protection against the perceived 
76 
 
socioeconomic threat from Chinese immigrants through the introduction of 
preferential rights in various spheres of society (Haque, 2003). Nevertheless, as the 
British had only granted the status of ‘son of the soil’ to the Malays, the Orang Asli 
were effectively excluded from this so-called special protection. As the Equal Right 
Trust through its ‘report on pattern of discrimination and inequality in Malaysia’ 
stated, “ironically, the same level of protection was not accorded to the Orang Asli 
(original people, natural people or aboriginal people in Malaya) – the 18 tribes who 
had a longer history of settlement in the country” (2012, p. 22). Accordingly, when 
Malaya gained self-rule, the special position of the Malays (and by extension the 
exclusion of the Orang Asli from such privileges) was consolidated by the Malay-led 
Alliance government.  
Article 153 of the Federal Constitution underscores and legitimizes this Malay socio-
political special position. Article 153 states that the special position of the Malays, 
defined by the ruling Malay-led coalition government as bumiputra and as the sole 
inheritors of the land and legitimate inheritors of Malaya, will always be safeguarded 
(Derichs, 2002). The bumiputra label then, as Mauzy (1988) observed, not only led 
to the division between the Malay and the non-Malay communities, but also justified 
the Malay political dominance in the AP. The leaders of this ruling ethnic-based 
coalition consisting of UMNO, MCA, and MIC (Jesudason, 2001) agreed with the 
idea of power sharing where the Malays would have a dominant position in both 
areas (Haque, 2003, p. 240; Means, 1986). Thus, UMNO elites became more 
influential in Malayan politics and public administration following the success of AP 
and later BN in repeatedly winning two thirds of parliamentary seats (except in the 
2008 and 2013 General Elections), thus leaving the non-Malays or the non-
bumiputra with minor political and public administrative roles (Lee, 1999).  
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The growing Malay bumiputra influence in politics and public administration that 
coincided with the marginalization of non-bumiputra created widespread 
dissatisfaction among the latter. They began to see Malay hegemony as an ideology 
that served to politically dominate them (Ishak, 2002). Koon (1996) observed that the 
implementation of Malay rights since 1957 paradoxically had brought significantly 
less ‘self-rule’ for the non-bumiputra, in particular the Chinese as it ended their 
economic autonomy in particular. In explaining this issue, Pye (1986) pointed out 
that Confucian culture that emphasized the importance of social harmony provided 
no guidelines for Chinese leaders to function in a non-Confucian context. He argued 
that “the Chinese concepts of authority are entirely premised on the assumption that 
both the omnipotent leader and his dutiful subordinates are Chinese, that a Chinese 
leader should be the subordinate of a ‘foreigner’ is culturally unthinkable…any 
Chinese who act as a leader must be an imposter, if he is subservient to the Malay 
majority leadership” (Pye, 1985, p. 251). Thus, this set the stage for the decline in 
popularity of MCA (as well as MIC) among their own peoples.  
In this regard, the leaders of both ethnic parties who supported the pro-Malay 
bumiputra or what Koon (1996) calls the pro-UMNO constitutional deal were 
regarded by the majority of Chinese and Indians as self-serving who sold off their 
peoples’ rights for their own political interests. For them their party should represent 
the community’s interests, namely for full citizenship rights, preservation of their 
own language and schools, and unrestricted economic advancement. However, non-
bumiputra opportunity for economic advancement (Pye, 1985) was affected by the 
constitutional guarantees for Malay special privileges that eventually concentrated 
economic power in the hands of the Malays, thus obstructing the advance of the non-
Malays. This led to the growing popularity of multi-racial parties such as the Labour 
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Party (renamed Democratic Action Party, DAP on October 11th, 1965) that stood 
against Malay hegemony.   
 
3.3 The Rise of Multiracial Parties: Early Challenges to Malay-led Ethnic Based 
Coalition  
When the political influence of multi-racial parties began to grow, the Malay elites of 
UMNO as the backbone of Alliance Party realized the importance of maintaining the 
existing political structure where Malays predominate. Mustapha (1999) opined that 
the decline of ethnic politics could pose a grave threat to the Alliance Party and 
ultimately UMNO’s political dominance. They feared that if the popularity of multi-
racial parties strengthened, it might weaken both MCA and MIC political support 
from the non-bumiputras. Such a development would spell an end to the peculiar 
system of ethnic based coalition and also see the abolition of Malay special rights.  
Adding to fears of a possible end to Malay-led inter-ethnic coalition government, the 
first ten years after independence saw a significant increase in the population of non-
bumiputra communities. The 1963 census, as reported by the Department of 
Statistics Malaysia (1974) indicated the Malays accounted for slightly more than half 
of the population of Malaya (51.23%, or 3,900,500 of 7,614,200 national 
population), while the Chinese and Indian made up of 47.35% (3,605,300) of the 
population. The Malay elites of UMNO felt that if this continued, ethnic politics and 
specifically their strong grip of Malaya’s politics would be in a great danger (Luping, 
1985).  
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The fear of a possible end to their strong grip of Malaya’s politics strengthened when 
Lee Kuan Yew, the president of Singapore proposed to join the Federation of Malaya 
to manage the communist threat to his PAP government21. The Malay elites feared 
that this could tip the racial balance in favour of the Chinese. There were genuine 
concerns that the increased number of non-bumiputra would give rise to a political 
system not based on ethnicity and racial divide under Malay domination as the 
inclusion of Singapore in the federation of Malaya would see the non-bumiputra 
outnumber the Malay bumiputra. This would allow non-bumiputra to dominate 
Malayan politics due to the application of the consociational principle of majority 
rule. This made efforts to maintain Malay bumiputra numerical advantage over non-
bumiputra essential. As a matter of fact, the 1957 census indicated that the merger of 
both countries would see the non-bumiputra outnumber the bumiputra by over one 
million people, and the Chinese population alone without the Indians and Others 
would outnumber the bumiputra by 100,000 people (see Malaya, Annual Report on 
the Federation of Malaya, 1958; Malaya, Federation of Malaya Official Yearbook, 
1961).   
Though the non-bumiputra were not interested in dominating Malaysian politics, 
they had been exposed to the influence of Communist Party of Malaya (CPM). Since 
1948, CPM had been strongly aligned with the left-wing coalition of Malay and non-
Malay organizations (PUTERA-AMCJA) in opposing the terms of the Anglo-Malay 
1948 Federation of Malaya Agreement. They presented a set of counter demands to 
the British government that were more progressive and advanced than those of  
UMNO. They asked for self-rule for the Federation of Malaya, a fully elected 
21 Lee Kuan Yew’s Peoples’ Action Party (PAP) government was increasingly under communist 
threat and the Singapore leader himself was of the opinion that Singapore’s future was best secured by 
joining Malaysia (Luping, 1985, p. 50).  
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legislature, and democracy for the people of Malaya for an interim period to be 
followed by the granting of independence. Their political manifesto, ‘The People’s 
Constitution for Malaya’, demanded the introduction of a nationality called Melayu 
(Malay) for all its citizens, Malay to be adopted as the national language and all the 
Malay rulers to be regarded as constitutional monarchs. This manifesto became an 
important blueprint for an attempt to establish a united nation of all ethnic groups 
who viewed Malaya as their home and the object of their loyalty. The British 
government, however, rejected this demand. Following this, headed by Chin Peng, 
the CPM turned to opposing this political system through insurgency that lasted until 
1960. Throughout this period of insurgency CPM continued to influence the Chinese 
community to oppose the Malay-led ruling coalition government by emphasizing the 
idea that Malays were no longer the ‘ethnic core’ of the nation, and to state that all 
races should be treated equally (Cheah, 2009). In addition, CPM compromised its 
agreement on the national language as it rejected Malay as the national language and 
demanded that the languages of the three major ethnic groups in Malaya be made 
official languages. In response to the insurgency the newly created Malayan 
government with the help of the British implemented the so-called Briggs Plan22, a 
resettlement program initiated by a committee under Sir Harold Briggs, the director 
of operations. Despite the end of insurgency, the MCP opposition against the Malay-
led political system instilled strong desire among the non-bumiputra to continuously 
22 Briggs Plan was an alternative way to end the insurgency through two resettlement programs. The 
first was to regroup people living near jungles and hills which were considered ‘security zones’ into 
existing villages, which were thereby enlarged, while others became suburban appendages to towns, 
sited near main roads easily accessible to government security forces. The majority (80%) of these 
‘new villages’ were in the western part of Malaya Peninsula and together 480 of them were 
established between 1957  and 1960 and involved the transfer of 573,000 people, 86% of whom were 
Chinese. The settlement, enclosed by barbed wire and teir entrances guarded by police-posts, had been 
linked to ‘concentration camps, but they were mitigated by the provision of facilities such as electric 
lights, piped water, schools and clinics. The second exercise was the regrouping of laborers on rubber 
estates, tin mines, factories and sawmills and other places of employment. Such exercise involved a 
total of 650,000 people of different races (Cheah, 2009, p. 144). 
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oppose Malay domination. The non-bumiputra began to turn their political support 
away from MCA and MIC, and support politicians such as Lim Kit Siang who 
strongly aligned himself with the idea of equal citizenship rights. This led to a 
growing interest among the non-bumiputra to establish a multiracial party, which 
was realized later in 1965 with the establishment of the Democratic Action Party 
(DAP) by Lim Kit Siang.  
In light of the growing interest among non-bumiputra to support a multiracial party, 
the Malay elites of UMNO eventually began to take relevant steps to ensure 
bumiputra numerical advantage over non-bumiputra (Luping (1985).  
 
3.4 The Formation of Malaysia: Maintaining Malay-led Ethnic Based Coalition  
The idea of a merger between Malaya and the British colonies of Singapore, Sabah, 
Sarawak and Brunei was nothing new. In fact, the British government had raised this 
idea following the signing of Atlantic Charter by U.S. President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill on August 14th, 1941. This 
joint policy statement emphasized the commitment of the United States of America 
and United Kingdom to the goal of self-government (the policy of decolonization) 
after World War II. Apart from that, this policy envisaged integrating small political 
units into bigger political blocs in the interests of administrative efficiency, economic 
development, political stability and defense viability (Singh, 2015; Singh, 1998; 
Stockwell, 1979). Hence, in 1942 the Eastern Department of the Colonial Office 
headed by Edward Gent proposed a ‘Grand Design’ for Southeast Asia post-World 
War II called ‘a federation’ of all British territories in the Malaya-Borneo region as a 
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precursor for granting self-government (Singh, 2015). This Grand Design was to be 
achieved in stages through political integration between Malaya and Singapore and 
between North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei23. It was with this aspiration the British 
government introduced measures towards self-rule.   
The effort to integrate these two separate blocs, however, failed due to political, 
economic and social development problems in these regions. As a result, the British 
government decided to revive the ‘Grand Design’ in 1949 by creating the post of 
British Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia to act as a coordinating body for 
these regions. This post was held by Malcolm MacDonald advised by Secretary of 
State for the Colonies Creech-Jones to coordinate administration between the 
governments in their area of authority. In order to perform this task, the 
Commissioner-General introduced the branches of the Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Association (CPA)24 in various British territories. The creation of CPA enabled him 
to foster much regional solidarity and goodwill among the local leaders; several CPA 
meetings were held and through these meetings, he elicited cooperation from the 
local leaders (Singh, 2015) to push vigorously for the realization of the ‘Grand 
Design’.  
23 This early effort of creating the ‘Grand Design’ was confirmed by J.D. Higham of the Colonial 
Office. The minutes dated 20. 01. 1953 C.O. 1022/61, Item 19. 192, J.D. Higham was quoted as 
saying “our original idea was that Malaya and Singapore would form one bloc and Sarawak, North 
Borneo and Brunei, another, and that the two blocs might then merge into some sort of 
confederation”.  
24 The CPA in pre-independence Malaya was an organisation that works to support the British 
government in identifying, developing and implementing benchmarks of good governance, democracy 
and human rights. It managed by an Executive Committee which reported to the Commissioner-
General.   
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The Commissioner-General’s aspiration for a political union at this stage received 
strong support from the first Chief Minister of Singapore, David Marshall in 195525, 
and after that by the first Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew in 1959. Lee 
Kuan Yew saw the merger as an effective way of making Tunku’s government take 
over responsibility for the island’s security as he was reluctant to act against the 
communists who had supported the PAP and helped it come to power (Cheah, 2003). 
Despite agreeing that Singapore’s security was under threat from the communists, 
Tunku had strongly opposed the merger because he felt that Malaya should not be 
implicated in this problem. Tunku said, “in a Malaya-Singapore merger, the Malays 
might be without the protection of the constitution, find themselves at a total loss in 
the only homeland they had. This might eventually mean trouble as an outcome. And 
who wanted that? ...Singapore vis-à-vis Malaya was not as simple as idealists might 
think” (Cheah, 2003, p. 194). 
However, during the Conference of Foreign Journalists Association of Southeast 
Asia at the Adelphi hotel on May 27, 1961, Tunku in his speech dropped his earlier 
opposition to such an idea by announcing his agreement for a merger between 
Malaya and Singapore. His condition was that North Borneo (Sabah), Sarawak and 
Brunei be included in the new federation to maintain a racial balance. He said, 
“Malaya today as a nation realises that she cannot stand alone and in 
isolation…Sooner or later she should have an understanding with Britain and the 
peoples of the territories of Singapore, North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak. It is 
premature for me to say now how this closer understanding can be brought about, but 
it is inevitable that we should look ahead to this objective and think of a plan 
25 The British ‘Grand Design’ was temporarily halted in 1957 following its decision to grant 
independence to Malaya in 1957. The British however, continued its efforts to push for a ‘Grand 
Design’ in the following years.      
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whereby these territories can be brought closed together in political and economic 
cooperation” (Singh, 2015, p. 214). 
The reason for the about-turn on the part of Tunku to form what he called ‘Mighty 
Malaysia’ was to ensure that the Malay bumiputra remain a majority and the 
politically dominant ethnic group in the country (Luping, 1985). The 1962 census 
showed that the inclusion of Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei in the federation of 
Malaysia would see the bumiputra comprising Malays and the indigenous peoples of 
these countries outnumbered the non-bumiputra by more than 1,600,000 (see US 
Bureau of the Census, 1978, pp. 192-193; Population Reference Bureau, 1962). 
Therefore, Tunku saw the merger as crucial for the maintenance of bumiputra 
majority status as he and other Malayan leaders acknowledged the indigenous people 
in these British colonies as being culturally similar to Malays in Malaya. This 
provided a reason to categorize the people of Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei as 
bumiputra26. On this point Ongkili wrote, “increasingly in the early sixties, Malayan 
leaders were acknowledging that the indigenous people of Borneo territories could be 
classified as Malays. Malayan ambassador to Indonesia, Senu Abdul Rahman had 
made a six-day visit to North Borneo (Sabah) in 1960. In his report, he classified the 
indigenous population of Borneo as Malays. The addition of the Borneo territories 
was therefore seen as not imperiling the position of the Malays in the Peninsular. The 
indigenous population of Borneo would help to balance the Chinese majority in 
Singapore” (2003, pp. 197-198). 
26 The concept of Bumiputra is derived from the Malay words Bumi (earth or land) and Putra (son). It 
is a social identity coined and used by Tunku to lump together the Malays and the indigenous people 
of Borneo, and is remained in use until today in Malaysia.  
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In a similar vein, Luping (1985) also argued that Tunku invited the leaders of Sabah, 
Sarawak and Brunei to join the Federation of Malaysia because he wanted to ensure 
bumiputra numerical advantage and UMNO’s strong grip on the country’s politics. 
Maintaining bumiputra numerical advantage through the inclusion of these British 
colonies could provide the ruling ethnic based coalition sources of political support 
through convincing the indigenous people of Sabah and Sarawak to favor this 
political arrangement. Most importantly, the consociational power-sharing principle, 
in particular the principle of proportional representation in the coalition government, 
was used to affirm the right of the ethnic majority to concentrate political power in 
their hands.  
A series of negotiations between the British government, Tunku, Lee and early 
leaders of Borneo territories set the stage for the merger. The negotiations focused on 
the conditions of a federation and began with the British announcement on October 
13th, 1961 that Tunku had accepted their invitation to London to discuss self-rule. 
After this negotiation, a white paper containing the points of agreement on a merger 
between Malaya and Singapore on November 22nd, 1961 was released. It was 
followed by the signing of a memorandum in Singapore for the formation of 
Malaysia on February 3rd, 1962 (Abisheganaden, 1963a, p. 1) by the CPA Committee 
Chairman, Fuad Stephens (Donald Stephens), witnessed by Khir Johari (representing 
the Federation of Malaya), Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore), O.K.K. Datu Mustapha Datu 
Harun (North Borneo), Teo Cheng Hoe (Sarawak) and Datuk Setia Pengiran Ali 
(Brunei).  
It is important to stress here that despite the presence of Datuk Setia Pengiran Ali of 
Brunei during the signing of the memorandum, the Brunei Sultanate had earlier 
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decided to withdraw from the planned merger. Their decision to withdraw from the 
merger was a result of a few factors. First, the Sultan believed that joining Malaysia 
would erode his power as he would not be the only monarch in the new political 
entity. Additionally, the Brunei Sultan knew petroleum revenue from his kingdom 
would be distributed to other members of the federation (Cheah, 2003, p. 94), which 
would have an impact on its economic development. Third, during the negotiations 
for the planned merger, the armed insurgency called the Brunei Revolt broke out on 
December 8th, 1962. The insurgency was a direct consequence of strong anti-colonial 
sentiment among the people of Brunei headed by Shaikh Ahmad Azahari of the 
Partai Ra’ayat Brunei (PRB) who heavily opposed the proposed merger with 
Malaya, Singapore and other Borneo territories (Majid, 2007).  
Nevertheless, the leaders from Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak were not 
deterred by the decision of Brunei to withdraw and proceeded to sign the 
memorandum. This memorandum recommended that the Cobbold Commission27, 
formed on January 17th, 1962 to determine whether the people of North Borneo and 
Sarawak supported the Malaysia federation proposal (Armstrong, 1963, p. 683; 
Ibrahim, 2005, p. 94) carry out its work on February 19th, 1962. This commission 
surveyed the opinion of the peoples of Sabah and Sarawak about the merger and on 
August 1st, 1962, the commission published the report called CMND 179428, which 
stated that the federation of Malaysia was in the best interests of Sabah and Sarawak. 
The Commission’s findings in summary stated that,  
27 The members of the Cobbold Commission were included Lord Cobbold (Chairman, Former Bank 
of England Governor), Wong Pow Nee (Chief Minister of Penang), Ghazali Shafie (Permanent 
Secretary to the Ministry of Foreign Affair, Malaya), Anthony Abell (former Governor of Sarawak), 
and Davidson Watherson (former Chief Secretary of Malaya).   
28 See Inter-Governmental Committee. (1962).  
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about one-third of the population of each territory strongly favour early 
realisation of Malaysia without too much concern about terms and conditions. 
Another third, many of them favourable to the Malaysia project, ask, with 
varying degrees of emphasis, for conditions and safeguards varying in nature 
and extent: the warmth of support among this category would be markedly 
influenced by a firm expression of opinion by Government that the detailed 
arrangements eventually agreed upon are in the best interests of the 
territories. The remaining third is divided between those who insist on 
independence before Malaya is considered and those who would strongly 
prefer to see British rule continue for some years to come. If the conditions 
and reservations which they have put forward could be substantially met, the 
second category referred to above would generally support the proposals. 
Moreover, once a firm decision was taken quite a number of the third 
category would be likely to abandon their opposition and decide to make the 
best of a doubtful job. There will remain a hard core, vocal and politically 
active, which will oppose Malaysia on any terms unless it is preceded by 
independence and self-government: this hard core might amount to near 20 
per cent of the population of Sarawak and somewhat less in North Borneo 
(Severino, 2011, p. 47-48). 
Based on this, however, one can argue that the people of both Sabah and Sarawak 
were not too keen on the Malaysia federation proposal. This was best described by 
Chin: “it is clear the Commission itself could only say with clarity that only one-third 
of the peoples of North Borneo and Sarawak fully supported the proposal without 
reservation. This was despite the massive propaganda undertaken by the colonial 
authorities. It is also clear that majority of the population, especially those in the 
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interior and the native population, were uneducated, and thus could not be expected 
to make an informed judgement” (2014a, p. 162)29.  
Nevertheless, despite this ambiguity, the report suggesting that the merger should go 
ahead was submitted to the British government and the Government of the 
Federation of Malaya on June 21st, 1962. Malaysian federation quickly became a step 
closer. This development, however, evoked strong domestic and international 
opposition. The domestic opposition came from political leaders in Malaya and 
Singapore. In Malaya, the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (now known as Pan-Malaysian 
Islamic Party, PAS) headed by Dr. Burhanuddin Al-Helmi30 insisted that Malaya 
should form a political union with Indonesia rather than with Singapore, Sabah, 
Sarawak and Brunei. The PAS leaders were of the opinion that the addition of Sabah, 
Sarawak and Brunei in the new federation would not be able to counterbalances the 
massive influx of Singaporean Chinese as they had less in common with the Malays 
compared with the peoples of Indonesia31. In Singapore, the idea of Malaysian 
federation was strongly opposed by the opposition Barisan Sosialis (Socialist Front, 
SF) headed by Dr. Lee Siew Choh32 who insisted that though they wanted 
29 The Cobbold Commission interviewed only about 4,000 people in both Sabah and Sarawak. This 
demonstrated that its recommendation on “the 1/3 of those interviewed supported the Malaysia idea, 
1/3 unsure but would support it if there were safeguards, 1/3 definitely opposed” was inaccurate as the 
report was based on the accumulative view of 0.88% (4,000) of Sabah population in 1960s (454,421) 
only. Most importantly, most of the interviewee were located in urban areas, places normally 
inhabited by non-indigenous such as Chinese and British. In addition, there is no specific information 
of whether the commission had specifically look at the economic, political and social impact of the 
formation of Malaysia on Sabah. However, social scientists such as Luping (1985) and Lim (2008) 
opined that the focus of interview was mainly on whether the people of Sabah were interested in the 
proposed political union in general, thus one certainly can agrue that the people of Sabah and Sarawak 
were not too keen on the Malaysia federation proposal.  
30 He was the president of PAS from 1959 to 1969 and has been described by the Malaysian Historian 
as who a radical nationalist and Islamic thinker who advocated Malay rights and proposed a political 
union with Indonesia.  
31 During this period, the PAS leaders were believed that the Malays in Malaya had more in common 
with the peoples in Indonesia than they did with the indigenous people in Borneo territories.  
32 The SF was formed on July 29th, 1961 and officially registered on August 31st, 1961 by the left-
wing members of PAP. 
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reunification with Malaya, it was not on the terms that Lee proposed, namely the 
sacrifice of local autonomy (Pingtjin, 2013, p. 13-15; Turnbull, 1977).  
At the international level, the opposition against Malaysia federation came from 
Philippines and Indonesia who argued that the proposal was nothing more than a 
‘British neo-colonial plot’ to encircle their territories (Cheah, 2003). It was the 
Indonesia opposition to the Malaysia federation that became the more serious 
because Sukarno, the Indonesian President, threatened a “political and economic 
confrontation” (Vorys, 1975, p. 154). The result of such threats led to the 
postponement of the merger though the Malaysia Agreement was signed in London 
on July 9th, 196333. This was because Tunku decided to end the pressure from both 
international parties by demanding the United Nation (UN) determine whether Sabah 
and Sarawak should be included in this new federation. Accordingly, the UN report 
dated September 14th, 1963 confirmed that majority of people in Sabah and Sarawak 
was in favor of this political union. As a result the Federation of Malaysia was 
officially declared on September 16th, 1963 by Tunku at Stadium Merdeka (Merdeka 
Stadium, Kuala Lumpur). It was witnessed by Yang Di-Pertuan Agong, Sultans, and 
the Governors of Singapore, Sabah, Sarawak and Penang with the conspicuous 
absence of Sultan Brunei (Abisheganaden, 1963b, p. 1) when his demand to be 
recognized as the most senior Malay Ruler and as the first Yang Di-Pertuan Agung 
(King) of the new federation (Mathews, 2013, p. 29) was rejected.  
33 The Malaysia Agreement was signed by representatives of British government (Harold Macmillan, 
Duncan Sandys and Lansdowne); the Federation of Malaya (T.A. Rahman, Abdul Razak, Tan Siew 
Sin, V.T. Sambanthan and S.A. Lim); North Borneo (Datu Mustapha Bin Datu Harun, D.A. Stephens, 
W.K.H. Jones, Khoo Siak Chiew, W.S. Holley and G.S. Sundang); Sarawak (P.E.H. Pike, T. Jugah, 
Abang Haji Mustapha, Ling Beng Siew and Abang Haji Openg); and Singapore (Lee Kuan Yew and 
Goh Keng Swee).   
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The new federation ensured bumiputra had numerical advantage over non-bumiputra 
communities thus preserving the supremacy of Malays through the maintenance of 
Malay-led coalition (Hazis, 2015). Indonesia refused to acknowledge this new 
nation-state and launched an undeclared war called Konfrontasi (meaning 
confrontation, from 1963 to 1966) though it was quickly quelled. In the new entity 
ethnic politics was reflected in the electoral victory of AP in 1964. The AP won 
85.6% (89 seats) of the parliamentary seats (104) contested in Malaya which at this 
point began to be known as West Malaysia: 59 seats went to UMNO, 27 to MCA and 
3 to MIC. By comparison, in the 1959 general election the AP had managed to win a 
total of 74 out of 104 contested seats (71.1%).  
Despite recognition of Malay-bumiputra socio-political dominance in the new 
federation, non-bumiputra communities, especially the Chinese, resisted the 
constitutional provision of Malay special rights.  
 
3.5 Internal Threats to AP: From Malaysian Malaysia to the 1969 Tragedy 
The non-bumiputra resistance against the constitutional provision of Malay socio-
political supremacy escalated when in May 1965 the Malaysian Solidarity 
Convention (MSC) was formed, led by Lee of PAP, following the merger between 
five Chinese dominated multi-ethnic opposition parties34. The MSC was formed to 
oppose the Article 153 of the Constitution of Malaysia that legitimated Malays as 
34 The MSC which composed of People Action Party (PAP), People’s Progressive Party (PPP), the 
United Democratic Party (UDP, later merged with Labour Party to form Parti Gerakan Rakyat 
Malaysia or the Malaysian People’s Movement Party, PGRM) and the People’s Progressive Party 
(PPP) from West Malaysia, and the Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP) and the Machinda Party 
(McP) from Sarawak was officially established in Sri Temasek, Singapore on May 9th, 1965 in an 
attempt to staunch the spread of communalism in the Federation of Malaysia (see “Grand opposition 
discuss grave trends….”, The Straits Times, May 10th, 1965, p. 1). 
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bumiputra of Malaysia and the most dominant ethnic groups within the Federation of 
Malaysia35.  The MSC created the concept of ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ which meant that 
all citizens of Malaysia were equal and that the nation-state was not defined by the 
supremacy of a particular ethnic group (Alex, 1968; Yee & Liow, 2013). Lee as the 
leader of the MSC, in announcing this during the Malaysian Parliament sitting on 
May 27th, 1965 proclaimed that  
support for the ideal of a Malaysian Malaysia means, in theory as well as in 
practice, educating and encouraging the various races in Malaysia to seek 
political affiliation not the basis of race and religion but on the basis of 
common political ideologies and common social and economic aspirations, 
which is the real basis of ensuring the emergence of a truly free, prosperous 
and equitable national community (Hill & Fee, 1995, p. 60).  
He also said,  
we cannot agree to anything but Malaysian Malaysia…we are prepared to 
play in accordance with the rules for five, ten and fifteen years, but the idea 
we present must come true…we will honor the constitution because we 
believe it can provide a solution to the problems of multiracial society in 
Malaysia…I would like to make this observation in moving this amendment. 
Loyalty to Malaysia is not equal to and not as the same as loyalty to the 
Alliance Party or the Alliance government. I am under no constitutional 
obligation to be loyal to the Alliance Party or the government, but I must be 
loyal to the constitution of Malaysia and I must obey the dicta of a 
35 This Article 153 also authorises the government to create Malay monopolies in various economic 
sectors. 
92 
 
                                                          
democratically elected government of Malaysia: I accept it…what this all is 
about? I thought the Constitution said we are all Malaysians. I said we had 
better decide now. Are we Malaysian or are we Malays? Because I cannot 
become a Malay. I can become a Malaysian and sixty-one percent of the 
people of Malaysia can be Malaysia, can be loyal to Malaysia, can accept the 
concept of Malaysia (Alex, 1968, p. 262-266). 
The proclamation of the ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ campaign was quickly stamped by 
Tunku and other Malay leaders of UMNO as a threat towards the position of Malays. 
In responding to such threats, Tunku evicted Singapore from the Federation of 
Malaysia in order to preserve AP’s strong grip on Malaysian politics and public 
administration (Luping, 1985). In announcing this, during the parliamentary sitting 
on August 8th, 1965 in Kuala Lumpur Tunku said,  
now, in the name of God the Compassionate, the Merciful, I, Tunku Abdul 
Rahman Putra Al-Haj Ibni Almahrum Sultan Abdul Hamid Shah, Prime 
Minister of Malaysia, with the concurrence and approval of His Majesty, 
Yang Dipertuan Agong of Malaysia, do hereby declare and proclaim that, as 
of the 9th day of August, in the year one thousand nine hundred and sixty five, 
Singapore shall cease to be a state of Malaysia and shall forever be an 
independent and sovereign state and separate from and independent of 
Malaysia, and that the government of Malaysia recognizes the present 
government of Singapore as an independent and sovereign government of 
Singapore and will always work in friendship and co-operation with it” 
(Government of Singapore, 1965, p. 4).  
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Arguably, this was because the eviction of Singapore from the Federation of 
Malaysia also meant the end of the uneasy political relations between UMNO of 
Malaya and PAP of Singapore, a relationship that could bring about the end of Malay 
socio-political supremacy status. This tense political relation emerged due to the 
determination of both Malay elites of UMNO and Chinese elites of PAP to topple 
each other. In fact, in an attempt to tip over PAP, UMNO participated in Singapore’s 
1963 election. Unfortunately it was unable to win any seats contested by PAP. As a 
response, in 1964 Malaysian general election, PAP placed its candidates in West 
Malaysia to challenge UMNO where it managed to win Bangsar parliamentary seat. 
The success of PAP in acquiring Bangsar that had been an UMNO-Alliance Party 
stronghold quickly ignited Tunku’s fear of the possible growing influence of PAP 
among the non-bumiputra voters, and drove him to make an agreement with Lee 
Kuan Yew of PAP that the UMNO-Alliance Party would not get involved in 
Singapore’s politics (Sopiee, 2005). However, some of the UMNO members 
disagreed with Tunku as they accused Lee of harassing Malays and denied them their 
socio-political special rights (Kwa, Heng & Tan, 2009). These accusations 
perpetuated the tense relationship between UMNO and PAP.  
As the UMNO-PAP relationship simmered, some of the AP leaders urged the central 
government to take constitutional measures to evict Singapore from Malaysia. The 
reason for that call was based on racial and religious issues. They accused Lee of 
being a troublemaker due to his decision to introduce the concept of ‘Malaysian 
Malaysia’. In this regard, some of the Alliance leaders such as T.H. Tan and Saidon 
Kechut described Lee as being anti-Malay, unhappy with Islam as the state religion, 
unpatriotic, greedy for power, and disrespectful to the Malay ruler and the head of 
the nation (The Senate, 1965). Guided by these accusations, the Alliance leaders 
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eventually believed that excluding Singapore from Malaysia federation would be the 
only way of ending the tense relationship. Consequently, on August 9th, 1965 the 
parliament voted in favor of Singapore’s expulsion from Malaysia.  
Nevertheless, the expulsion of Singapore from the Malaysia federation did not mean 
the end of tense relationship between the Malays as the bumiputra and the non-
bumiputra. In the aftermath of 1969 general election, it appeared that the ruling AP 
was returned to power but with less than its traditional two-thirds majority 
parliamentary in the parliament. The AP won only 76 out of a total of 144 
parliamentary seats throughout Malaysia (Drumond & Hawkins, 1970; Ratnam & 
Milne, 1970; Rudner, 1970), while the opposition parties composed largely of multi-
ethnic parties such as Democratic Action Party (DAP), Pan Malayan Islamic Party 
(PMIP), People Progressive Party (PPP), Partai Rakyat (Peoples’ Party, PR), Parti 
Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Malaysian People’s Movement Party, GERAKAN and 
Independence gained 68 parliamentary seats. This suggested that neither the Alliance 
Party nor the opposition commanded an absolute majority in the parliament. The 
more shocking outcome was that AP not only continued to lose to PIMP (later 
known as PAS) in Kelantan, but also lost to GERAKAN in Penang. The failure of 
the AP in acquiring the two-thirds majority in the parliament was partly explained by 
the decline in MCA and MIC political support from the non-bumiputra. As Yackob 
(2006) observes the humiliating defeat of AP during this election at the hands of the 
predominantly Chinese opposition parties resulted from the non-bumiputra decision 
to reject the MCA and MIC as part of the AP. This phenomenon occurred especially 
in Selangor where the AP tied with the opposition for control of the Selangor state 
legislature for the first time since 1957. Both AP and opposition won 14 state seats. 
95 
 
In contrast in the 1964 state election the AP had won 24 of 28 state seats, while the 
opposition won only 4 seats.  
These results set the scene for the May 13th, 1969 tragedy. The tragedy began when 
on the night of May 11th and 12th, the opposition celebrated their victory. On the next 
day (May 13th) UMNO youth members gathered in Jalan Raja Muda of Kuala 
Lumpur at the residence of Harun Idris, the Selangor Menteri Besar (Chief Minister) 
and demanded that they too should hold a victory celebration (Wilkinson, 2004, p. 
223). The refusal by both parties to accept the fact that they each failed to get 
majority of seats in the state legislature sparked the riots in Kuala Lumpur and 
Selangor spreading throughout the city within 45 minutes. The riots led to 196 
killings and considerable destruction of property (Yackob, 2006, p. 33). It was also 
reported 439 people were injured. Among the dead were 143 Chinese and 25 Malays 
(Taylor, 2008; Hwang, 2003; Colletta, Lim & Kelles-Viitanen, 2001; Funston, 1980). 
The racial riot led to the declaration of darurat (national emergency) throughout 
West Malaysia by the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong (the ruling king of Malaysia) on May 
15th, 1969. As a result, the Malaysian government suspended the parliament and 
formed a caretaker government, National Operations Council (NOC or Majlis 
Gerakan Negara, MAGERAN)36, to temporarily govern the country. Solid security 
measures were introduced by the NOC to deal with this ethnic violence. Police 
battalions, a territorial army, and unarmed vigilantes were part of the measures that 
prevented the violence from spiraling out of control.  
 
36 This caretaker government which governed the country from May 16th 1969 to 1971 was composed 
largely of ‘second generation’ UMNO leaders and civil servants, and headed by the former Deputy 
Prime Minister, Abdul Razak Hussein (Rudner, 1970, p. 20).  
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 3.6 The Birth of BN and NEP: Efforts of Malay Leaders to Preserve and 
Consolidate UMNO-led Coalition  
 In the immediate period following the 1969 tragedy, Malay elites of UMNO focused 
on consolidating the UMNO-led coalition under the pretext of remediating the inter-
ethnic crisis (Shamsuddin, Liaw & Ridzuan, 2015; Haque, 2003; Derichs, 1999). On 
January 1st, 1973, Razak Hussein as the leader of the NOC decided to establish 
Barisan Nasional (BN, National Front) to replace the ruling Alliance Party. Raja 
(2012) notes that the decision to replace the Alliance Party with BN was guided by 
Razak’s desire to increase the membership of the coalition in an effort to establish 
what he calls ‘Ketahanan Nasional’ (National strength) through political stability. 
The creation of BN was, however, regarded as the result of growing determination 
among UMNO elites to safeguard Malay supremacy (Ketuanan Melayu) which 
coincided with the PAS leaders’ decision to join UMNO37 in September 1972 (Datar, 
1983; Funston, 1980). At this point there were increased calls among the Malay 
masses to safeguard Malay rights and privileges (Wick, 1971, p. 18). Gomez and 
Jomo (1997) described this group as the ‘Young Turks’ of UMNO who were 
increasingly bold and vocal in their demand for Malay rights. Mahathir, one of the 
‘Young Turks’ of UMNO, criticized Tunku for giving the Chinese what they 
demanded. He said, “the Malays have run amok, killing those they hate because you 
have given them too much face” (Means, 1991, p. 8-9; Munro-Kua, 1996, p. 56).  
37 In commenting this issue, Raja Nur Alaini (2012) noted that the implementation of security measure 
in 1969 in fact has provided the federal government an opportunity to unite the political powers.  
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These demands inclined the UMNO elites to focus on consolidating the Malay-led 
coalition by emphasizing peace and harmony. As Bakar (2003) argues, the May 13th 
tragedy forced UMNO to broaden its view of political legitimacy to ensure peaceful 
and just governance of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country. Ahmad & 
Sulaiman (2008) stressed that UMNO leaders believed that its political survival was 
important to prevent a repeat of those traumatic days. Thus, UMNO leaders became 
focused on ensuring the UMNO-led BN retained full control of Malaysia’s politics.   
In order to achieve this, Razak and the UMNO elite introduced a pro-bumiputra or 
specifically a pro-Malay policy called the New Economic Policy (NEP) on August 
31st, 1970, which was implemented in 1971, and as Koon (1996) argues is strongly 
associated with special privileges for Malays. In addition, the Malaysian constitution 
recognized the role of Sultans as the heads of Islam in every state and the 
determiners of the King38 as the constitutional monarch at the federal level, selected 
from their number every 5 years (Haque, 2003; Derichs, 1999). Non-Muslims were 
automatically disqualified from this position. Thus, any attempt to question the 
Malay special rights was seen as an insult to the Malay culture and traditions 
(Harding, 2012). The implementation of Article 153 as per the 1957 Constitution saw 
the Malay and non-Malays ratio in the public services fixed at 4:139 (Means, 1986; 
Mah, 1985). 
This attitude of prioritizing the Malay-Muslims was crystalized when the coalition 
government announced that Bahasa Melayu (Malay language) should be the national 
language under the pretext of fostering more rapid national cohesion. The ruling 
Malay political elites believed that national unity could be achieved by making 
38 In Malaysia, the King also called ‘Yang Di-Pertuan Agung’.   
39 This ethnic ratio meant that if there are 5 positions in public service, 4 will be held by the Malays.  
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Bahasa Melayu the national language (Ya’acob, Awal, Idris, Hassan, Kaur & Noor, 
2011) but at the same time allowing everybody to learn and use other languages for 
other than official purposes (this is stated in Article 152 of the Malaysian 
Constitution). The Malay-led coalition government made Bahasa Melayu (Malay 
language) the language of education and administration replacing English in all 
public school and higher learning institutions (Gill, 2009). In addition, the Malay-led 
coalition government introduced an ethnic quota for university admission in place of 
a merit-based selection (Abraham, 1999). Under this system, public universities 
reserved a certain proportion of seats for Malay students (Government of Malaysia, 
1977) and as a result, an increased number of Malays were able to further their 
studies in public universities such as Universiti Malaya (Malayan University, UM) 
and Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (National University of Malaysia, UKM) 
(Means, 1986). 
The preferential treatment covered economic activities as well, even though the early 
coalition leaders agreed that economic power would be accorded to non-Malays. 
This was especially evident where the King had constitutional rights to direct any 
relevant authority to reserve certain proportion of business and trade licenses for 
Malays. This enabled the UMNO-led or to be more specific Malay-led government 
to increase the number of Malay business tycoons to compete with their Chinese 
counterparts (Jayasankaran, 1999). In 1975, for example, the government introduced 
the Industrial Coordination Act (ICA) as a means of creating and increasing the 
number of Malay tycoons. Under the ICA any non-bumiputra firm with capital and 
reserve funds of more than 250,000 Malaysian Ringgit with a minimum of 25 
employees was required to achieve at least 30% Malay (and in general bumiputra) 
equity ownership to get business licenses approved and renewed (Lee, 2000). The 
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government, as Crouch (2001) and Mah (1985) observed, also could deny any non-
bumiputra licenses if they failed to satisfy this requirement especially in the business 
sectors related to construction, mining, transport, and timber. In addition, the Malay-
led government established various state and/or federal owned companies called 
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and Government-Link Companies (GLCs) to be 
controlled and managed as bumiputra enterprises, such as Edaran Otomobil National 
Berhad (EON), Malaysian Airline System Berhad (MAS), and Cement Industries of 
Malaysia Berhad40. At the same time, institutions such Majlis Amanah Rakyat 
(MARA) and Bank Bumiputra (now known as Bumiputra Commerce Berhad, BCB) 
were created to provide credit and technical assistance to the bumiputra and 
specifically Malay business entrepreneurs.  
The Malay-led coalition government’ preferential treatment to ensure socio-political 
supremacy of the Malays, however, was not enough to avert the threat to the UMNO-
led BN’s political dominance. This was especially true when the rakyat (the masses) 
began to understand that NEP had largely benefited the Malay elites of West 
Malaysia, but not the bumiputra masses. The most critical of the NEP were the non-
Muslim bumiputra of Sabah led by Donald Stephens and Pairin Kitingan who 
opposed the Malay-led federal government (Yusoff, 2001; 2002).  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has analyzed the continuity of ethnic politics in post-colonial Malaya 
(West Malaysia). Ethnic politics became a feature of governance as Malay political 
40 See Marimuthu (2010). 
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elites of UMNO attempted to maintain the existing ethnic-based coalition 
government. In other words, the Malay elites’ strong determination to ensure 
continuation of ethnic based coalition government system for their political benefits 
explained the continuity of ethnic politics in post-colonial Malaya. In fact, ethnic 
politics not only continued but strengthened in post-colonial Malaya.  
In the process, the division between the communities was not only at the political but 
also the socioeconomic levels. This aggravated the uneasy relations between Malays 
and non-Malays. This chapter has shown there was an awkward relationship between 
bumiputra and non-bumiputra, between the governing bumiputra political elites and 
the non-governing non-bumiputra political elites, between the Malay bumiputra and 
the Non-Malay bumiputra, and between the political elites and the rakyat. The 
preservation of uneasy relationship between the Malays and non-Malays (Chinese 
and Indians) in Malaya (West Malaysia) and the growth of unhappiness among the 
non-Muslim bumiputra in Sabah with the Malay-led federal government 
consolidated the uneasy ethnic relations in the country). 
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 Chapter 4: Introducing West Malaysia’s Model of Government to Sabah 
  
4.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter discussed how the political influence of the ruling coalition 
began to deteriorate following resistance from non-bumiputra. The ruling Malay 
political elite’s effort to invite Sabah and Sarawak as well as Singapore to join the 
Federation of Malaya to form Malaysia was to ensure that the total bumiputra 
population of the new federation would always be numerically superior to that of 
non-bumiputra (Luping, 1985; Chin, 2014b) as was vital for the maintenance of the 
Malay-led regime. Preserving this political system was important because it 
provided the ruling elite an opportunity to maintain power in accordance with the 
consociational principle of ethnic majority rule that allowed only the political 
leaders of the ethnic majority to control the state. In other words, the desire to 
include both Sabah and Sarawak in the the new Federation known as Malaysia was 
mainly driven by the ruling Malay political elite’s desire to maintain power through 
the preservation of ethnic politics in Malaya (West Malaysia) and later expand it to 
the Borneo territories (East Malaysia).  
Nevertheless, in terms of culture and demography there was little in common 
between the people of Malaya and those of Borneo, other than that they were all 
once part of the British Empire (Chin, 2014b). Most importantly, before the 
Malaysia proposal was flouted, there were diverse ethnic groups in Borneo and thus, 
any attempt to develop, escalate and diffuse ethnic politics based on Ketuanan 
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Melayu (Malay supremacy) as in Peninsular Malaya to the Borneo territories of 
Sabah and Sarawak was incompatible with indigenous politics. Despite this, ethnic 
politics eventually expanded into East Malaysia, especially in Sabah. Over half a 
century, the people of Sabah eventually became socio-politically divided into three: 
Malay-Muslim bumiputra, non-Muslim bumiputra and non-bumiputra due to the 
success of federal leaders in exporting what Chin (2014b) called ‘West Malaysia’s 
model of government’ to Sabah.  
This chapter reviews political developments in Sabah by focusing on federal 
leaders’ efforts to introduce West Malaysia’s model of government to this Borneo 
territory, and how this led to the growing importance of ethnicity in Sabah politics. 
Before examining these issues, however, it is important that we understand the 
socio-political background of Sabah. Doing so offers an increased insight into the 
reason why federal leaders based in West Malaysia expanded ethnic political 
activities in Sabah. 
At the heart of such an approach is the acknowledgement of the necessity to 
recognize the difference between the category of rakyat in West Malaysia and 
Sabah. Although the concept of rakyat refers to the commoners or the ordinary 
people who are not nobility, the category of rakyat in West Malaysia is not 
necessarily the same as the category of rakyat in Sabah. The rakyat in West 
Malaysia comprise Malays who adheres to the concept of daulat (sovereignty)41 and 
derhaka (treason), as well as the Orang Asli, Chinese, and Indians. In addition, there 
are small numbers of Europeans, Americans, Eurasians, Arabs and Thai. Among 
these groups, the Malays constitute about half of West Malaysia’s population and 
41 The concept of daulat refers to calls for great respect and loyalty to the Malay rulers (Gillen, 1994, 
p. 2). 
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their political leaders are politically dominant. In contrast, however, despite 
comprising about one-fourth of West Malaysia’s population and their political 
leaders not being politically dominant compared to the Malays, the Chinese are 
economically dominant. Because of the Malay leaders’ political domination and the 
Chinese control over economic power, other groups were often neglected in West 
Malaysia’s politics. This was especially true in the case of Orang Asli who 
constitute the smallest group of West Malaysia’s population and are deprived 
socially and economically (Nicholas, 2003; Nobuta, 2009; Gillen, 1994; Andaya & 
Andaya, 1984).  
The category of rakyat in Sabah is even more complex than that in West Malaysia 
as it comprises dozens of ethnolinguistic groups. This includes Kadazan, Dusun, 
Rungus, Murut, Sama-Bajau, Suluk, Bisaya, Malay-Brunei, Chinese, Kedayan, 
Orang Sungai, Kimaragang, Lun Dayeh, Lun Bawang, Cocos, Dumpas, Rumanau, 
Lotud, Mangkaak, Tidung, Tambanuo, Idaan, Huminodun, Minokok and Kwijau. 
The Malaysian government, however, tend to oversimplify the situation in Sabah by 
officially recognising only some of the dozens of ethnolinguistic groups. The 
Malaysian government even has classified these ethnolinguistic groups into four 
headings, namely non-Muslim bumiputra, Muslim bumiputra, Chinese and Others. 
Of these groups, the largest group was the non-Muslim bumiputra, but unlike in 
West Malysia, their political leaders often were dominated by the minority, the 
Muslim bumiputra. Despite being Muslim and politically dominant, the Muslim 
bumiputra in Sabah is not the same as in West Malaysia categorised as the Malays. 
This point of argument was highlighted by Ajamain (2014) who stressed that the 
rakyat in Sabah cannot be associated as Malay just because they are Muslims. He 
said, “The people of Sabah may be Muslim but they are equally proud to be Bajau, 
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Irranun, Dusun, Murut, Brunei, Suluk and 40 other ethnic groups and sub-groups” 
(Free Malaysia Today, 2014, March 12).    
It is in this sense that shedding light on the dissimilarity between the category of 
rakyat in West Malaysia and Sabah provides a sound basis of knowledge on the 
federal leaders’ move to ensure the expansion of ethnic politics in Sabah. On the 
other side of the coin, the dissimilarity underscores the difficulty faced by the 
federal leaders based in West Malaysia to expand West Malaysia’s model of 
government in this state. Political elites understand this well and are aware that 
there must be a systematic way of overcoming such difficulty. What is required 
therefore is a clear understanding of the socio-political background of Sabah. This 
becomes a vehicle with which we can map the contours of the interrelationship 
between the federal politicians and ethnic politics in Sabah. 
 
4.2 The Socio-Political Background of Sabah 
Sabah, originally known as Sabak or Saba under the rule of Brunei Sultanate and 
later renamed ‘North Borneo’ throughout colonial rule, is one of the two Malaysian 
territories located in Borneo that Ross-Larson (1976) and Chin (2012) called East 
Malaysia. According to the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs 
(IWGIA, 2016) Sabah is a Malaysian territory with a diverse ethnic population, 
comprising 42 officially recognized ethnic groups with more than 50 languages and 
not less than 80 dialects. Of these, 39 ethnic groups are categorized as indigenous 
(also called natives or Anak Negeri) numbering about 2,203,500 or 60% of Sabah’s 
population of 3,736,600 in 2016 (IWGIA, 2016, p. 273). The IWGIA also reported 
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that three ethnic groups categorized as non-indigenous numbering about 1,533,100 
made up about 40% of its population in 2016. The main indigenous ethnic groups are 
the Kadazandusun, Bajau and Melayu-Brunei, and the main non-indigenous ethnic 
groups are Chinese and Others (referring to Indonesian and Filipinos) (Department of 
Statistics Malaysia, 2015; Amir, Sulaiman, Razak, Yusof, Abdullah, Shah, Deraman, 
Ahmad, Noor, Meftah, Ariffin, Kasar & Hamid, 2013). 
Barlocco (2014) observed that these ethnic labels did not exist in Sabah “before the 
establishment of outside control over the area” (p. 35). The reason is that the people 
of Sabah described by Mohamad (1977) as ‘the original people’ or the ‘early 
inhabitants of Sabah’ never evolved any significant unit greater than the kampong 
(village) with a small population size of between 50 and 100 usually consisting of 
kin (Barlocco, 2014; Boulanger, 2009; Luping, 1985). Thus, the ethnic label was not 
important because they were focused on maintaining strong family ties and living 
harmoniously together rather than differentiating themselves (Boulanger, 2009; 
Robinson, Karlin & Stiles, 2013; Tarmudi, Saibin, Naharu & Tamsin, 2014). 
The arrival of Islam through Muslim immigrants from Sulawesi, Indonesia to Sabah 
in late the 15th century led to the establishment of the external rule of the Brunei 
Sultanate in the early sixteenth century (Amir, Sulaiman, Razak, Yusof, Abdullah, 
Shah, Deraman, Ahmad, Noor, Meftah, Ariffin, Kasar & Hamid, 2013). The Brunei 
Sultanate in its effort to centralize control of administration introduced ethnic labels 
for Islamized and non-Muslim indigenes, and thus ethnicity began to characterize the 
social life of indigenous population in Sabah. The Brunei Sultanate introduced the 
term Melayu (Malay) for indigenous people who had embraced Islam and for 
Muslim immigrants and the term became synonymous with the word Islam or 
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Muslim (Luping, 1985). Nevertheless, many Islamized indigenes preferred to call 
themselves Brunei-Malay (Melayu-Brunei, Muslim indigenes who live along the 
West Coast of North Borneo) or Orang Sungai (Muslim indigenes who lives along 
the rivers in the east of Borneo) to keep their culture, traditions and language alive 
through the maintenance of close ties with members of their traditional communities 
(Ali, 2010). In this regard, the Islamized indigenous people believed that calling 
themselves as such rather than as Melayu contributed towards the maintenance of 
their close relationship in traditional communities because Malay was a term for 
those who lived in Malaya only and not for indigenous people in Sabah (IWGIA, 
2016). Such an attitude also affected Muslim immigrants from neighboring countries 
such as the Philippines and Indonesia who preferred to call themselves Suluk, Sama-
Bajau and Illanun rather than Malays (Nimo, 1968; Waren, 1983; Waren 1981; 
Harisson, 1975).  
While most Islamized indigenous and Muslim immigrants rejected Malay as their 
ethnic label, the Sultan of Brunei also introduced a broad social identification for 
non-Muslim indigenous peoples called Dusun to differentiate the Islamized 
indigenous and the non-Muslim indigenous people. The word Dusun is a Malay word 
referring to farm or orchard. The term Dusun was thus used by the Brunei Sultanate 
to describe the indigenous farmers who grew both wet and hill paddy (rice) (Glyn-
Jones, 1953; Luping, 1985, p. 6). This early social identification comprised what the 
Sultan of Brunei described as Suku42: Bisaya, Bonggi, Bundu, Dumpas, Gana, Garo, 
Idaan, Kimaragang, Kolobuan, Kuijau, Labuk, Linkabau, Liwan, Lotud, Lun 
Bawang, Dayeh, Makiang, Malapi, Mangkaak/Kunatong, Minokok, Murut, Ngabai, 
42 The term Suku refers to social group of people characterized by commonality of language and adat 
(customary law). 
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Paitan, Pingas, Rumanau, Rungus, Sonobu, Sinorupu, Sonsogon, Sukang, Sungai, 
Tagahas, Tatana, Tangara, Tidong, Tindal, Tobilung, Tolinting, Tombonuo, 
Tuhawon and Tutung (Appell & Harrison, 1968). The Brunei Sultanate decision to 
introduce Dusun led to the emergence of terms such as Dusun, Melayu-Brunei, 
Orang Sungai, Melayu, Suluk, Sama-Bajau and Illanun. 
These social identifications during this period, described by Scott (2009) and 
Barlocco (2014), did not necessarily differentiate the people of Sabah during that 
period, as they viewed ethnic labels as unimportant. In fact, ethnic labels resulted in 
some ambiguity among the indigenous people of Sabah (Chee-Beng, 1997) as they 
identified themselves both as Melayu-Brunei, Orang Sungai or Malay on the basis of 
their Muslim identity and as Dusun due to similarities in their language, costume, 
music and songs, food and beverages, traditions during birth, marriages, death, and 
close family relations (Stephen, 2000). Most importantly, all ethnic labels during this 
period were informal and did not apply in any official matters. Ambiguity of ethnic 
label among the indigenous peoples continued even after the Brunei sultanate rule 
ended. Sultan Muhyiddin decided to lease this region in 1977 to an Austrian trader, 
Gustavus von Overback in 187743 to overcome piracy by immigrants from 
Philippines (many of whom were Illanun and Suluk) and avoid a potential civil 
war44. The ambiguity persisted after Overback transferred the lease in 1881 to Alfred 
43 The lease made through the signing of treaty on December 29th, 1877 in Brunei Palace by Abdul 
Momen, the Sultan of Brunei. The treaty granted Overback the right to control the whole region of 
Sabah. Apart from that, through this treaty Sultan of Brunei also appointed Overback as the 
“Maharajah of Sabah and Rajah of Gaya and Sandakan”.   
44 When Brunei was under the rule of the 13th Sultan Muhammad Ali for a year (1960), there was a 
misunderstanding between Pengiran Muda Bungsu (son-in-law of Sultan Muhammad Ali) and the son 
of Pengiran Abdul Mubin over Sabung Ayam (cockfight). Pengiran Muda Bongsu lost the game and 
was jeered by the son of Pengiran Abdul Mubin. Due to anger, Pengiran Muda Bungsu killed 
Pengiran Abdul Mubin’s son. In an act of revenge, Pengiran Abdul Mubin killed Sultan Muhammad 
Ali and made himself a new sultan of Brunei, and took on the name of Sultan Abdul Hakkul Mubin. 
He appointed Pengiran Muda Bungsu as Bendahara (Treasurer) to prevent retaliation from Sultan 
Muhammad Ali’s families. However, such a decision did not prevent Pengiran Muda Bungu and 
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Dent Brothers, who immediately after acquiring the lease formed the British North 
Borneo Company (BNBC) and named the region North Borneo (The Times, 1927, 
November 24).  
However, the transfer of ownership of North Borneo by the BNBC to the British 
colonial office in 1945 at the end of Japanese occupation of this region45 witnessed 
the establishment of formal social categorization in this territory. Under its ‘indirect 
rule’ system of administration46, the British began to establish ‘proper social 
categories’ in what became known as the North Borneo Crown Colony in 1946, 
described by Scott (2009) as a ‘module of rule’. In this regard, the British decided to 
make the existing ethnic labels the legal ethnic categories for all official uses. The 
British also decided to recognize the early immigrants of Suluk, Sama-Bajau and 
Ilanun as the natives of North Borneo. Thus, the native population of North Borneo 
became known as Dusun, Brunei-Malays, Orang Sungai, Sama-Bajau, Suluk and 
Ilanun. The immigrants from China and other parts of the world who arrived after the 
establishment of colonial (British) rule in Borneo were identified by the British as 
Chinese and Lain-lain (‘Others’), regardless of what dialect they spoke. Together, 
both Chinese and Others were categorized as non-natives of North Borneo.  
Sultan Ali’s families to avenge the death of Sultan Muhammad Ali. This created chaos in Brunei, thus 
forcing Sultan Abdul Hakkul Mubin to move to Pulau Chermin. Following this, Pengiran Muda 
Bungsu declared himself the Sultan of Brunei by the name of Sultan Muhyiddin, thus resulting in 
Brunei having two sultans. The existence of two Sultans then ensued the battle between the two 
competing Sultans. As a result, the civil war of Brunei started in 1961 and lasted for 12 years (1961-
1973) (Jamil Al-Sufri, 2007; Raffles, 1830; Saunders, 2002; Wright, 1970). 
45 The Japanese occupation in Sabah began on January 13th, 1942 following its successful invasion of 
Labuan, and ended on September 10th, 1945 right after the official surrender of Japanese 37th Army 
led by Lieutenant General Baba Masao.   
46 The British ‘indirect rule’ refers to a system of administration that retained the local institutions 
mostly in the form established by the Brunei sultans (Barlocco, 2009, p. 37) such as the Datuk 
(regional leader), and Orang Kaya-Kaya (literally means ‘rich man’, OKK). Apart from that, the 
colonial institutions such as the Native Chief and Native Courts were also introduced as to facilitate 
its ‘indirect rule’.  
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The decision of the British to categorize the people of North Borneo, however, at this 
point did not necessarily divide the people of North Borneo. This was because ethnic 
identities were free from political manipulation by politicians as British policy did 
not encourage the people of North Borneo to form political parties. The governor of 
North Borneo even warned that the establishment of political parties at this stage 
carried the danger of communal strife (Milne, 1965, p. 104). As a result, there was no 
political party established in this region. This prevented ethnicity from being 
manipulated by politicians for their advantage. Regardless of their ethnic 
identifications, the people of Borneo lived harmoniously and visited each other 
during the festivals without questioning whether the food served was halal (foods 
and drinks permissible for Muslims to eat or drink under the Islamic law of 
Sharia’ah), and there was also a tendency among them to share rumah panjang (long 
house), gardens and playgrounds. On this basis social scientists such as Tarmundi, 
Saibin, Naharu and Tamsin (2014), and Robinson, Karlin and Stiles (2013) described 
North Borneo as a ‘multicultural paradise’.  
Nevertheless, ethnic differences began to assume importance there following the end 
of Sabah’s long insulation from party politics. It reared its fiery head when Tunku 
Abdul Rahman announced his proposal for political union between Malaya, 
Singapore, North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei to form the Federation of Malaysia on 
March 27th, 1961. Tunku’s aspiration inclined aspirant Sabah leaders to play up the 
importance of ethnicity in their social life as a first step to forming what Kaur and 
Metcalfe (1999) calls ‘communal’ political parties as in Malaya. Such efforts began 
when the educated non-Muslim indigenous group led by Donald Stephens introduced 
an ethnic label called Kadazan to replace Dusun for non-Muslim indigenous people 
in early 1961. Their use of the word ‘Kadazan’, as Reid (1997) argues, was a 
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reflection of their demand to be treated with as much respect as all other races in 
Sabah if they were to support Malaysia. However, non-Malays or non-Muslims were 
treated as second-class citizens by the Malay dominated government in Malaya, even 
though it was formed from political collaboration among Malay and non-Malay 
elites. Reid observed, “educated Kadazans have come to regard the word ‘Dusun’ as 
derogatory when referred to them during the colonial days. Their use of Kadazans 
was their demand to be treated with as much respect as all the other races in Sabah” 
(1997, p. 127)47. This attitude also affected leaders of other ethnic groups such as 
Datu Mustapha Datu Harun (non-Muslim indigenous), G.S. Sundang (non-Muslim 
indigenous from the interior), and Peter Chin and Khoo Siak Chiew (Chinese/non-
indigenous). This was evident when the five communal-based political parties 
established at the end of 1961 in Sabah all differed in their attitudes towards the 
proposed political union and the ethnic groups each sought to represent (Yusoff, 
1999, p. 3).  
The first political party in Sabah was the United National Kadazan Organization 
(UNKO), established on August 1961 by Donald Stephens. This party was supported 
by non-Muslim indigenes, especially the Kadazans residing along the West Coast. 
The second political party was the United Sabah National Organization (USNO). It 
was a political party that represented the Muslim indigenous population who 
accounted for 31.2% (141,840) of the total population of North Borneo (454,421) in 
47 Although such attitude and demand also affected other non-Muslim indigenous, many in the interior 
were not interested in identifying themselves as Kadazans and preferred to call themselves as Dusun 
or just by their suku’s name (Stephen, 2000). Their refusal to identify themselves as Kadazans was 
mainly because they believed that such label was a British creation. They also believed that the label 
‘Kadazans’ was applicable only to those non-Muslim indigenous living in the nearby areas such as 
Penampang and Papar because it was derived from the word ‘Kakadazan’ (towns) (Reid, 1997). 
111 
 
                                                          
1960 (Department of Statistics Malaysia, 1965) and was founded by Datu Mustapha 
Datu Harun in December 196148, a Suluk from Kudat.   
The third, fourth and fifth parties were the United Pasok Momogun Organization 
(UPMO), the Democratic Party (DP) and the United Party (UP). UPMO, like UNKO, 
was a non-Muslim indigenous party established by G.S. Sundang on January 1962, 
and mainly supported by the indigenous people of the interior. DP and UP, 
established by Peter Chin on November 1961 and Khoo Siak Chiew on February 
1961 respectively, were mainly supported by Chinese communities. As Chinese 
comprised only 23.1% (104,971) of Sabah’s population, the DP and UP later merged 
to form the North Borneo National Party (BUNAP) in October 1962 to unify the 
Chinese communities under one political party. Like DP and UP, UNKO and UPMO 
later merged to form the United Pasokmomogun Kadazan Organization (UPKO) in 
June 1964 with the aim of unifying into one political party non-Muslim indigenes 
who accounted for 37.0% (167,993) of Sabah’s population. 
It was only USNO, and specifically Datu Mustapha, who appeared to have endorsed 
Tunku’s proposal as he saw such a proposal as favorable to Muslim communities in 
Sabah (Luping, 1989). In contrast, the leaders of non-Muslim populations were from 
the beginning doubtful of such a proposal as they saw the formation of Malaysia as a 
ploy by the Malayan leaders to colonize Sabah and absorb non-Muslims into the 
Malay-Muslim population through Islamization (Gin, 2009, p. 214). Donald 
Stephens, in particular, was sceptical of Malaysia proposal in arguing that the 
48 USNO was described by Datu Mustapha as a multi-racial party, but in reality, this devoted its 
attention to the indigenous Muslims. According to Ongkili, “It was of course open to non-Muslims, 
albeit not many could be recruited. USNO immediately supported the Malaysia proposal and worked 
for its successful formation by fully supporting Tunku Abdul Rahman and the other Malayan leaders 
over the issues” (1989, p. 62).  
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formation of Malaysia was in fact a ploy by the Malayan leaders to colonize the 
Borneo territories. In his open letter to Tunku, Donald Stephens said,  
“if we had been asked to join Malaysia at the time Malaya achieved 
independence and Britain made it possible for us, the story would have been 
different one. Now that Merdeka has been Malaya’s for some years, and we are 
still struggling towards it, Malaya’s proposal that we join as the 12th, 13, and 
14th states savours of imperialism, of a drive to turn us into Malayan 
colonies… To join Malaya, while we are still colonies, and become Malayan 
colonies…the implication is to hand (ourselves) over to your (Malaya) control” 
(Wellman, 2011, p. 89; Kitingan, 2011, September 16). 
Stephens also specifically expressed his concern about the possibility of North 
Borneo becoming a new colony of Malaya, saying, “North Borneo is still not ready 
to join Malaysia and joining Malaysia means changing the status of North Borneo 
from a "British colony" to a "colony of Malaya". Furthermore, Stephens 
emphatically asked Tunku to withdraw his intention to turn North Borneo into the 
14th state of the Federation. He said, “please do not pursue the idea of making Brunei 
the 12th state, Sarawak the 13th State and North Borneo the 14th State of the 
Federation. We are frankly not interested” (Human Right Watch, 1991, p. 33). That 
is, with their concern about North Borneo becoming a new colony of Malaya, the 
non-Muslim leaders opposed the merger. Sundang as the leader of UPMO strongly 
believed that the Malaysia proposal was hasty, and proposed that North Borneo 
should achieve progress and independence on its own first before entering into any 
federation arrangement with any of its neighbors (Ongkili, 1989; Yussof, 1999). 
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UNKO and BUNAP continued to oppose the idea of making North Borneo part of 
Malaysia. 
In dealing with the non-Muslim leaders’ opposition against the Malaysia proposal, 
British government eventually decided to grant North Borneo self-rule on August 
31st, 1963. Such a decision was a result of all ethnic leaders including the indigenous 
non-Muslim political parties’ leaders consent to the formation of the Malaysia 
federation. The decision by all ethnic leaders (non-Muslim native, Muslim native and 
Chinese) to join the Federation of Malaysia, as an equal partner, with Malaya, 
Singapore and Sarawak, was anchored by the 20-point agreement, Perjanjian 20 
Perkara (Cheah, 2002; Luping, 1985). This agreement (also known as the ‘20 
points’) was submitted by five Sabah political parties, the United National Kadazan 
Organization (UNKO), United Sabah National Organization (USNO), United Party 
(UP), Democratic Party (DP)49, and the National Pasok Momogun Organization 
(Pasok). It was written by leaders of those parties to ensure that the interests, rights 
and autonomy of the people of Sabah would always be safeguarded after the 
formation of the Malaysian federation. In addition, it envisaged that Sabah be one of 
the four entities in the new federation (the others being Malaya, Singapore and 
Sarawak)50. Thus, with the incorporation of the memorandum into the IGC report, 
the Malaysian Agreement51 and the Federal Constitution, the IGC concluded its 
49 Prior to the formation of Sabah National Party (SANAP), there were two Chinese political parties in 
North Borneo namely United Party (UP) and Democratic Party (DP). The UP formed in Sandakan on 
February 1962 by Khoo Siak Chiew. This political party catered to the big timber and wealthy 
English-educated Hakka and Teochew Chinese business interests. The DP formed in Kota Kinabalu 
on November 1961 by Peter Chin to protect the Chinese Wholesale and retail businessperson interests. 
Both parties merged to form Borneo Utara National Party (BUNAP) on October 1962. It was then 
renamed the Sabah National Party (SANAP) on August 31st, 1963 and eventually became the Sabah 
Chinese Association (SCA) in May 1965 (Yusof, 1999, p. 3; Luping 1985, p. 137).   
50 See Appendix A for the full text of the memorandum. 
51 The Malaysian agreement signed on July 9th, 1963  
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plenary meeting in Kuala Lumpur (Malaya)52 on December 18th to 20th, 1962 
(Kitingan, 1987). Nine months later, on September 16th 1963, North Borneo, 
renamed Sabah, officially announced itself as part of the Malaysia federation 
(Ongkili, 2003; Ryan, 1967).  
Sabah’s incorporation into the new federation of Malaysia marked the start of the 
growing influence of ethnicity in its politics. Such a development was partly a result 
of efforts by federal leaders based in West Malaysia to impose the West Malaysia 
model of government to their political advantage. This model of government was 
“essentially based on Muslim-led coalition government with Ketuanan Melayu 
(Malay supremacy), and in more recent times, Ketuanan Islam (Muslim supremacy), 
as its ideological core” (Chin, 2014b, p. 83). As it was based on the ideology of 
Ketuanan Melayu, this model of government required that the Malay-Muslim leaders 
must be accorded dominant executive power within the coalition government; hence 
other ethnic groups (the non-Malay) gained an insignificant role in the government’s 
decision-making process.  
The concept of West Malaysia’s model of government is based on a consociational 
model that was first employed in the Netherlands (McGarry & O’Leary, 1993), but 
that deviated from these initial principles and resulted in Malaysia being defined as a 
semi-authoritarian regime (Lopez, 2014). As explained in Chapter 1, the 
consociational model is based on the idea that conflict resolution within a divided 
society is best achieved through cooperation between political elites from different 
ethnic groups that transcend cleavages at a mass level anchored by inclusive 
coalition. As noted by its formulator, Lijphat (2003), consociational democracy is a 
52 The final plenary meeting held on December 18th – 20th, 1962.  
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government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political 
culture into a stable democracy. The model assumes that there are deep differences 
among the salient segments in the society and these differences are insurmountable. 
The model also assumes that these segments are incapable of regulating their 
behavior in the face of these troublesome differences, thus often leading to violent or 
deadly outcomes (Lopez, 2014). The leaders of these salient segments can overcome 
such challenges through the creation of a ‘grand coalition’ among themselves, the 
establishment of mutual veto, the application of proportionality-based representation 
within the grand coalition, and creation of segmental autonomy. 
In contrast, however, the consociational model as practiced in Malaysia has all but 
broken down. Although the formation of coalition government in Malaysia primarily 
reflected the application of the consociational model, the most important principle, 
the ability of the weakest social group in the grand coalition to veto policies or 
legislations that affect the groups, has all but dissipated (Lopez, 2014). Within the 
Malaysian framework, the political elites of BN and specifically UMNO are 
accorded political and economic advantages since they can veto the interests of the 
rakyat. This resulted in the marginalization of not only non-bumiputras but also the 
Malays and bumiputras who were not part of the grand coalition.  
The marginalization of non-bumiputras, and the Malays and bumiputras who were 
not among the political elites who formed the grand coalition was one of the most 
discussed issues in Sabah. Most of my informants, and particularly the non-Muslim 
bumiputra males usually acknowledged this situation. The personal experience of 
one of my non-Muslim bumiputra male informants (43 years old) seems also to 
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suggest the importance of marginalization against the people of Sabah in their daily 
conversation. Based on his experience, he said that: 
The marginalisation of rakyat in Sabah is the most discussed issue because, like 
me, the rakyat in this state are unhappy and therefore would want to express 
their disappointment with the government by supporting the opposition. 
(interview with a non-Muslim bumiputra male, a key respondent of this study 
in his fourty-six years old on June 2nd, 2014 in Sandakan).   
While the informant expressed his disappointment with the government, some 
informants even explained that the marginalisation of the rakyat in Sabah has been 
the result of the introduction of West Malaysia’s model of government in this state. 
At the same time, he also stressed that the introduction of such a model of 
government in Sabah resulted in the growing importance of ethnicity in Sabah’s 
politics. He said:  
The marginalisation of rakyat in Sabah has been the result of federal leaders’ 
move to spread West Malaysia’s model of government in this land. The most 
significant impact of such a move has been the growing interests among our 
politicians in politicising ethnicity, thus leading to the growing importance of 
ethnicity in Sabah politics (interview with a non-Muslim bumiputra male, a key 
respondent of this study who was a government servant in his sixty-eight years 
old on June 2nd, 2014 in Sandakan).   
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4.3 The Early Attempt to Impose West Malaysia’s Model of Government in 
Sabah (1963-1976) 
It is clear from the foregoing that political parties established in the wake of the 
formation of Malaysia federation sought to represent the different views of the 
people. Ongkili noted that the situation “prompted them to think communally and to 
fight for their exclusive interests” (1989, p. 63). Furthermore, encouraged by the 
political trend in Malaya, soon after the formation of Malaysia, the founding leaders 
of UPKO, USNO, SANAP (comprising UP and DP) and Pasok chose to form a 
political alliance similar to the Malayan Alliance and called it the Sabah Alliance 
(SA) (Ratnam, 1965; Milne, 1967). Nevertheless, Gale (1989) explained that Sabah’s 
early political alliance appeared not to be characterized by ethnic difference, as 
membership was open to all ethnic groups. Most importantly, the SA was not under 
the control of Malay leaders because unlike Malaya Malays were not a majority. In 
fact, based on Table 4.1 Malays constituted only about 0.3% (1,645) of Sabah’s 
population (454,421) in 1960 while the non-Muslim indigenous groups accounted for 
37.0% (167,993) of its total population. Thus, Malaya’s political system designed to 
protect the rights of the Malay as a majority ethnic community was not suitable for 
Sabah (Pugh-Kitingan, 1989). For this reason, when the SA formed the first state 
government, Stephens, representing the non-Muslim indigenous groups and the 
political party UPKO, became the first Chief Minister (Chin, 2014b).  
To ensure their political survival, the federal leaders based in West Malaysia had 
taken steps to implement the Malayan model of government in Sabah, introducing 
what Chin (2014b) calls a ‘Muslim-first model’, a coalition government which 
required the Muslim leaders to be given executive power. Thus, the federal leaders 
began to identify and unite Muslims who identified themselves as Malays (even 
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though they were traditionally not Malays), Brunei-Malays, Orang Sungai, Suluk, 
Sama-Bajau and Ilanun. Nevertheless, even with such adjustments, the 
implementation of the Malayan model of government remained incompatible in 
Sabah as the Malay-Muslim population was not the majority. 
Table 4.1 shows that the Malay-Muslims constituted only about 39.9% (181,457) of 
Sabah’s population compared with 60.1% (272,964) non-Muslim population. Therein 
began the effort to increase the number of Malay-Muslim population in Sabah with 
the help of Mustapha. This process, which will be specifically analyzed in the 
following chapter, in turn dramatically increased the Malay-Muslim population in 
Sabah, thus igniting fears among the non-Muslim population of losing not only their 
political rights but their social identity.   
 
Table 4.1: Sabah’s Population by Ethno-religious Categories in 1960 
 
 
 
Ethno-religious Categories    Total  Percentage (%) 
 
                                                          
Non-Muslim      272,964  60.1 
- Indigenous      167,993  37.0 
- Non-Indigenous (Chinese and Others) 104,971  23.1 
 
Muslim       181,457  39.9 
 -Indigenous     141,840  31.2 
  (Malay)        (1,645)   (0.3) 
-Non-Indigenous (Immigrants)    39,617    8.7 
 
 
Total       454,421         100.00 
 
Source: Adapted from Fernandez, Amos & Predza (1974); Department of Statistics 
             Malaysia (1965). 
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Thus the leaders of non-Muslims began to take necessary efforts to strengthen the 
unity of their own people. Stephens and G.S. Sundang merged UNKO and Pasok 
Momogun to form the United Pasok Momogun Kadazan Organization (UPKO) in 
June 1964. The non-Muslim non-indigenous (read Chinese) leaders for similar 
reasons renamed SANAP as the Sabah Chinese Association (SCA) in May 1965 
(Ongkili, 1989). 
Non-Muslim leaders, especially Stephens, also began to question Tunku’s attitude 
towards the ‘20 points’, and this resulted in the end of cordial federal-state relations 
(Yusoff, 1999). Among the issues raised by Stephens, who until January 1971 was a 
native Christian, was the decision by the federal leaders to replace the British officers 
with Malays from West Malaysia. He accused the federal leaders of ‘Malayanizing’ 
the state civil service, which was antithetical to the Borneanization agenda that 
underscored the ‘20 points’. When news of Singapore’s expulsion from Malaysia 
was announced on on August 9th, 1965, Stephens reacted very logically. He said, 
“the reason we joined Malaysia was to be with Singapore. If Singapore is out, 
Sabah’s position with Malaysia should be reviewed. And we must decide about 
staying or going” (Golingai, 2013, September 16; Granville-Edge, 1999, p. 78).  
Fearful of the possibility of Sabah’s secession from the Malaysia federation as well 
as to facilitate the process of implementing the Muslim-first model of government in 
Sabah, Tunku encouraged Mustapha, who at that time was the Yang Di-Pertua 
Negara Sabah (YDPN, Head of State), to challenge Stephens (ASEAN Forecast, 
1985). In doing so, Tunku gave him vital support to isolate Stephens by refusing to 
sign the letter of appointment of John Dusing, a Kadazan, to the post of State 
Secretary to replace the outgoing British officer. As a result, the relations between 
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Stephens and Mustapha worsened. It provided Tunku a chance to call all the state’s 
leaders for a meeting in Kuala Lumpur on December 8th, 1964 to determine 
Stephens’s chief ministerial post. During the meeting, USNO delegates proposed that 
Peter Lo of SANAP take over as Chief Minister.   
Thus, on December 16th, 1964, Kalong Ningkan, the Chief Minister of Sarawak, was 
requested by Tunku to come to Kota Kinabalu, to participate in a National Council53 
of the Sabah Alliance Party. It was held on December 17th, 1964. The council agreed 
that Stephens step down and in return be appointed to the federal cabinet as official 
Sabah representative at the federal level. Following this meeting, on December 31st 
1964, eleven days after the expulsion of Singapore from the federation of Malaysia, 
Stephens stepped down from his position as the Chief Minister of Sabah to become 
the first federal cabinet member from Sabah. The interim Chief Minister was Peter 
Lo. Meanwhile, in order to ensure that UPKO members did not think that Stephens 
had lost in the contest of wills, the party council made out that it was a 
‘promotion54’. Additionally, as a Federal Minister, Stephens was determined to 
defend the equal partner status of Sabah based on the original Federation of Malaysia 
agreement.  
Yet, Mustapha and Tunku persisted in their effort to ensure Malay-Muslim control of 
the state’s politics. With the help of Syed Kecik who was Mustapha’s legal advisor 
from West Malaysia and based on Tunku’s recommendation, during the 1967 state 
election Mustapha and Tunku alienated Stephens from Sabah’s politics. Mustapha 
and Syed Kecik offered voters throughout Sabah money as an incentive to persuade 
53 The National Council was the consultative and advisory committee for the state’s government or the 
Sabah Alliance Party’s government.  
54 The minutes of a National Council meeting held on December 19th, 1964 stated “the conditions 
were that Dato Donald Stephens must be ‘promoted’ from State Chief Minister to Federal Minister for 
Sabah Affairs”. 
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them to vote USNO and threatened them if they refused to do so. When the results 
were announced, neither USNO nor UPKO could claim an unqualified victory. 
USNO captured 14 of 32 seats, UPKO 12 and SCA 5 (Yusoff, 1999). USNO 
required 17 seats to form the state government. Mustapha persuaded SCA leaders to 
form a coalition with USNO by promising the SCA elected representatives cabinet 
positions. USNO-SCA alliance formed the state government on April 28th, 1967 with 
Mustapha as Chief Minister, and 2 ministers from USNO and SCA respectively.  
The exclusion of UPKO in the USNO-SCA government, however, did not satisfy 
Mustapha as Stephens as the non-Muslim leader was still not completely alienated 
from Sabah’s politics. Thus, Mustapha persuaded key UPKO members to defect to 
Sabah Alliance by offering them cabinet posts, timber concessions and other 
inducements (Ross, 2001). As a result, two UPKO elected representatives, including 
Payar Juman of Kiulu55 who was later appointed as Minister of Social Welfare, 
defected from UPKO and joined USNO. After the defection, Mustapha and federal 
government blocked financial assistance for UPKO. This prompted Stephens to 
dissolve UPKO and join USNO the same year (1967) with the hope the party could 
regain access to the Sabah government, share in the distribution of offices and 
prevent further defections from its ranks. Unfortunately, such a decision led to the 
end of Stephens’ domination as Mustapha gained full control over Sabah’s politics.  
This provided the federal leaders an opportunity to impose the Muslim-first model of 
government in Sabah. Encouraged by the federal leaders, Mustapha began to 
integrate diverse Muslim ethnic groups in Sabah as desired by federal government. 
To achieve this, “Mustapha tried actively to promote Islam as a means of creating 
55 Kiulu is a state constituency located in Tuaran, and is part of Tuaran parliamentary/federal 
constituency.  
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cultural and religious uniformity within the state. In 1971, he introduced a bill to 
amend Article 5A of the state constitution to make Islam the official religion of the 
state. He also instituted an intensive program of Islamic conversion in the state” 
(Yusoff, 1999, p. 13). To facilitate the systematic conversion into Islam of the 
indigenous peoples, he established the United Sabah Islamic Association (USIA) on 
August 14th, 1969. Mustapha’s effort in propagating Islam had the desired result. By 
February 1974, over 75,000 indigenous peoples of Sabah had converted to Islam 
(Yusoff, 1999). This pleased the federal leaders as they viewed Mustapha’s success 
in propagating Islam as a good start for the implementation of Muslim-first model of 
government, leading to the improvement of relationship between state and federal 
government.  
However, in 1970, in the second term of Mustapha as the Chief Minister, after Tun 
Abdul Razak had replaced Tunku56, the federal-state relations once again began to 
deteriorate. During this period, Razak described Mustapha’s policies and action as 
Chief Minister as contrary to federal interests. He accused Mustapha of actively 
assisting the Moro rebels in Philippines. Apart from that, Razak also accused 
Mustapha of hoping to become a Sultan (King) of Sabah as he came up with an idea 
of taking Sabah out of Malaysia and incorporating this land with the Sulu 
archipelago in the Southern Philippines (Chin, 2008). This was against the Malayan 
leaders’ ambition of implementing the Malayan model of government in Sabah. For 
this reason, Razak prepared to oust Mustapha from the post of Chief Minister and 
sought an alternative Sabah-based political party to weaken Mustapha’s electoral 
strength.  
56 He was the second Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaysia. 
123 
 
                                                          
Razak was well aware that relations between Stephens and Mustapha were 
characterized by prolonged tension, and that despite being isolated from Sabah’s 
politics Stephens remained popular at the grassroots level. Hence, Razak asked 
Stephens to team up with Harris Salleh, USNO’s secretary general and a Minister for 
Industrial Development in Mustapha’s government, to create a new political party 
called Bersatu Rakyat Jelata Sabah (Sabah People’s United Front, BERJAYA). 
BERJAYA was formed as a multi-ethnic political party led by Donald Stephens and 
Harris Salleh on July 15th, 1975. It then contested in the 1976 state’s elections and 
gained an outright majority of seats in the State Legislative Assembly (SLA)57 
capturing 28 of 48 seats58, USNO captured 20 and SCA did not win any seat. 
Consequently, Mustapha was ousted from the post of Chief Minister and on April 
20th, 1976 BERJAYA government was sworn in with Stephens, who become Fuad 
Stephens following his conversion to Islam in 1971, once again appointed as the 
Chief Minister and Harris Salleh as the Deputy Chief Minister. The formation of the 
BERJAYA state government strengthened the Malayan leaders’ effort to execute the 
Muslim-first model of government in Sabah.  
 
4.4 West Malaysia’s Model of Government in Sabah during BERJAYA Rule 
      (1976-1985) 
Two months after the formation of BERJAYA state government, on June 6th 1976, 
Fuad Stephens who had begun to oppose the incursion of the federal government into 
Sabah politics died tragically in a plane crash near Kota Kinabalu airport (Aziz, 
2013, p. 89). Those killed in the crash included Datuk Peter Mojuntin (Minister of 
57 SLA in Sabah also known as Dewan Undangan Negeri (DUN). 
58 There were 48 seats contested during 1976 election with an increase of 16 seats compared to only 
32 seats in 1967 election.    
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Local Government Affairs), Datuk Chong Tahin Vun (Minister of Transportation and 
Public Works), Datuk Salleh Sulong (State Finance Minister) and Darius Binion 
(Assistant Minister to the Deputy Chief Minister). In the aftermath of the tragedy, 
and after investigations by the Australian GAF NOMAD aircraft manufacturer were 
completed, despite the fact that Malaysia had not yet publicly released their final and 
full report of the investigation, Mohd. Ali bin M Shariff, the Deputy Communication 
Minister of Malaysian government made the following statement on the findings on 
October 28th, 1976 (Bennett, 1976):  
the findings of an investigation did not reveal any technical errors or sabotage 
as being the cause of the air crash. What they have instead discovered is that 
the fault was due to human error. It was also revealed that the aircraft’s 
storage space at the back of the aircraft was loaded with goods above the 
maximum load. As a consequence, this resulted in the aircraft losing control 
when it attempted to land at the Kota Kinabalu Airport, thus resulting in the 
accident (Sta Maria, 1978, p. 21-22).  
Many, however, believed the crash was premeditated and engineered by state and 
federal leaders to sabotage Fuad to ensure that any local leader must be supportive of 
the federal agenda and “even today, many people still subscribe to this theory” 
(Golingi, 2013, June 13). 
This belief was strengthened with the appointment of Harris Salleh, the Muslim 
leader with strong UMNO connections, as successor to Fuad. As the new Chief 
Minister of Sabah, Harris had strong political support from the newly elected Prime 
Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamad, and was bent on strengthening the Malay-
Muslim political dominance and weakening non-Muslim indigenous political 
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influence. He embarked on efforts to ensure the Kadazan - who were the majority 
ethnic group - appeared culturally inferior (Puyok, 2011). To dilute their (Kadazan) 
political influence Harris categorized all indigenous people in Sabah into one ethnic 
group called Pribumi59, which altered Sabah’s demographic character from non-
Muslim dominated to Malay-Muslim dominated through systematic legalization of 
Muslim illegal immigrants from other countries such as Indonesia, Philippines and 
Pakistan (this issue will be discussed further in chapter 5). At the same time, Harris 
also ordered Pesta Kaamatan (harvest festival) to be renamed Pesta Rakyat (People’s 
Festival). This ignited criticisms from a young Kadazan leader in Harris’ cabinet, 
Joseph Pairin Kitingan, who believed such a move not only diluted the Kadazan 
ethnic identity, but also made them constitutionally inferior to the Malays who were 
described as bumiputra in the federal constitution. The effort of the federal leaders 
and Harris to prioritize Malay-Muslims and offer them socioeconomic advancement 
opportunities convinced Pairin to take this view.  
Harris was angered by Pairin’s criticism seriously and gave him his marching orders. 
Pairin was forced to resign from BERJAYA and was also sacked from his state 
cabinet post on August 15th 1984 (Chin, 1999a, p. 7)60. To completely cast Pairin out 
of Sabah politics, Harris declared Tambunan constituency vacant and called for a by-
election on December 29th, 1984. To remain in the state’s political arena, Pairin 
contested as an independent. In his political campaign, apart from drawing attention 
to Harris’s effort to marginalize non-Muslim indigenous people through the 
introduction of the Pribumi term and the legalization of Muslim illegal immigrants, 
59 Pribumi is a Malay word that means indigenous people. 
60 BERJAYA was a multi-racial party and did not require political collaboration with ethnic based 
political parties as BERJAYA comprised political leaders of all ethnic groups in Sabah. In other 
words, during BERJAYA’s era, Sabah’s government was not a government of coalition parties, rather 
it was made up of a single political party.   
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Pairin also highlighted wrongdoing committed by Harris. According to Puyok 
(2011), Pairin accused Harris of handing over Labuan to the federal government 
without any compensation for the state or for the people of Sabah, claiming that 
Harris himself was the only individual who benefited from the transfer. This 
accusation led to the growing anti-BERJAYA sentiment in Sabah, and particularly 
the electorate in Tambunan. Consequently, when the by-election result was 
announced, Pairin had managed to beat BERJAYA candidate, Roger Ongkili, by a 
margin of four to one.  
Harris was not happy with the by-election result, and downgraded Tambunan’s status 
from a district to a sub-district, and withdrew government officers and facilities from 
this constituency (Kong, 1986, July 7). Despite this undemocratic gesture from 
Harris, the people in Tambunan did not waver in their support for Pairin as they 
wanted him to continue to fight for their political rights and interests as the 
indigenous people of Sabah (Chin, 1999a). Accordingly, Pairin formed a political 
party called Parti Bersatu Sabah (Sabah United Party, PBS). This party was officially 
registered on March 5th, 1985 with the aim of defending the political rights and 
interests of indigenous peoples regardless of their religion. Fearful that the 
establishment of PBS would further strengthen Pairin’s political influence in Sabah, 
supported by Mahathir Harris advised Sabah Governor, Adnan Robert, to dissolve 
the SLA and called for a fresh state election on April 20th - 21st, 1985. In this 
election, Mahathir sent federal ministers to support BERJAYA, promising more 
socioeconomic development funds for the state and on-the-spot grants (Kong, 1986, 
July 7). In addition, in his heated ceramah (political campaign) Mahathir accused 
PBS of being anti-Islam and Pairin a ‘Catholic chauvinist’, and that the federal 
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government would ‘swim and sink’ with BERJAYA. This made Harris confident that 
BERJAYA would obtain a majority in the SLA.  
Despite this, BERJAYA was thrashed in this election with PBS emerging as the clear 
electoral victor. In describing this, Yusoff noted that,  
despite its formidable advantages, BERJAYA suffered a stunning defeat. 
BERJAYA retained only six seats, compared to the forty-four it previously 
held61, and Harris Salleh himself lost his Tenom seat to Kadoh Agundong, a 
virtual unknown, by 895 votes. Mustapha’s Muslim-based USNO, which had 
been expelled from the BN in 1984, captured sixteen seats, with PBS winning 
clear majority with twenty-six seats (including one Pasok candidate who had 
defected to PBS)  (2001, p. 29).  
This resulted in the fall of BERJAYA and the disruption of the federal leaders’ effort 
to implement the West Malaysia’s model of government in Sabah as the PBS 
government was dominated by non-Muslims headed by Pairin.  
 
4.5 West Malaysia’s Model of Government in Sabah during PBS Rule 
     (1984-1994) 
After the establishment of the PBS government, Mahathir encouraged Mustapha of 
USNO to take legal proceedings against Pairin. Mustapha demanded that the State 
Governor (Yand Dipertuan Negeri, YDPN) announce as void the appointment of 
61 In 1981 election, there were 48 seats contested. Of these, 44 captured by BERJAYA, 3 went to 
USNO, and 1 for the Sabah Chinese Consolidated Party (SCCP).  
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Pairin as Chief Minister before the Sabah High Court (Tan, 2011). Mustapha also 
demanded the YDPN exercise his discretion under Article 6(3) of the Sabah 
Constitution by appointing himself (Mustapha) as Chief Minister. This demand, 
however, was unsuccessful as Justice Tan Chiew Thong concluded that the YDPN 
could not appointed Mustapha as Chief Minister because USNO did not win the 
election (Tan, 2011). Pairin, on the other hand, was entitled to the post of Chief 
Minister following the success of PBS in gaining an outright majority of seats in the 
SLA. The decision by the judge was based on Malaysia’s consociational democratic 
system of majority rule.   
Following his failure in bringing Pairin down through legal challenge, Mustapha and 
Harris then launched a series of political demonstrations. At the same time, they also 
orchestrated public violence in Kota Kinabalu, Sandakan and Kudat, which allegedly 
had the tacit blessing of the federal government and resulted in a proclamation of an 
emergency to justify a takeover of state government by the federal government (New 
York Times, 1986, March 29). The people of Sabah claimed that Mustapha and 
Harris manipulated the presence of thousands of illegal Muslim immigrants from the 
Philippines, as Sabahan Muslims did not have a problem with Pairin (Ling, 2012, 
September 14). These immigrants were given food, money and permission to stay in 
the state mosque with their wives and children for a week, and in return, they were 
required to hold the demonstrations, setting off fish bombs throughout the cities. The 
violence, as Firus noted, “caused 18 bomb blasts, 14 fires, 2 explosions along with 
fire, 32 false bomb blasts calls, 5 unexploded bombs found, 2 civilians were killed, 
10 people were injured which included policeman, 30 warehouses were destroyed 
which involved the loss estimated at RM6.3 million. A total of 1, 260 people have 
been arrested for their involvement in the demonstrations” (1986, p. 36).  
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Despite the public violence, Mustapha and Harris failed in their attempt to bring 
Pairin down. As long as Pairin remained the Chief Minister, federal leaders together 
with Mustapha and Harris continued to undermine him. Federal leaders advised the 
State Governor (Yang Dipertuan Negeri, YDPN) to dissolve the Dewan Undangan 
Negeri (State Legislative Assembly, SLA) and call a fresh state election on February 
26th, 1986, a year after the 1985 election. The objective for the dissolution of SLA 
was to give the local Muslim-led party an opportunity to gain electoral victory, 
isolating PBS from state politics. In this state election, however, PBS surprisingly 
gained a bigger victory by winning 34 out of 48 seats, an additional 8 seats. In 
contrast, BERJAYA won just 1 seat, USNO 12 seats and Sabah Chinese 
Consolidated Party (SCCP) 1 seat. Having won more than a two-thirds majority, the 
PBS government was sworn in and Pairin once again became the Chief Minister.  
As he was well aware that the federal government was in charge of the national 
coffers, Pairin as the leader of the PBS attempted to join BN to ensure that Sabah 
would get funds for socioeconomic development from the federal government. The 
federal government also was well aware that BN had no choice but to accept PBS or 
it would mean risking the loss of Sabah parliamentary seats to the opposition in the 
upcoming general election. Arguably, even if PBS was dominated by non-Muslims, 
the inclusion of PBS into the BN coalition would create an opportunity for the 
implementation of a Muslim-first model of government. This was because the BN 
coalition structure required all non-dominant parties to support UMNO as the 
dominant party within the BN coalition, thus making it possible for the forced 
implementation of Muslim-first model by the UMNO leaders in Sabah. Accordingly, 
a few months before the general election, on August 8th, 1986, the PBS application to 
join the BN was finally accepted (Yusoff, 2002). 
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Following this, Mahathir began to take the necessary steps to implement the Muslim-
first model of government in Sabah through his refusal to recognize PBS leadership. 
Yusoff (2001) noted that in order to achieve this, Mahathir appointed Malay staff 
from West Malaysia into the upper ranks of the Sabah administrative hierarchy. This 
inevitably placed Sabah under greater federal control as various socioeconomic 
development projects were placed under the control of upper rank Malay officials, 
leaving the state government with fewer roles in these projects. In responding to this 
development, Pairin described Mahathir’s refusal to recognize the PBS leadership as 
a ploy to prevent them from leading the state government because of their social 
identity as non-Muslims (Yusoff, 2001). This re-ignited the anti-federal sentiment 
among the non-Muslims population in Sabah. As a result, the relationship between 
the non-Muslim indigenous-led state government and the Malay-led federal 
government that was stable after the PBS joined the BN coalition once again became 
uneasy.   
The non-Muslim indigenous-led state government and the Malay-led federal 
government relations became even tenser when Pairin “released a directive calling 
for the replacement of the term pribumi by bumiputra which would place the 
indigenous people in Sabah at the same level as the Malays in Peninsular Malaysia 
(West Malaysia). Pairin also carried out drastic restructuring of the civil service to 
improve efficiency. He removed the practice of seeking the Village Development 
and Security Committee’s (Jawatankuasa Keselamatan dan Kemajuan Kampung or 
JKKK) approval for land applications, permits for housing construction, trading and 
firearm licenses, education, scholarships, and other related applications. Pairin 
alleged that JKKK was introduced by BERJAYA as a means of political control 
rather than as a tool to help the people. He also restructured MUIS (Majlis Ugama 
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Islam Sabah/Sabah Islamic Council) to ensure that missionary works were carried 
out by qualified officials to prevent forced conversions involving non-Muslims” 
(Puyok, 2011, p. 9). These measures posed a threat to any effort to implement the 
West Malaysia’s model of government in Sabah because such moves weakened 
Muslim political influence. The restructuring of MUIS, for example, weakened their 
political influence as they no longer were able to perform Islamic missionary 
activities without a qualification such as a Diploma in Islamic Mission and official 
permission from the PBS government to perform this activity.  
As these moves posed a threat to West Malaysia’s model of government in Sabah, 
Mahathir began to initiate the arrest of PBS key leaders under the Internal Security 
Act (ISA). Among them were Jeffery Kitingan, Benedisc Topin, Abdul Rahman 
Ahmad, Damit Undikai, Vincent Chung, Albinus Juarie and Arifin Hamid. They 
were charged with having a plan to turn Pulau Balambangan (Balambangan Island) 
of North Kudat into the PBS military training base to take the state out of Malaysia 
(Yosoff, 2002). 
The uneasy state-federal relationship became more apparent after Pairin withdrew 
PBS from BN on October 16th, 1990 to support Gagasan Rakyat (People’s Might, 
GR), the opposition coalition led by Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah (a man who was 
widely seen as a threat to UMNO’s monopoly of Malay votes) during the general 
election held on October 20th – 21st 1990 (Hoong, 1991). Mahathir stressed that this 
act was a ‘stab in the back’. Following this, after a series of negotiations to persuade 
Mustapha to join UMNO, Mahathir announced that UMNO would spread its wings 
in Sabah. Thus, on February 22nd 1991, he officially announced that UMNO would 
enter Sabah. On January 10th 1994, Pairin, the Chief Minister, advised the YDPN to 
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dissolve the SLA for state election. The outcome saw PBS capturing 25 state seats 
with the remaining 23 going to the BN (UMNO 18, SAPP 3, LDP 1, AKAR 1). 
Nevertheless, shortly after PBS secured a simple majority, some of its elected leaders 
defected to BN component parties such as UMNO, USNO, PDS,62 PBRS,63 SAPP64 
and AKAR65. As Chin explained,  
although PBS won the election narrowly, the Pairin-led administration 
collapsed within three weeks when Sabah UMNO successfully enticed key 
PBS legislators to defect. The going rate for the early defectors was said to be 
three million ringgit66. The final blow to Pairin came when his younger 
brother, Jeffrey Kitingan, announced that he was leaving PBS to form a new 
party, Parti Democratic Sabah Bersatu (PDSB), which would ultimately seek 
to join the BN. Another key PBS strongman, the party’s secretary general, 
Joseph Kurup, also left and formed Parti Bersatu Rakyat Sabah (PBRS). 
Kurup joined the BN coalition immediately. Yet another key PBS figure and 
former deputy chief minister, Bernard Dompok, formed Parti Demokratik 
Sabah (PDS) and it too became a component of the BN (1999a, p. 9).  
Many believed that the federal leaders had given the defectors what the locals 
described as political kataks (the Malay word for frog)67 worth up to one million 
ringgit each for leaving PBS (Chin, 1994). This in turn resulted in the collapse of the 
62 An abbreviation for ‘Parti Demokratik Sabah’ (Sabah Democratic Party), a political party headed by 
Bernard Dompok. 
63An abbreviation for ‘Parti Bersatu Rakyat Sabah’ (United Sabah People’s Party), a political party 
headed by Joseph Kurup. 
64 An abbreviation for ‘Sabah Progressive Party’, a political party headed by Datuk Yong Teck Lee. 
65 An abbreviation for ‘Angkatan Keadilan Rakyat’ (People’s Justice Front), a political party formed 
by Mark Koding. 
66 Ringgit is a Malaysian currency. 
67 The word ‘Katak’ here refers to the politicians who hop from one party to another, like frog (Chin, 
1999a: 14). 
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PBS government as it was forced to hand over the state’s political power to UMNO 
Sabah. This then led to the successful implementation of the Muslim-first model of 
government in this Borneo territory.  
  
4.6 West Malaysia’s Model of Government in Sabah after 1994 
On March 19th, 1994, the introduction of a rotational appointment of Chief Minister 
in Sabah led to the division of the people of Sabah into three main communal groups 
just as in West Malaysia (Daily Express, 2005, January 1). It was also a means to 
share political power among the three main communities - the non-Muslim 
bumiputra, Muslim bumiputra and Chinese - represented by various political parties 
in this state. Each leader appointed under this system was given a period of 2 years as 
a Chief Minister. The post was then passed on to another leader representing another 
community. Under this system, seven political leaders were appointed as Chief 
Ministers. These included Sakaran Dandai (Muslim bumiputra), Salleh Said (Muslim 
bumiputra), Yong Teck Lee (Chinese), Bernard Dompok (non-Muslim bumiputra), 
Osu Sukam (Muslim bumiputra), Chong Kah Kiat (Chinese) and Musa Aman 
(Muslim bumiputra).  
This system was discontinued when BN captured 59 of 60 seats in the 2004 state 
election. The remaining seat was won by an independent candidate John Ghani in 
Kuala Penyu constituency. Abdullah Badawi who was then Prime Minister of 
Malaysia and successor to Mahathir announced the abolition of the rotation system 
for the chief minister on January 1st, 2005. The Daily Express (2005, January 1) 
explained that 
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after 10 years and seven Chief Ministers from the three main ethnic groups in 
Sabah, namely the Muslim bumiputra, non-Muslim bumiputra and Chinese, the 
unique Chief Minister rotation system was finally abolished. Prime Minister 
Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, who is also Barisan Nasional (BN) 
Chairman, fresh from leading the BN to the landslide victory in the March 21 
general election, announced the scrapping just as the new Sabah Cabinet 
members were being sworn in at the Istana Negeri on March 27. With the 
abolishment of the system, Datuk Seri Musa Aman, who took over from Tan 
Sri Chong Kah Kiat and whose term was supposed to end in March 2005, 
became Sabah's 14th Chief Minister for the next five years (2005, January 1, p. 
1).  
The end of the rotation system thus closed the door to political leaders of both non-
Muslim bumiputra and the non-bumiputra (Chinese) communities getting back into 
power. This consolidated the UMNO and specifically Muslim bumiputra grip over 
Sabah politics as Musa Aman has remained Chief Minister until now (2017). This 
also signified the success of federal leaders’ efforts to implement the Muslim-first 
model of government in the state (Puyok, 2008, p. 4), especially after PBS re-joined 
the BN coalition for the second time on January 23rd, 200268. In 2002, for example, 7 
out of 11 ministerial positions and 10 out of 18 assistant ministerial positions were 
accorded to Muslim bumiputra. In addition, the position of State Secretary was 
accorded to Muslim bumiputra. Thus the Muslim bumiputra dominated the state 
government by holding 60% (18 of 30) of its key positions.  
68 During the PBS Six Delegates Conference on September 12-13th 2001, the PBS Supreme Council 
made a decision to return to BN. On November 15th 2001, Pairin submitted PBS’s formal application 
to Mahathir. However, the federal leader who was actually instrumental in bringing back PBS back 
into the national coalition was Mahathir’s Deputy Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (Puyok, 201). 
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The Muslim bumiputra domination over state government led non-Muslim 
bumiputra, Muslim bumiputra and Chinese leaders to use ethnicity to make their 
existence more calculable within Sabah’s political arena. The BN structure that was 
essentially based on inter-ethnic political collaboration with Malay dominance has 
been the key driving factor behind the manipulation of ethnicity to further the interest 
of Sabah politicians. This was exemplified by the remark made to me by a Bajau 
man in his forties who said, “all politicians in Sabah, nowadays, are the same. They 
tend to manipulate ethnicity for their own political interests such as to gain and 
maintain political support from the masses, to enable them to become the minister, 
and most importantly to accumulate wealth” (interview with a key informer of this 
study on February 6th, 2014, in Tuaran, Sabah).  
The idea expressed by this Bajau man was well demonstrated by the expansion of 
ethnic politics into Sabah. This was especially true when the politicians in Sabah 
became more determined in urging the rakyat to identify themselves based on their 
ethnic labels. On January 24th, 1995, for example, Pairin who was also the president 
of Kadazan Cultural Association (KCA), in his effort to consolidate political support 
from the non-Muslim indigenous peoples, signed an agreement with Mark Koding of 
United Sabah Dusun Association (USDA)69 to introduce the term Kadazandusun 
rather than Kadazan or Dusun. This was aimed at unifying all indigenous peoples in 
Sabah regardless of whether or not they were Muslims to support PBS. On May 20th 
2000, the Kadazandusun politicians coined the term ‘KadazanDusunMurut’ with its 
acronym ‘KDM’ for similar reasons (Puyok & Bagang, 2011; Puyok, 2011).  
69 USDA was an ethnic based non-governmental organization established in 1960s by the indigenous 
people who refused to call themselves as Kadazan due to the belief that such ethnic label is a British 
creation (Stephen, 2000).  
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More recently, various indigenous politicians throughout Sabah have urged the 
government to upgrade their ethnic labels from the status of sub-ethnic to full 
ethnicity for their own political interests. For example they requested that Rungus be 
upgraded from a sub-ethnic category of KadazanDusunMurut to full ethnicity on 
June 12th, 2015 (Dangin, 2015). Since then Rungus and some other sub-ethnic 
communities such as Kimaragang, Murut, Bonggi, Tombonuo and Tobilung have no 
longer considered themselves as part of ethnic KadazanDusunMurut. As a result, the 
people of Sabah prefer to call themselves according to their newly recognized ethnic 
categories. For example, ‘Momogun’ as an ethnic label for indigenous people was 
introduced on June 3rd 2015 by Henrynus Amin, Christine Van Houten and Slyvester 
Disimon through the formation of the Momogun National Congress (MNC) but this 
did not lead to most indigenous people identifying themselves as Momoguns as they 
preferred to be known as Rungus, Kimaragang, Muruts, Bonggi, Tombonuo and 
Tobilung (Bagang, 2017). The reason for this rejection was mainly because of what 
my Bajau (Muslim-bumiputra) female informant aged forty-two years who I spoke 
with during my visit in Tuaran on February 6th, 2014 described as their leaders’ 
determination to gain political support from the rakyat.  
 
4.7 Implication of Recent Voting Trends in Sabah 
The introduction of West Malaysia’s model of government influenced voting trends 
in Sabah. By the turn of the 21st century, Anderson’s (2013) ‘us’ versus ‘them’ based 
on ethnicity led to a situation where people of the same ethnic group supported 
parties headed by elites of their own ethnic group. The voting patterns in both state 
and parliamentary election in 2004, 2008 and 2013 explain how this happened in this 
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state. In the 2004 and 2008 elections, the BN captured 59 of 60 state seats and 24 of 
25 parliamentary seats, and in the 2013 elections it captured 48 of 60 state seats and 
22 of 25 parliamentary seats (see Table 4.2). Table 4.3 shows that most of the seats 
were captured by UMNO. In the 2004 and 2008 elections, 32 of 59 seats and 13 of 
24 parliamentary won by BN were held by UMNO, and its local coalition partners 
contributed 27 state seats and 11 parliamentary seats. Although BN experienced a 
setback in the 2013 election when it won 48 state seats (a reduction of 11) and 22 
parliamentary seats (a reduction of 2), UMNO remained the main contributor as it 
won 31 of the 48 state and 14 of the 22 parliamentary seats. Its local non-Muslim 
coalition partners such as PBS, UPKO and PBRS, however, contributed only 17 state 
and 8 parliamentary seats. This indicated that the decline in the number of both state 
and parliamentary seats won by BN in the 2013 election was the result of the failure 
of UMNO coalition partners to maintain support from the voters.  
 
 
Table 4.2: Elections Results in Sabah, 2004-2013 
 
 
         Year of Election 
Parties’ Name   2004   2008   2013 
   State Parliament State Parliament State   Parliament 
 
BN   59/60   24/25      59/60   24/25      48/60     22/25 
 
Opposition    1/60     1/25    1/60     1/25  12/60       3/25 
 
 
Source: Adnan & Jamal (2014); Noor (2013); Moniruzaman (2013); Sun (2013); 
Marzuki (2004); Election Commission Malaysia (2009; 2013) 
 
 
The 2013 election saw an increase in the number of state and parliamentary seats 
won by the opposition parties of Parti Keadilan Rakyat (National Justice Party, 
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PKR), Democratic Action Party (DAP), Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), State 
Reform Party (STAR) and Sabah Progressive Party (SAPP) as they had won only 
one seat at both state and parliamentary elections in 2004 and 2008. Together the 
opposition parties captured 12 state and 3 parliamentary seats in this state in the 2013 
election. This was the result of the formation of three non-Muslim dominated parties 
in Sabah but this divided the KadazanDusunMurut political elites and weakened their 
political bargaining (Puyok & Bagang, 2011). After the fall of PBS government in 
1995, two non-Muslim dominated parties were formed called Parti Demokratik 
Sabah (Sabah’s Democratic Party, PDS) and Parti Bersatu Rakyat Sabah (United 
Sabah People’s Party, PBRS). The PDS, renamed the United Pasok Momogun 
Kadazandusun Organization (UPKO) as an attempt to resurrect the old UPKO 
formed by Stephens in 1964, was founded by Bernard Dompok in 1994 after the split 
from PBS. The PBRS was founded by Joseph Kurup, who left PBS in 1994. 
Together, these non-Muslim dominated parties were expected to be a force in 
securing strong support for BN among the non-Muslim indigenous groups in Sabah.  
However, as a result of the strong Malay-Muslim grip over state government through 
the implementation of Muslim-first model of government, political support from the 
non-Muslim indigenous people weakened. This happened due to the growing 
disappointment among non-Muslim indigenous groups with their parties’ efforts to 
unite them politically. Puyok and Bagang pointed out that  
although the calls for unity have grown louder and stronger, the three leaders 
appear to be somewhat unenthusiastic about it. The reason is more personal 
than technical. The PBS called the UPKO to walk hand in hand with Pairin for 
the betterment of the KadazanDusunMurut community. The UPKO, however, 
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insisted that if there was a plan to unite the KadazanDusunMuruts, it must be 
through an appropriate platform. It proposed the UPKO to be the platform 
because it was a ‘pure’ Kadazandusun party, unlike the multi-racial PBS (2011, 
p. 188). 
The disagreement among the three leaders disappointed the non-Muslim indigenous 
people because it indicated they were pursuing their own interests rather than those 
of the rakyat and this further divided the non-Muslim communities 
(KadazanDusunMurut).   
 
Table 4.3: Seats Captured by UMNO and its Coalition Partners in Sabah, 2004-2013 
    
 
    
Type of Seats           2004          2008    2013  
   State Parliament State Parliament State   Parliament 
 
UMNO   32/59    13/24   32/59      13/24 31/48    14/22 
 
UMNO Coalition  27/59    11/24   27/59      11/24 17/48      8/22 
Partners 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Hazis (2015, p. 14); Puyok (2008); Mohamad (2004);             
Election Commission Malaysia (2009; 2013). 
 
This drove the non-Muslims to support the opposition. Consequently, the BN lost 10 
non-Muslim majority seats and 1 mixed seat70 at the state level. BN also lost nine 
non-Muslim seats, but added 1 Muslim majority seat of Beaufort at the parliamentary 
level. This indicated the decline of non-Muslim support for the BN but did not 
70 While the mixed seat here refers to constituency with no significant different in terms of ethnic 
voters share of population proportion, the non-Muslim majority seats (as well as Muslim and Chinese 
majority seats) refers to constituencies with more than 51% of voters are from these ethnic groups 
respectively. 
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necessarily affect the Muslims as they remained the key supporter of BN in Sabah. 
Table 4.4 shows that BN’s popular vote in Sabah remained significant at more than 
60% in the 2008 (68.9%) and 2013 (61.5%) elections in Muslim bumiputra areas, but 
declined from 59.6% in the 2008 election to 44.4% in the 2013 election in non-
Muslim bumiputra areas. The BN’s popular vote in the Chinese majority 
constituencies declined from 35.6% in 2008 election to 34.2% in 2013 election. 
However, in mixed seats, BN’s popular vote remained strong at more than 55% 
despite it declining from 63.4% in 2008 election to 56.5% in 2013 election. 
 
 
Table 4.4: BN’s Popular Vote by Ethnic Divide in Sabah, 2004-2013 (in Percentage) 
    
 
    
Type of Seats            2004 (%)       2008 (%) 2013 (%) 
 
 
Muslim bumiputra Seats  66.0    68.9    61.5 
 
Non-Muslim bumiputra seats  58.6    59.6    44.4 
 
Chinese seats    35.6    35.6    34.2 
 
Mixed seats    62.1    63.4    56.5 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Hazis (2015, p. 14); Puyok (2008); Mohamad (2004) 
 
 
The decline in BN’s popular votes in each ethnic based seat is in line with the decline 
in its total popular votes at both state and parliamentary in the 2008 and 2013 
elections. As Table 4.5 shows, BN’s popular votes declined from 61.6% in 2008 to 
55.8% in 2013 state elections. Its popular vote in the parliamentary elections also 
declined from 61.2 in 2008 to 54.8% in 2013. In contrast, the opposition’s popular 
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votes increased from 38.4% in the 2008 state election to 44.2% in the 2013 state 
election. The opposition’s popular votes also improved from 38.8% in the 2008 
parliamentary election to 45.2% in the 2013 parliamentary election.   
 
 
Table 4.5: BN and PR’s Popular Vote in Sabah, 2004-2013 (in Percentage) 
                 
 
 
Parties    2004    2008    2013 
   State Parliament State Parliament State  Parliament
        
 
BN   61.5      64.0    61.6     61.2    55.8     54.8 
 
Opposition   38.5     36.0    38.4     38.8    44.2     45.2 
 
 
Source: Election Commission Malaysia (2009; 2013); Hazis (2015); Mohamad 
(2004) 
 
 
The increase in the popular vote for the opposition, however, did not lead to a 
collapse of the UMNO-led BN government because their popular vote remained 
higher in both state and parliamentary elections in Sabah. Disunity among the 
opposition parties, in particular among the political elites of these parties, was the 
cause of this. Even though the opposition parties in Sabah could have improved on 
their popular vote through political collaboration, disunity among them created 
multi-corner contests. Each party refused to compromise on their differences and 
attitudes to each other or make way for political unity under one banner to face their 
common enemy BN. This resulted in UMNO-BN securing a popular vote of more 
than 50% in various seats in 2013 election. This was especially true in some non-
Muslim majority seats such as Keningau, Kota Marudu, Tenom and Pensiangan. 
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Hazis observed that “in four KDM seats (Kota Marudu, Keningau, Tenom and 
Pensiangan), less than 50% of the popular vote went to the BN, but the opposition 
votes were split between the PKR, SAPP, STAR and Independents” (2015, p. 21). In 
some cases, when the opposition parties were dominated by different ethnic groups 
who went separate ways their ability to gain electoral victory eroded. Their decision 
to challenge each other and UMNO-BN even resulted in the opposition parties losing 
their deposits. For example, the Chinese dominated SAPP that contested 8 
parliamentary seats lost their deposit for all 8 seats. It also lost its deposit in 37 of 41 
seats contested. The non-Muslim bumiputra dominated STAR that contested 49 state 
seats lost its deposit in 42 seats and captured only one seat. As for the parliamentary 
seats, STAR contested 20 parliamentary seats and lost its deposit in 18 seats and did 
not win even one seat.  
Thus, the implementation of West Malaysia’s model of government in Sabah 
politically divided the people of Sabah and weakened the non-Muslim political 
bargaining and was the reason why the opposition groups split and challenged each 
other rather than focusing on their common goal of defeating UMNO-BN. This 
model of government created problems related to intra- and inter-party coordination. 
Although the opposition parties could have used this model of government by 
forming a non-Muslim-led alliance to increase their chance to win the election, they 
attracted voters instead through appeals to candidate qualities alone (Greene, 2007). 
The opposition also could have manipulated the tendency among Muslim voters to 
support political elites of their own ethnic group, but they dismissed this approach. 
As a result, opposition parties lacked the capacity to strengthen their popular vote 
and subsequently failed to weaken UMNO-BN grip over Sabah politics.  
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 4.8 Implications for the Survival of UMNO-led Federal Government 
The successful implementation of West Malaysia’s model of government in East 
Malaysia, in particular Sabah, by the federal leaders also consolidated the rule of 
UMNO-led federal government there at the time when its political influence in West 
Malaysia was waning. This was especially true when the Reformasi movement began 
to gain support from the rakyat. It was a protest movement that had kicked started in 
September 1998 in West Malaysia initiated by Anwar Ibrahim following his sacking 
as Deputy Prime Minister by Mahathir, the then Prime Minister. It started as a 
political campaign calling for the resignation of Mahathir as Prime Minister who was 
labelled as a dictator by Anwar and whose administration was denounced as riven by 
corruption and cronyism (Weiss, 1999). The political campaign subsequently 
resulted in demonstrations, riots and online activism among the rakyat who were 
affected by these allegations. It included a huge rally in Kuala Lumpur on September 
20th, 1998, in the midst of the Commonwealth Games and Queen Elizabeth of 
England’s visit to Kuala Lumpur. Consequently, Anwar and some of his key 
supporters such as Dr. Badrul Amin, Ezam Nor, Saari Sungib, Hishamudin Rais, N. 
Gobalakrishnan, Tian Chua Chang, Lokman Adam and Ghani Haron were finally 
arrested and detained under the Internal Security Act 1960 (ISA 1960).71  
While his key supporters were released in 1999, Anwar was charged with misuse of 
power and sodomy on April 14th, 1999, and sentenced to nine years of imprisonment. 
This did not detract from the growing influence of the Reformasi movement 
71 ISA 1960 (Akta Keselamatan Dalam Negeri 1960, ISA 1960) was a preventive detention law in 
force in Malaysia. It enacted in 1957 and amended in 1960, allowing for detention without trial or 
criminal charges under limited and legally defined circumstances. 
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throughout West Malaysia. The Reformasi movement attracted several Malay non-
governmental organizations such as Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (Islamic Youth 
Movement of Malaysia, ABIM), Malaysian Islamic Reform Society and non-Malay 
non-governmental Organizations like Suara Rakyat Malaysia (Malaysian People’s 
Voice, SUARAM) who joined forces in organizing more demonstrations in West 
Malaysia. They demanded the resignation of Mahathir, the end of UMNO political 
domination, and a change in the national political system from ‘race’-based to issue-
based. Building on the momentum of the Reformasi movement, Anwar’s wife, Wan 
Azzizah Wan Ismail, eventually formed a political party called Parti Keadilan 
Nasional (National Justice Party, PKR) on April 4th, 1999 to provide the rakyat a 
legitimate platform to overthrow Mahathir, ending UMNO political domination and 
to change the political system through elections. Thus, with the slogans of Lawan 
Tetap Lawan (Fight On), Ubah (Change) and Ini Kalilah (This is the moment), PKR 
formed an opposition coalition called Barisan Alternatif (Alternative Front, BA) on 
October 24th, 1999 with Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Pan-Malaysian Islamic 
Party (PAS) to face the UMNO-BN in the 2004 General Election. The growing 
political support for PKR-led opposition from the rakyat ewas demonstrated in the 
1999 General Election when the opposition gained 45 of 193 seats in Dewan Rakyat 
(Parliament of Malaysia), adding 15 seats (including 1 parliamentary seat created by 
Election Commission of Malaysia) to the 30 in the 1995 election. In contrast, despite 
winning the 1999 election, the number of seats captured by UMNO-BN was reduced 
by 14 as it won only 148 seats compared with 162 in 1995 election. The results were 
described by UMNO leaders as the greatest blow for UMNO-BN since 1969. This 
drove Mahathir to finally announce during UMNO’s general assembly in 2002 that 
he would resign as Prime Minister in October 2003 because he believed that such a 
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decision could remediate anger among the Malay voters who flocked to BA, many in 
protest at his treatment of Anwar (Wain, 2010). Mahathir was then succeeded by 
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi who was sworn into office on October 31st, 2003 (Harper, 
2003). 
After five months in office, on March 21st, 2004, Badawi advised the Duli Yang 
Maha Mulia Yang Dipertuan Agong (King of Malaysia, DYMMYDPA) to dissolve 
the existing parliament to hold the 2004 election. In this election, although the 
electorates in West Malaysia were inclined to support the opposition, under Badawi’s 
leadership, UMNO-BN won an overwhelming victory by holding 198 of 219 seats in 
the Dewan Rakyat (Marzuki, 2004; Harper, 2003). Of these, 51 seats were from 
Sabah and Sarawak (Puyok, 2011).  
 
 
Table 4.6: Elections Results and UMNO-BN Hegemony, 1999-2013 
 
 
       Year of Election 
Parties’ Name   1999  2004  2008  2013 
 
 
UMNO-BN   148/193 198/219 140/222 133/222 
-West Malaysia  100/145 147/166   86/166   86/166 
-East Malaysia      48/48     51/53     54/56     47/56 
 
BA/PR       45/193   21/219   82/222  89/222 
-West Malaysia     45/145   19/166   80/166  80/166 
-East Malaysia         0/48       2/53       2/56      9/56 
 
 
Source: Adnan & Jamal (2014); Noor (2013); Moniruzaman (2013); Sun (2013); 
Marzuki (2004) 
 
 
146 
 
Following the success of UMNO-BN in winning almost all parliamentary seats in 
Sabah and Sarawak, federal leaders began to label these Borneo states as a ‘fixed 
deposit’ of votes (Brown & Lim, 2013; Sun, 2013). After the 2008 election many 
began to label Sabah and Sarawak as the ‘kingmaker’. Sun (2013) observed that the 
crucial role of Sabah and Sarawak in determining which way the country would go 
for the ruling BN coalition or for the Barisan Alternatif (Alternative Front, BA) 
which was renamed Pakatan Rakyat (People’s Alliance) on April 1st 2008. In the 
2008 election, when the results were announced, BN had captured 140 of 222 
parliamentary seats with 54 seats from East Malaysia, while PR won 82 seats with 
only 2 from Sabah and Sarawak (Moniruzzaman, 2013). Table 4.6 shows that in the 
2013 election BN captured 133 of 222 parliamentary seats with 47 from Sabah and 
Sarawak, while PR won 89 seats with 9 from Sabah and Sarawak. This meant that 
UMNO-BN lost its two-thirds majority, having lost 7 seats to PR in Sabah and 
Sarawak compared with only 2 in 2008 election.  
The reduced number of seats captured by UMNO-BN in Sabah and Sarawak was due 
to the electoral success of local opposition leaders such as Jeffry Kitingan, Lajim 
Ukin, Yong Teck Lee and Baru Bian through the slogans ‘Sabah for Sabahan’ and 
‘Sarawak for Sarawakian’72. Moniruzamman noted that, “it is only Sabah and 
Sarawak that may keep the BN coalition surviving for some more times, but a slight 
loose in their grip may enable the PR (Pakatan Rakyat or opposition) to change the 
political and electoral landscape in Malaysia” (2013, p. 68-69). In addition, Sun 
wrote, “had Sabah and Sarawak not brought in their 47 seats in the last elections, 
there could have been a change of government in Putrajaya. That’s how critical these 
72 ‘Sabah for Sabahan’ and ‘Sarawak for Sarawakian’ are political slogan used by local opposition 
leaders to urge Sabahans and Sarawakian reject the West Malaysia based political party and support 
local parties respectively.   
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two East Malaysian states are to BN” (2013, April 9). Arguably, UMNO-BN 
campaign has been very effective in maintaining more than 80% winning margin in 
Sabah and Sarawak. In contrast in West Malaysia, after the 2004 election UMNO-
BN constantly failed to achieve a similar margin of electoral victory when it captured 
only 52% of all seats (166). Most importantly, without this sufficient number of 
parliamentary seats from Sabah and Sarawak, BN would fail to get a simple majority 
in the Dewan Rakyat, thus preventing this coalition from forming government. To 
obtain a simple majority in the Dewan Rakyat, each party or coalition party is 
required to win 112 parliamentary seats in elections. However, in 2008 and 2013 
election, UMNO-BN captured only 86 of 166 parliamentary seats in West Malaysia. 
Hence, if it had not won 54 and 47 parliamentary seats in the 2008 and 2013 
elections respectively in Sabah and Sarawak, BN would have failed to get the simple 
majority of seats in the Dewan Rakyat.   
 
4.9 Conclusion 
This chapter described the political development in Sabah that focused on the federal 
leaders’ role in the implementation of West Malaysia’s model of government based 
on ethnic divide. Although it appeared to be not as strong as in West Malaysia, the 
implementation of such a model of government led to the expansion of ethnic politics 
in Sabah. The expansion of ethnic politics, in turn, resulted in the consolidation of 
UMNO-led federal government.  
Accordingly, given their role in the implementation of West Malaysia’s model of 
government in Sabah, this chapter argued that the federal leaders’ effort to 
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implement such a model of government by expanding ethnic politics in this state was 
mainly driven by their determination to stay in power. This is because, without the 
success of UMNO-BN in capturing more than eighty percent of parliamentary seats 
in Sabah, they would have lost power in the 2008 and 2013 general elections. The 
UMNO-BN success in winning those seats in both elections was the result of the 
expansion of ethnic politics in this state by the federal leaders. Nevertheless, it is 
important to stress here that the expansion of ethnic politics was not necessarily the 
result of federal leaders’ efforts to implement ethnic based model of government in 
Sabah, but rather was due to local politicians’ efforts to make their presence more 
significant in Sabah politics. In fact, in order to remain in Sabah’s political arena, 
local politicians such as Stephens, Datu Mustapha, Harris Salleh, Pairin and Musa 
Aman adopted the Malayan leaders’ practice of divide-and-rule based on ethnicity. 
The rakyat, on the other hand, were brainwashed into identifying themselves 
according to specific ethnic labels such as Malay-Muslim, Dusun, Kadazan, 
Kadazandusun, KadazanDusunMurut and Momogun in the pretext of safeguarding 
their own ethnic interests.  
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 Chapter 5: The Demographic Change and Ethnic Politics in Sabah 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The population of East Malaysia traditionally does not fit with what Boulanger 
(2009) calls the ‘tri-ethnic schema’ of the West Malaysia plural society which has 
three major ethnic groups, Malays who are the majority, followed by ethnic Chinese 
and ethnic Indians. Also, unlike in West Malaysia where the Orang Asli as the only 
indigenous community are a minority group, Sabah has more than 30 indigenous 
communities73 and the Malays are a minority (Chin, 2014b, p. 90). Before the 
formation of the Federation of Malaysia, Malays were the minority as they accounted 
for less than 40 percent of Sabah’s total population (Department of Statistics 
Malaysia, 1970; Fernandez, Amos & Predza, 1974; Milner, 2008). The people of 
Sabah who professed different religions coexist peacefully (Sintang, 2014) and hence 
when Sabah together with Malaya, Sarawak and Singapore, came together to form 
Federation of Malaysia in 1963, they supported political parties regardless of ethnic 
differences and the leaders of these early communal political parties promoted multi-
ethnic membership and focused more on regional sentiment (Puyok, 2011). The 
demographic and political characteristics of Sabah posed a threat to the ruling 
73 Indigenous communities of Sabah consists of Tangaa’, Rungus, Murut, Orang Sungai, Tidong, 
Kimaragang, Tobilung, Tagas, Kimaragang, Sandayoh, Sonsogon, Sukang, Tagaro, Tatana, Tutung, 
Bisaya, Lotud, Kwijau/Kuriyou/Kuyau, Gana, Bonggi, Minokok, Mangkaak/Kunatong, Pingas, 
Bundu, Liwan, Tagahas, Tindal, Tagol, Timugon, Tombonuo, Lun Bawang/Lun Dayeh, Baukan, 
Serundung, Okolod, Pingas, Lingkabau, Dumpas, Rumanau, Lobu, Sinobu, Makiang, Kolobuan, 
Sinobu, Malapi, Paluan, Selungai and Malay-Brunei.  
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Malay-led-federal coalition parties’ efforts to maintain a grip over Malaysia’s 
politics through the ethnic divide. It thus forced the federal leaders with the help of 
some local Muslim leaders to apply what Nagata (1979) described as ‘various ways’ 
to alter Sabah’s demographic character from non-Muslim dominated to Malay-
Muslim dominated as they believed that such a move could contribute to the 
escalation and diffusion of ethnic politics in this region. 
Observers such as Sadiq commented that:  
the incorporation of illegal immigrants through citizenship documents is 
connected to the electoral politics of Sabah. Legalising illegal [Muslim] 
immigrants has become the preferred strategy of the dominant Malay parties 
when overt Malaysization (through conversion, internal migration and so on) 
does not proceed quickly enough. The goal of the Malay, who dominated the 
federal government, is to change the demographic and political character of 
Sabah so that it become Malay-Muslim dominated (2005, p. 116).  
Therefore, with the legalization of illegal Muslim immigrants through the systematic 
granting of citizenship (Chin, 2014a; 2014b), Sabah’s demographic character 
eventually changed from non-Muslim dominated to the Malay-Muslim dominated. 
As Frank noted “it is an open secret that Sabah’s demography has been changed by 
special exercises condoned as ‘Project 1’ and ‘Project 2’ that enable the immigrants 
to legalise their status” (2006, p. 73).  
Apart from the legalization of illegal Muslim immigrants, it is also important to 
recognize the significance of the federal-led Islamisation of Sabah’s population 
which changed its demographic character. The objective was to assimilate Sabahans, 
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especially the indigenous people, into Malayness (Barlocco, 2014). Mustapha, for 
example, with the support of federal government practiced an Islamization policy 
that reached its peak between 1970 and 1974. Called the ‘one language, one culture, 
one religion policy’ its aim was to assimilate the people of Sabah into Malayness. 
Although Mustapha’s reign ended after the collapse of USNO in 1976, the 
Islamization policy has continued until today.  
The federal and local Muslim political leaders moved to manipulate issues related to 
cross-border migration, citizenship and Islamization for the pursuit of demographic 
change and this resulted in the growing importance of ethno-religious sentiment in 
Sabah. Thus, ethnic politics in Sabah became more pronounced than ever before as 
“bargaining for political power was no longer based on multi-racial appeals but 
ethno-religious sentiments” (Puyok, 2011, p. 19). Ethno-religious sentiments used for 
political power among political elites in turn led to heightened ethno-religious 
tension. This invited historical examination of the significance of both cross-border 
migration and the Islamization policy in changing Sabah’s demographic character 
with emphasis on their contribution to the escalation and diffusion of ethnic politics 
and how such activity accommodated the growing ethno-religious friction in this 
region.  
This chapter examines how federal leaders, with the help of some local Muslim 
political leaders, decided to legalize the illegal immigrants74 and introduced the 
74 The concept of illegal immigrants in this study refers to what Kassim (2009a) described as (i) a 
foreigner who enters a country without permit or pass, (ii) a foreigner who enters a country legally 
but stays on without renewing the permit or pass, (iii) a contract worker who violates the work 
permit by changing their work or their employer, (iv) a foreigner who misuses the pass visit, (v) 
those who possess fake document or legal document through illegal means, (vi) a foreign workers 
who fails to renew his or her working permit, and (vii) a refugee who fail to renew his or her yearly 
IMM13 pass.  
 
152 
 
                                                          
Islamization policy as their preferred strategies to pursue demographic change in 
Sabah. It also shows how the escalation and diffusion of ethnic politics contributed to 
the growing ethnic friction in this region. Ethnic friction related to tensions between 
the non-Muslim and the Malay-Muslim populations and between the indigenous and 
the ‘new citizens’.  
In examining the impact of federal and local Muslim leaders’ strategies to 
manipulate cross-border migration and Muslim conversion of the indigenous people, 
I shall apply Brauch’s (2011) and Cesari’s (2009) social constructive perspective 
which looks at cross-border migration and religious difference as a source of socio-
political change. Comparing the phenomenon of cross-border migration and religious 
conversion in pre-independence and post-colonial Sabah is important as such an 
exercise will eventually reveal the significant role played by the federal and the local 
Muslim political leaders.   
Accordingly, the first section of this chapter briefly examines the phenomenon of 
cross-border migration, religious difference and social relationship in pre-
independent Sabah. It has to be noted that although cross-border migration and 
religious conversions have taken place in Sabah since before the colonial era, they 
did not have a significant effect in those times on ethnic relations due to the 
insignificant role of ethnicity in Sabah’s politics. This is followed by an examination 
of how federal and local Muslim political leaders’ efforts to change the existing 
demographic character through the manipulation of cross-border migration and 
religious conversion for their political interests have made ethno-religious sentiments 
vital in Sabah’s politics. The third section investigates the rise of ethno-religious 
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sentiment and its impacts on the relationship between non-Muslim and Muslim 
groups, and between the indigenous and the new citizens in Sabah.  
 
5.2 Brief History of Cross-Border Migration and Religious Differences in Pre-
Colonial Sabah 
The phenomena of cross-border migration and the conversion of local peoples to 
Islam are by no means new in Sabah as both activities have taken place since even 
before the colonial era. Broadly speaking, it is possible to categorize the immigrants 
into two groups namely pre-independence and post-colonial immigrants. Together, 
both groups of immigrants coexist with the Dusunic speaking people of various tribal 
groups, whom Luping (1985; 1994) calls the ‘original inhabitants’ or Mohamad 
(1977) calls the ‘definitive race of Sabah’, and the Islamised local peoples of the 
territory. As they contributed to changing Sabah’s demographic character, pre-
independence and post-colonial immigrants and new Muslim converts were often 
linked with the development of Sabah politics (Lim, 2013), especially in the context 
of ethnic politicization.  
Historically, in the period before independence in 1963, Sabah’s population was 
dominated by the non-Muslims, in particular the ‘original inhabitants’ of Sabah who 
were traditionally non-Muslims. The Department of Statistics Malaysia (1970) and 
Fernandez, Amos and Predza (1974) said the population percentage of non-Muslim 
in 1960 was about 60.1% (272,964 individuals) of the total population of Sabah 
(454,421 individuals) and that the population percentage of Muslims was only about 
181,457 individuals (39.9% of the total population). The non-indigenous population 
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was a result of cross-border migration of Muslims from the neighboring countries of 
Indonesia and the Philippines, and non-Muslims from China and India. While the 
Muslim immigrants from Indonesia and the Philippines arrived in Sabah long before 
the colonial powers established their presence in this part of the world (Kurus, 1998), 
the non-Muslim immigrants from China and India arrived during the British rule.   
Instead of settling in this territory, however, before 1963 most of the Muslim 
Indonesians and Filipinos preferred to return to their homeland and continue to visit 
Sabah. Transnational mobility among Muslims of Indonesia and the Philippines in 
Sabah was part of their normal life (Lina & Sarkawi, 2011). The geographical 
location of Sabah close to both Indonesia and the Philippines with their porous 
borders allowed easy movements of these people (Lumenta, 2011).  
As most of the Muslim Indonesian and Filipinos were unwilling to settle in Sabah 
permanently, in 1881 the British North Borneo Chartered Company (BNBC) began 
to recruit Chinese labor as a solution to their manpower problem. At the time there 
were only between 60,000 and 100,000 Dusunic speaking people (Tze-Ken, 1998, p. 
13). Thus, they needed to recruit foreign labor to develop the new colony.  
Sir Walter Medhurst was appointed the Immigration Commissioner to recruit the 
labor from China. The British decision to recruit the labor from China, who, in West 
Malaysia identified as Chinese rather than as Haka, Hokkien, Teochew and 
Cantonese, was due to their reputation of being hardworking and not choosy in terms 
of jobs (Badiru, 1993). The non-Muslim Chinese willingness to work in any kind of 
job in fact provided the British with the opportunity to develop not only the 
agricultural sector but also the mining industry. Unlike the Chinese, the locals such 
as the Rungus, the Dusunic speaking people who lived in the northernmost point of 
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Sabah during this era practiced certain taboos. Their culture prohibited them from 
digging certain areas. This was known as pantang larang (taboo). The Rungus male 
(non-Muslim bumiputra) in his seventies even described the planting of coconuts as 
similar to digging one’s own grave. He said, “when the British asked the Rungus in 
Kudat to dig a hole for planting the coconuts, some of their leaders insisted that such 
an act was unacceptable because it was similar to an act of digging a grave for 
themselves” (interview with a key respondent on December 12th, 2013 in Kudat).  
In light of this factor, under Medhurst’s control many non-Muslim Chinese from 
China were recruited who in the 1920s made up one-fifth of Sabah’s population 
(Tze-Ken, 1998, p. 85). Many eventually decided to assimilate and settle in Sabah, 
marrying the locals, primarily the Dusuns. Their offspring adapted to the local 
culture.  
Apart from the Chinese, Punjabis from India were brought into Sabah by Captain 
Harrington following the formation of the Armed Constabulary in 1889 (Gill, 2007). 
Under the Constabulary the Punjabis (also called Orang Sikhs or Sikhs by the locals 
and categorized as Indians by the British) performed paramilitary functions alongside 
the natives as members of the British armed personnel. Gill in explaining this issue 
said:  
“the original force of the constabulary employed by the British North Borneo 
Chartered Company after its formation in 1881 was composed of Sikhs who 
were brought into the country by Capt. Harrington, formerly of the Riffle 
Brigade and the uncle of Lt. Col. C.H. Harrington who was the Commandant of 
the North Borneo Armed Constabulary from 1889 till 1926” (2007, p. 53). 
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The formation of the Constabulary thus led to the emergence of a small population of 
Indians in Sabah, who numbered around 174 in 1911 (Rose, 1912, p. 21). Many of 
them, when World War II ended, returned to India after retiring from the 
constabulary, but a small group remained. Like the Chinese, most of them eventually 
got married to locals and became assimilated into Sabah society (Sandhu & Mani, 
1993, p. 581). The religious similarity between the locals, the Chinese and the 
Punjabis in terms of either Christianity or paganism (animism) and the fact that 
consumption of pork and keeping dogs as pets were not prohibited in the non-
Muslim culture in Sabah enabled the easy integration of both groups of migrants.   
In contrast, despite the fact that they arrived earlier than the Chinese and the 
Punjabis, the Muslim immigrants from Indonesia and the Philippines who decided to 
permanently settle in Sabah were often seen by the locals as the ‘other’ due to 
religious differences. Their religion of Islam prohibited them from consuming pork 
and keeping dogs as pets and these became the main sticking points. Even in cases 
where some of them married locals, their integration into the local society remained 
problematic, especially when they showed reluctance to live among the locals.  
The fact that the pre-independence Muslim immigrants from Indonesia and the 
Philippines hardly integrated into the traditional society of Sabah stood in sharp 
contrast with the easy integration of the Chinese and Punjabis into Sabah’s society. 
This was aptly described by a Kadazandusun man (non-Muslim bumiputra) in his 
70s who was not only a politician but also a local scholar concentrating on Sabah 
politics who remarked: 
we as the real natives of Sabah have never stopped anyone from becoming part 
of our society. All are welcome to live within our community. However, some 
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do not want to recognize our religion and the way we live our life as the non-
Muslim. We are exactly peace loving type of people and have never stopped 
anyone from becoming part of our society, but they tend to insult our religion 
and have no strong will to live within our traditional native society (interview 
conducted on April 2nd, 2014 in Penampang). 
The idea of ‘lacking strong will’ to live within the traditional society of Sabah as 
expressed by this Kadazandusun man indicates very well the fact that difference in 
religion prevented the Muslim immigrants from integrating into Sabah non-Muslim 
society.  
The issue relating to integration into the traditional society, however, has never 
prevented the pre-independence Muslim immigrants from Indonesia and the 
Philippines from being identified as the natives of Sabah. In fact, together with the 
locals or the Dusunic-speaking people, the pre-independence Muslim immigrants 
were identified as ‘native’ by the British following the introduction of Land 
Proclamation 3 in 1913. In contrast, however, the Chinese and Indians despite being 
assimilated into Sabah’s society, as in Malaya, were never referred to by the British 
as the natives of Sabah. This was because the Land Proclamation (Official Gazette, 
February 21st, 1913) stated that “native means any aboriginal inhabitants of Malay 
Archipelago and the children of such an inhabitant by any union of any native or 
aliens” (Government of British North Borneo, 1913). Based on the ‘Proclamation’, 
the term native was only used to refer to the aboriginal inhabitants of the Malay 
Archipelago. Nevertheless, the offspring from such mixed marriages could consider 
themselves as native. Their children usually identified themselves as Sino-Kadazan 
or Sino-Dusun (literally means half Kadazandusun and half-Chinese) or if their 
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father was a native then the children identifed themselves with their father’s 
ethnicity. This may have been the reason why many of the Chinese married locals 
because the native title accorded to their children enabled them to own a land and 
enjoy many other benefits enjoyed by the natives (Pue & Sulaiman, 2013; Opinion, 
2010, December 5; Bulan, 2007). 
The 1960 census of Sabah’s population shows that 37.0% (167,993) of the state’s 
population (454,421) were non-Muslim natives while 31.2% (141,840) were 
Muslims (see Table 4.3 in chapter 4). Although non-Muslims were more numerous 
there were no social barriers between the peoples of Sabah due to their strong 
inclination to view ethnicity as distinct from religion, and focus on the common good 
and social harmony and reject formal social differentiation (Chin, 2015; Lim, 2008; 
2013; Luping, 1985). 
It has to be emphasized that the decision to create social identity based on cultural 
and language similarity (which gave birth to the invention of Kadazan as an ethnic 
category) in the late colonial period of between 1950s and 1960s (Luping, 1985; 
Puyok & Bagang, 2011) later drove the British to reclassify the natives as non-
Muslim natives and Muslims but did not drive a wedge between the people of Sabah. 
In fact, their decision, as Puyok and Bagang (2011), and Hussin (2008) observed was 
merely aimed at identifying themselves as one social group and not meant to 
differentiate themselves. As a consequence, the relationship between the non-
Muslims and Muslims was good, even though both groups tended to live separately 
in their different kampung (village), but they saw each other as their social 
companions and not rivals in political and economic activities. 
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Non-Muslims natives also supported leaders who were of Muslim origin such as Tun 
Mustapha in his demand for Sabah for Sabahans. Datu Mustapha was a Suluk of 
Philippines origin. Despite his origins, the locals recognized him as the ‘father of 
Sabah’s independence’ and ‘father of Sabah’s Development’ (Sabah Foundation, 
2003). Thus, though some of the Muslim natives were seen as immigrants, they were 
nevertheless accepted as Sabahans. Not only were cross-border migration and 
religious differences not major issues in pre-independent Sabah, there were also 
cases where non-Muslim indigenous people married immigrants and embraced 
Islam. The decision to embrace Islam can be described as not politically driven but 
rather based on various personal, informal reasons (Kassim, 2009b).  
The key reason for this is that there was no formal contest for political power in pre-
independent Sabah (Yusoff, 1999). Issues relating to cross-border migration and 
religious differences were irrelevant. Thus, locals were not interested in ethnic 
politics as a kind of social belonging. 
Additionally, before the 1960s, majority of the original people of Sabah were 
uneducated (Chin, 2014a), unaware of regional politics, and were not subject to the 
need to (re)identify their social belonging or to distinguish themselves from each 
other. However, when Sabah gained self-rule and thereafter became part of the 
Malaysian federation many of the ‘original inhabitants’ of Sabah became educated 
following the mandatory requirement for all children to undergo a schooling system 
(Ruslan, 2003; Tze Ken, 2003; Luping, 1994). The people of Sabah began to 
comprehend how both cross-border migration and religious differences were 
impacting on the demography of Sabah, which in turn personally affected their social 
status as the ‘original inhabitants’ of Sabah who had been largely marginalized. 
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5.3 The Growing Importance of Cross-Border Migration and Religious   
Differences in Post-Colonial Sabah 
Both cross-border migration and religious difference assumed importance in Sabah 
following the dramatic increase of its population, especially when the Muslim 
population and in particular the Muslim immigrant population increased (Gunggut, 
Habibun & Zuraidah, 2006) after federation of Malaysia in 1963. Table 5.1 shows 
that half a century after independence, Sabah’s population had increased by 390% 
(an increase of 2,752,321 in 50 years) against the increase of only 165% at the 
national (Malaysia) level for the same period of time, “making Sabah a Muslim 
majority state” (Chin, 2014b, p. 83).  
 
Table 5.1: Population Growth in Malaysia (1960 – 2010) 
 
    Sabah   Sarawak                  Malaysia________ 
Year   Population  Increase  Annual   Population   Increase  Annual   Population   Increase   Annual 
       Growth                                            Growth                                             Growth 
                                                      Rate (%)                                          Rate (%)                                          Rate (%) 
 
1960      454,421           -             -          744,529           -             -                    -               -             - 
1970       636,431    196,883      3.7         976,269      231,740     2.8      10,439,430          -             -      
1980       929,299    277,995      3.9      1,235,553      407,218     2.4      13,136,109    2,696,679   2.6 
199175 1,734,685    805.386      5.9      1,642,771      372,018      2.7     18,102,362    4,966,253   2.6 
2000     2,603,485    868,800      4.5      2,009,893      367,122      2.3     22,198,276    4,095,914   2.6 
2010     3,206,742    603,257      2.1      2,471,140      461,247      1.8     28,334,135    6,135,859   2.0 
 
Total Population 
Increase   2,752,321 (390.0%)        1,726,611 (149.0%)                    17,894,705 (165.0%) 
(1960-2010) 
 
Source: Adapted from Fernandez, Amos & Predza (1974); Department of Statistics 
Malaysia (1970, 1980, 1991, 2000, 2010); Swee-Hock (2007); U.S. Bureau 
of the Census (1978, p.188). 
 
75 Instead of 1990, the census for Malaysia’s population was held only in 1991. For this reason, Table 
5.1 uses the census data for Malaysian population in 1991. 
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The latest census shows a decline in Sabah’s annual population growth rate from 
4.5% in 2000 to 2.1% in 2010 though it remains higher than the national average of 
2.6 in 2000 and 2.0 in 2010; Sarawak also experienced a decline in population 
growth and fertility whereby it registered a population growth rate of 2.3 in 2000 and 
1.8 in 201076. It is also interesting to note that until 1990, the population of Sabah 
was smaller than Sarawak (by 306,254), but by 1991 Sabah had a larger population 
(by 91,914 individuals). Sabah’s population was almost half a million (458,353) 
more than Sarawak in 2000, and by 2010 Sabah’s population was 735,602 more than 
Sarawak. These figures thus indicate that Sabah experienced what Frank (2006) calls 
‘extraordinary’ population growth during these last four decades. 
This extraordinary increase of Sabah’s population coincided with the decline in the 
percentage of non-Muslim bumiputra (KadazanDusunMurut) from 37.0% (167,993) 
in 1960 to only 21.1% (675,070) in 2010. In contrast, there was a percentage increase 
in Muslim bumiputra population from only 31.2% (141,840) of Sabah’s population 
in 1960 to 40.2% (1,290,239) in 2010. The population of non-Muslim non-bumiputra 
also declined in terms of percentage from 23.1% (104,971) of Sabah’s population in 
1960 to 13.6 % (435,519) in 2010. Like the Muslim bumiputra, the population of 
Muslim non-bumiputra consisting mainly of Muslim immigrants from Southern 
Philippines and Indonesia increased rapidly from only 8.7% (39,617) of Sabah’s 
population in 1960 to 25.1% (805,914) in 2010 (see Table 5.2). This changed 
Sabah’s demographic character from non-Muslim dominated to Muslim dominated.    
 
 
76 Sarawak’s population which already high than Sabah in 1960 (744,529 individuals) increased to 
2,471,140 individuals only in 2010 (an increase of 148% or an addition of 1,726,611 individuals in 50 
years).  
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Table 5.2: Ethnic Group Representation in Sabah (1960-2010) 
 
 
Ethnic                Census Year 
Group       1960           1970          1980*          1991           2000          2010 
 
Non-Muslim      167,993     215,811      487,627       397,287      569,678      675,070 
Bumiputra          (37.0%)    (33.9%)       (52.5%)       (22.9%)      (21.9%)      (21.1%) 
                                                             [Non-Muslim] 
Malay-Muslim   141,840     221,264                          606,253   1,031,676   1,290,239 
Bumiputra          (31.2%)     (34.8%)     770,389        (35.0%)      (39.6%)      (40.2%) 
                                                                (82.9%) 
Malay-Muslim     39,617       63,797   [Malay-Muslim]     455,961      626,611      805,914 
Non-Bumiputra    (8.7%)     (10.0%)                          (26.3%)      (24.1%)      (25.1%) 
 
Non-Muslim       104,971    135,559     158,910         275,184      375,518     435,519 
Non-Bumiputra   (23.1%)    (21.3%)     (17.1%)         (11.5%)      (14.4%)     (13.6%) 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Department of Statistics Malaysia (1965; 1970; 1980; 1991; 
2000; 2010).  
 
* The 1980s census collapsed non-Muslim bumiputra, Malay-Muslim bumiputra and 
Malay-Muslim non-bumiputra which included Indonesians and Filipinos (Regis, 
1989, p. 419) into single category of Pribumi, thus making it impossible to obtain 
data for individual ethnic groups. 
 
 
Unlike in India where changes in its demographic character were the result of 
increased fertility rate among Muslims (Balasubramanian, 1984) Sabah’s 
demographic character has been the result of both federal and local Muslim political 
leaders’ use of ‘phantom voters’ to influence the outcome of Sabah’s elections and to 
ensure a Malay-led or Muslim-led state government based on West Malaysia’s 
consociational democracy.  
In doing so, by the late 1960s there were many Malay celup (fake Malay) in Sabah. 
The concept of Malay celup here refers to an individual in Sabah (and Sarawak) who 
is classified by the Malaysian government as Malay due to his or her religious 
similarity with the Malays in West Malaysia.   
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In an effort to increase the Malay celup in Sabah, the federal government introduced 
Project 1 (Loh, 2005), a special exercise of granting Malaysian identification cards to 
Muslim illegal immigrants and Muslim refugees from the Philippines. These 
Muslims were chosen because in terms of spoken language and physical appearance 
they closely resemble the Bajau of Sabah, and therefore can easily disguise 
themselves as Sabah citizens (Frank, 2006). Many of these illegal immigrants and 
refugees were given the opportunity by the Sabah government to become its citizens 
following the establishment of citizenship law and regulation in 1963. Nevertheless, 
in this earlier period, unlike the non-Muslim Chinese and Indians these Muslims 
decided to retain their Filipino citizenship rather than becoming the citizens of 
Sabah. As Kassim (2009a) observed, the Muslim migrants from the Philippines who 
arrived in the 60s and earlier could have applied for citizenship when Sabah achieved 
independence in 1963, but most of them did not do so.  
Most Filipinos regularly come to Sabah for economic purposes. In the late 1960s the 
shortage of labor brought about by special privileges granted to the bumiputra 
opened up work opportunities for Filipinos willing to perform unskilled job or what 
Kassim (2009a) termed the ‘3-D jobs’: dirty, dangerous and difficult jobs. Due to 
their willingness to perform the ‘3-D jobs’, both Sabah and the federal government 
encouraged the Muslim immigrants from Philippines to participate in developing 
various sectors of Sabah’s economy (i.e. primary [agriculture, farming, fishing, 
quarrying] and secondary [construction, processing, manufacturing]) (Hassan, Omar 
& Dolah, 2010).  
While some were recruited through proper processes, most of them arrived 
clandestinely in Sabah and this caused great concern to the indigenous people who 
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viewed them as a threat to their security. Instead of preventing the Muslim illegal 
immigrant evacuees from the insurgency against the Philippines government in 
Mindanao77 from coming to Sabah, the authorities granted them permission to stay 
and work in Sabah under IMM13 social work passes. They were also accommodated 
temporarily in five resettlements: Telipok and Kinarut in Kota Kinabalu, Kampung 
Bahagia of Sandakan, Kampung Selamat of Semporna and Kampung Hidayat of 
Tawau. The IMM13 and the temporary accommodation were given based on the 
conditions that they: a) had been directly affected by the unrest; b) had arrived in 
Sabah between 1970s to 1980s; c) had come from Region 9 (Zamboanga del Norte, 
del Sur, Sibugay); d) were Muslims; and e) must renew their IMM13 social work 
pass every year for an annual fee of RM90.00 per person (Kassim, 2014, p. 19). The 
Malaysian Immigration Department issued IMM13 to 57,000 Filipinos who mostly 
settled in coastal towns such as Sandakan, Tawau and Lahad Datu (Frank, 2006).  
At the time of Mustapha’s term as the Chief Minister (1967-1976), under the 
guidance of Syed Kecik78, a peninsular Malay businessman sent to Sabah by the 
federal leaders to assist Mustapha (Chin, 2014b, p. 84), these political refugees and 
the illegal immigrants were naturalized as citizens of Malaysia (Tham, 2016; Sadiq, 
2009). Mustapha, as a Muslim of Suluk origin decided to secretly make them 
Malaysian citizens through the issue of a Malaysian identification card, a document 
that showed they were legitimate citizens of Malaysia in Sabah (Shukri, 2015). The 
change in their status from either refugees or illegal immigrants to Malaysian citizens 
77 The prolonged conflict between the Philippines Army and the Moro National Liberation Front 
(MNLF), later renamed Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) had caused the Muslim communities 
to move out of the conflict zone of Mindanao (Barrios-Fabian, 2004). 
78 He (Syed Kechik Syed Mohamed Al-Bukhary) was the Mustapha government’s legal advisor from 
1968 until 1975. Many non-Muslims in Sabah believe that he was the real man behind USNO 
government’s aggressive Islamisation effort and was the mastermind behind the banishment of 
‘Catholic priest and nuns’ out of Sabah in early 1970s.  
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enabled the Malaysian government to classify them as Malay or as what Chin 
(2014b), Frank (2006) and Dolittle (2011) called Malay-Muslim who included 
Malay-Muslim bumiputra (natives) and Malay-Muslim non-bumiputra (immigrants).  
Apart from the secret granting of citizenship, Mustapha also tried to convert the non-
Muslim indigenes through ‘forced Islamization’ with the aim of including them in 
the category Malay-Muslim bumiputra (Nagaraj, Kiong-Hock, Nai-Peng, Chiu-Wan 
& Pala, 2007). Some even call this the Malayanization project. Leiking, a Member of 
Parliament for Penampang, for example, described the conversion of non-Muslim 
indigenes since the Mustapha era as the effort to ‘Malayanise’ (a program to make 
them Malays) or an effort to reclassify non-Muslim indigenous as the Malay-Muslim 
bumiputra (Lim, 2013; Goliu, 2013). Mustapha established the United Sabah Islamic 
Association (USIA) on October 10th, 1969 and later the Sabah Islamic Council 
(Majlis Agama Islam Sabah, MUIS) on April 26th, 1972 to ensure his Islamization 
efforts were lawful. The establishment of USIA and MUIS paved the way for 
Mustapha to push for more organized and active dakwah (Islamic mission) activities 
in Sabah. Under the dakwah program of these government-supported organizations 
of USIA and MUIS, it was reported that 2,840 non-Muslim indigenous people in 
Sabah converted to Islam between 1970 and 1980 (Kassim, 2009b, p. 47; Lim, 2008; 
2013). Among them was Donald Stephens, the Huguan Siou (Paramount leader of 
the Dusunic speaking people in Sabah) who converted to Islam in January 1971 and 
later adopted the name Muhamad Fuad Stephens (Granville-Edge, 1999).  
The effort to increase the Malay celup population through the granting of Malaysian 
identification cards and the Islamization policy, as Chin (1999a), Schumann (2006), 
and Adnan and Jamal (2014) argue, was the beginning of the strong growth of 
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Malay-Muslim population in Sabah. As Table 5.2 shows, in the 1960 census, the 
Malay-Muslim population was about 39.9% (181,457 individuals) of Sabah’s 
population. The Malay-Muslim population, however, increased to about 44.8% 
(285,061 individuals) in 1970. The increase in Malay-Muslim population continued 
and in 1980 52.5% (487,627) of the Sabah population (929,299 individuals) were 
registered as Malay-Muslims.  
This continued even under the BERJAYA government era (1976-1985). When 
BERJAYA won the state election in 1981, Harris Salleh as the Chief Minister of 
BERJAYA government wanted to foster more rapid integration with Malay-Muslim 
dominated West Malaysia and allowed only three ethnic categories, namely 
bumiputra, Chinese and lain-lain kaum (others ethnics) in Sabah (Andaya & Andaya, 
1982, p. 297). Accordingly, Harris who had strong political support from the federal 
leaders, in particular Mahathir Mohamed, the longest-serving Prime Minister of 
Malaysia (1981-2003) decided to take necessary measures to increase the Malay-
Muslim population as a means of further consolidating the Malay-Muslim bumiputra 
political dominance in Sabah.  
His efforts were more aggressive than Mustapha as he allowed the naturalization of 
not only the illegal immigrants from Philippines but also illegal immigrants or the 
immigrants with proper working pass from Indonesia and other countries such as 
Pakistan and India (Su-Lyn, 2013). At the same time, he also boosted the dakwah 
activities to ensure more non-Muslim indigenous people became Muslims. Thus, the 
census carried out at the end of Mustapha’s era showed that Sabah’s annual 
population grew from 3.7 % per annum up to 1970 to 3.9 % per annum from 1970 to 
1980 (see Table 5.1). Furthermore, it was also reported that the number of Muslim 
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converts increased from 2,840 individuals between 1970 and 1979 to 13,451 
individuals between 1980 and 1990 (see Table 5.3). 
 
Table 5.3: Muslim Converts in Sabah (1970 – 2015) 
 
 
 
  Years          1970-9        1980-1990      1990-2000       2001-2004        2005-2015 
 
 
  Total           2,840         12,451          10,268            4,660                * 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Kassim (2009b).  
 
*  No new data for Muslim converts in Sabah are available for 2005-2009 and 2010-
2015, but many non-Muslim indigenous people suggests that the rate of 
conversion has declined following the success of UMNO-led BN to change 
Sabah’s demographic character and later gain control over its politics.  
 
 
As the Malay-Muslim population grew significantly many, if not all, non-Muslim 
indigenous people began to show their opposition as they feared they were becoming 
a minority and a marginalized group in Sabah in terms of their political rights. 
According to Hwang (2003) and ASEAN Forecast (1985, August), Harris’s open 
exhortation to the Muslims to affect a 52 per cent Muslim majority to control the 
Christians of Sabah caused widespread apprehension among non-Muslim indigenes, 
in particular the non-Muslim leaders as they faced the possibility of becoming a 
minority and thereafter politically deprived. Some non-Muslim leaders who were 
against Harris’ policy were dissatisfied that these ‘new citizens’ had systematically 
been granted the status of ‘native’ by the BERJAYA government (Sadiq, 2005; 2009; 
Leong, 2009).  
168 
 
They claimed that while the Sabah Native Ordinance 1952 (Section 2 (d) which 
loosely defined the ‘natives’ as members of a people indigenous to the Republic of 
Indonesia or the Sulu group of islands in the Philippines Archipelago or the states of 
Malaya or the Republic of Singapore was manipulated to categorize many Muslim 
Indonesian and Filipinos as the natives of Sabah. The definition of Malay according 
to Article 160 of the Malaysian Constitution was the tool to categorize the Muslims 
from other parts of the world such as Pakistan as the native people of Sabah79. To do 
so, Harris introduced the term pribumi80 on October 7th, 1982 (Regis, 1989, pp. 15-
16) to include Muslim immigrants in the category of Malay-Muslim native81. Article 
160 of the Malaysian Constitution defined the Malay and the native/indigenous 
persons in Malaysia who belong to the category pribumi as “a person who professes 
the religion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language, conforms to Malay 
custom” (The Commissioner of Law Malaysia, 2010, p. 153). This was the basis for 
Harris to include the Muslim immigrants in Sabah as Malay-Muslim natives. In 
Indonesia the word asli (literally means original or the first/earlier inhabitant of a 
specific territory) is added to the term pribumi (read pribumi-asli) to refer to 
native/indigenous status (Siddique & Suryadinata, 1982, p. 663) and so to distinguish 
the native from the newcomers. The introduction of the term pribumi allowed the 
illegal Muslim immigrants to be systematically granted citizenship soon after they 
arrived in Sabah (Sadiq, 2009) and to be included in the category lain-lain (others) in 
the 1970 census and eventually subsumed under the new category of natives in the 
1980 Population and Housing Census (Sadiq, 2005, p. 110).  
79 The definition of native and Malay as stated in Ordinance 1952 (Section 2 (d) and Article 160 of the Malaysian 
Constitution is the very reason why Muslim immigrants from Indonesia, Philippines and Pakistan can become 
native of Sabah Malaysia overnight, and yet Chinese and Indians can never do so, hence must remain immigrants.  
80 Pribumi refers to a group in Sabah that share a similar sociocultural heritage and whose members are 
considered as natives of the state.  
81 As they have the same meaning, that is the ‘son-of-soil’ or the ‘indigenous/native people’, since 1980s until to 
date, both pribumi and bumiputra were used interchangeably in Sabah.  
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The Sabah Native Ordinance 1952 (Section 2 (d) and the Article 160 of the 
Malaysian Constitution), therefore can be seen as the legitimate documents 
manipulated by Harris and the federal leaders to reduce the non-Muslim numerical 
supremacy by bringing in the Muslim immigrants from not only Indonesia and 
Philippines but also Muslims from other parts of the world to Sabah (Sadiq, 2005; 
2009; Leong, 2009; Frank, 2006; Mutalib, 1999). It is therefore, not a surprise that 
many ‘natives’ in Sabah who admitted that they were Indonesian or Filipino were 
actually not natives but were the BERJAYA government’s certified natives (literally 
means the immigrants who had been given native certificates or documents that 
enacted their inclusion in the category of native people). The State Local 
Government and Housing Minister, Datuk Hajiji Noor in 2012 admitted that loose 
certification of natives took place in Sabah. He said, “we need to admit that a few 
decades ago we made the serious mistake of opening a huge loophole in the law by 
allowing the loose certification of natives” (Lajiun, 2016). Hajiji’s confession in 
many respects indicated that such a systematic effort to increase the Malay-Muslim 
population in Sabah had been continued in the BERJAYA era, and that non-Muslim 
disquiet was not misplaced.   
The result of growing apprehension among the non-Muslim indigenous was assuaged 
by the overthrow of BERJAYA by a newly formed political party, the Christian-led 
PBS in 1985. The success of PBS in defeating BERJAYA and subsequently forming 
the state government caused the Malay-Muslim leaders at the federal level to 
acknowledge the need to further intensify efforts to increase the number of Muslim 
population significantly in this state. As a result, the federal leaders, in particular 
Mahathir Mohamad, who was the Prime Minister of Malaysia during that time 
decided to continue Mustapha and Harris’s effort to increase the Muslim population 
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in Sabah. This effort was far more aggressive as it included a systematic granting of 
citizenship to more than half a million illegal Muslim immigrants (Frank, 2006) to 
ensure the overthrow of the non-Muslim indigenous-led PBS government. This 
action, which contributed to the overthrow of PBS government on March 17th 1994 
resulted in a significant increase in Sabah’s annual population growth from 3.9% per 
annum up to 1980 to 5.9% up to 1991 (see Table 5.1) and a strong increase in the 
Malay-Muslim population in the territory from 1,658,287 individuals in 2000 (63.7% 
of 2,603,485) to 2,096,153 individuals in 2010 (65.3% of 3,206,742). This was 
known to the locals as Project IC or Project Mahathir or Project II.  
 
5.4 Projek IC and the Malay-Muslim Domination  
The Projek IC82 is the term used by many indigenous people of Sabah, in particular 
the non-Muslims, to describe the systematic granting of Kad Pengenalan Malaysia 
(Malaysian Identification Card, IC) or in other words the systematic granting of 
citizenship to foreigners in Sabah in return for their votes. They argued that the aim 
of this operation which started around mid-1990s (Mutalib, 1999) was to further 
increase the Malay-Muslim population in Sabah believing that they would vote 
against any Christian-led political party and would be supportive of a Muslim-led 
political party (Sadiq, 2005; 2009). This project is believed to have involved the 
former Prime Minister of Malaysia (Mahathir Mohamed), the former Chief Minister 
of Sabah (Harris Salleh), and several federal government institutions such as 
National Registration Department (NRD), Election Commission of Malaysia (ECM), 
82 IC is an abbreviation for identity card, a card used by the Malaysian government to identify its 
citizens. 
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the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and the Immigration Department of Malaysia 
(IDM).  
This dubious IC granting process involved the granting of IC without going through 
the proper legal process of the submission of important documents such as Birth 
Certificate and their Parents’ Marriage Certificate required by the Malaysian 
registration law. Locals assert that many Muslim immigrants from Indonesia, 
Philippines and other countries such as Pakistan managed to become Malaysian 
citizens through this Project IC. Soon after they were given IC, their names were 
added to the Malaysian electoral roll to enable them to vote during elections. 
The individuals who were granted IC in return were required to vote for the ruling 
coalition (Mutalib, 1999; Sadiq, 2005). In order to ensure these ‘new citizens’ would 
only vote for the Malay-led ruling coalition, the UMNO-BN leaders stressed that all 
Muslims were obliged to vote for Muslim-led political party in accordance with the 
Islamic fardhu (obligation). The former Chief Minister of Sabah, Osu Sukam, for 
example, during the gathering of the state’s Islamic officials and missionaries in Kota 
Kinabalu (KK) stated that it was fardhu kifayah (an Islamic social obligation) for 
Muslims to vote for BN because it was led by Muslims and Islam could only flourish 
under Muslim rule (read UMNO-led government) (Chin, 1999a). Accordingly, the 
locals, especially the indigenous people, understand that these ‘new citizens’ have 
consistently voted for BN since the 1980s or even earlier.   
There is strong anecdotal evidence to support such a claim. In 2000, Justice 
Muhammad Kamal Awang in what was popularly referred to as the Likas83 case 
83 Likas is a sub-district of Kota Kinabalu which located less than 15 kilometres from Kota Kinabalu 
city centre. 
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(petition K11/99) declared that the result of 1999 Likas constituency election was 
void. The failure of the ECM in maintaining an ‘electoral roll in accordance with the 
law (read a clean roll)’ according to the judge made the electoral roll illegal and 
hence the Likas election was declared null and void. During the ‘hearing’, Hassanar, 
the former District Officer of Sandakan claimed that some 40,000 foreigners were 
given citizenship rights through Project IC. The petitioner even presented evidence 
of 4,197 persons with dubious ICs who cast their vote in Likas.  
A former Internal Security Act (ISA) detainee, Siti Aminah Mahmud84, during a 
press conference in Petaling Jaya, Selangor on February 27th, 2013 admitted that 
Project IC was indeed real. She confessed that she was one of the individuals who 
helped to achieve the goals of the project to increase the size of the Malay-Muslim 
population in Sabah. She admitted to being instructed by some of the UMNO 
supreme leaders to facilitate the issue of IC for Muslim immigrants as part of a plan 
to help UMNO take over Sabah from PBS in the 1990s. She said, “there were five 
tasks for me – helping to campaign, increasing Malay voters, locating villagers in 
rural especially those who have no IC at the border of Sabah-Indonesia, and ensuring 
the victory of UMNO in toppling PBS” (Omar, 2013; Zulkifli, 2013). She also 
confessed to being involved in this operation from 1990 to 1994, before she was 
detained under ISA in 1995, and that she knew the operation was led by Mahathir 
Mohamed. She said, “I knew it because Datu Mustapha (the Sabah UMNO Chief 
during that period of time) told us not to be afraid about getting arrested. He said this 
is Mahathir’s and Megat Junid’s projects and he said if he (Mustapha) helps UMNO 
to win, he (Mustapha) would be appointed as the state governor” (Omar, 2013; 
Zulkifli, 2013). In addition, she claimed, “the IC were given to a group of 
84 She was detained under ISA in 1995 for two years for her alleged involvement in the ‘Project IC’. 
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immigrants…not some but in bags (IC)…the area with highest number were Tawau, 
Sandakan, Lahad Datu and Kota Kinabalu, as well as at the Tawau-Indonesia border. 
Another area was Semporna. Many were given there because many Filipinos were 
there” (Omar, 2013; Zulkifli, 2013). 
Interestingly, although the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Illegal Immigrants of 
Sabah (RCI) formed on August 11th, 2012, found that Project IC existed, it refused to 
acknowledge the involvement of federal and local Muslim leaders as it concluded 
that it was a result of the Registration Department of Malaysia officials’ desire for 
corrupt monetary gain. The RCI report concluded that: 
it was a period in which syndicates and individuals aided by or in complicity 
with corrupt officials, had taken advantage of a weakly institutionalized 
citizenship system compounded by the huge number of immigrants/foreigners 
for monetary gain. It was also a period which saw the emergence of an alleged 
project called Project IC with a corrosive political agenda. In short, it was a 
period heightened nefarious activity that had precipitated and accelerated the 
influx of illegal immigrants in the State. Sabah now suffers the cumulative 
spill-over effects of that period (Kiong, Luping, Mustafa, Ampon & Wu, 2014, 
p. 365-366).  
In responding to the delay of more than 3 years in the release of RCI report (August 
2012-December 2014), Lim Kit Siang, the DAP’s (Democratic Action Party) 
Member of Parliament for Gelang Patah said “it looked as if the authorities had 
something to hide” (Chan, 2014, December 12; Editor Team SabahKini, 2014, 
December 6).  
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Many indigenous peoples of Sabah were also suspicious of the federal leaders’ 
attitude towards this issue. Simon Sipaun, a native person of Sabah and a member of 
the anti-graft watchdog, the Centre to Combat Corruption and Cronyism (C4) argues 
that the federal leaders adopted different strategies in dealing with illegal immigrants 
in West Malaysia and in Sabah. He said  
West Malaysia was at one time flooded with Vietnamese refugees, but they 
had been either deported home or sent to other countries. However, when it 
came to the immigrants in Sabah, they were allowed to stay and even 
awarded citizenship…what made it worst was that these people were 
registered as voters, which gave them opportunity to decide the state’s fate 
(Sokial, 2015, April 14).  
Therefore, due to the different strategies employed by the federal leaders in dealing 
with the problem, despite its decision to set up the RCI the locals remained steadfast 
in their belief that the federal government was not sincere in solving the illegal 
immigrant woes in Sabah.  
What is clear is the fact that the federal and local Muslim leaders have contributed to 
the extraordinary increase in Sabah’s population that coincided with the strong 
growth of the Muslim population here. The reason for this, as a key informant of this 
study argues is, “if they (the federal and local Muslim leaders who were also the top 
leaders of BN), were sincere in solving this perennial problem then they would have 
imposed proactive efforts in Sabah” (interview with key informant on April 3rd 2014 
in Penampang).    
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Although it appeared that the federal government had deported 550,000 immigrants 
from Sabah since 1990 (Omar, 2016), which resulted in the decline of Malay-Muslim 
non-bumiputra population from 26.3% in 1991 to about 24.1% in 200085, locals 
assert that such efforts were insufficient. In fact, when commenting on this issue, the 
native peoples of Sabah generally said that both state and federal governments are 
not sincere in tackling the problem as they claim that the governments retain their old 
attitude of encouraging many more illegal Muslim immigrants to Sabah (Adnan, 
2013; FMT Staff, 2011, August 28).  
According to the general perception shared by most Sabahans I spoke to, the 
governments retain such an attitude because it seems to have been a successful 
strategy in Malay-Muslims dominating Sabah politics. Supporting this perception, 
Barlocco noted that “the strategy seems to have been successful, a fact that might be 
seen as connected with the defeat of PBS in 1994 and the victory of UMNO in the 
elections held since then. The voting immigrants have until now been loyal to 
UMNO, knowing that their benefits would be granted by the ruling party, while 
…..the number of voting Indonesians is so high in certain areas in the east coast that 
they filed their candidates and got some elected in the State Assembly” (2014, p. 78-
79). The former chief minister Harris Salleh himself acknowledged that the influx of 
illegal immigrants from the Philipphines and Indonesia were all part of the federal 
government’s plan to change the voting pattern in Sabah to benefit Malay parties 
(Sadiq, 2005).  In fact, the change of ethnic makeup in favour of the Malay-Muslim 
in a significant way has contributed in dramatic change of percentage of voters based 
on ethnicity. Table 5.4 shows that at the beginning of the twentieth century, the non-
85 As the percentage of Malay-Muslim non-bumiputra population declined, the percentage of non-
Muslim non-bumiputra increased from 11.5% of Sabah population in 1991 to about 14.4% of Sabah 
population in 2000. 
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Muslim bumiputras were the dominant voters, comprising about 39.6% of the state’s 
voting population but, to their alarm, by 1991 they had fallen to 22.5%. Similarly, 
Chinese have seen their share decline from 23.0% in 1960 to 11.5% in 1991. Both of 
these groups were the supporters of non-Muslim led parties such as the PBS, which 
opposes the systematic granting of citizenship to the illegal immigrants by some 
local and federal political elites.  
In contrast, the population of Malay-Muslim voters who were the supporters of 
Malay-Muslim led party such UMNO and USNO have risen from 36.4% in 1960 to 
61.0% in 1991 following the significant increase of Malay-Muslim non-bumiputra or 
to be more specific the Indonesians and Filipinos voters.  
 
Table 5.4: Percentage of Voters by Ethnic Group in Sabah, 1960-1991 
 
                                                                          Census Year 
Ethnic Group     1960 1970 1980 1991 
 
Non-Muslims bumiputra    36.9  34.7    -  22.5 
Malay-Muslims     36.4  37.3    -  61.0 
Malay-Muslim bumiputra  29.3  28.1    -  31.5 
Malay-Muslim non-bumiputra   7.1    9.2    -  29.5 
(Indonesian & Filipino)     
Chinese      23.0  21.4    -  11.5 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Sadiq (2005, p. 109); Tomiyuki (2000, p. 37). 
* The 1980s census collapsed non-Muslim bumiputra, Malay-Muslim bumiputra and 
Malay-Muslim non-bumiputra which included Indonesians and Filipinos (Regis, 
1989, p. 419) into single category of Pribumi, thus making it impossible to obtain 
data for individual ethnic groups. 
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As explained, this overwhelming increase in the population of Malay-Muslim voters 
contributed to the failure of PBS to maintain a bigger majority in the state assembly 
in the 1994 election. PBS won 25 seats while the remaining 23 went to the UMNO-
BN, and these results followed a clear racial line: PBS won all 15 Kadazandusun-
majority constituencies and UMNO took all 18 Malay-Muslim-majority 
constituencies (Chin, 1994). The non-Muslim PBS performed worse in 1999 election 
when the Malay-Muslim BN took 31 from a total of 48 seats with Sabah UMNO 
wining 24 seats and its coalition partners comprised of SAPP, LDP and PDS 7 seats. 
The PBS as the non-Muslim bumiputra party, however, declined as it took only 17 
seats. This allowed the UMNO-led BN in Sabah to form the state government on 
March 13th, 1999. This marked the end of non-Muslim bumiputra political 
domination, and thus made Sabah’s political character to be dominated by Malay-
Muslims. 
 
5.5 Increased Feelings of Insecurity among Non-Muslims 
The insincerity of Malay-led federal and state government to solve the problem of 
illegal immigrants has ignited a feeling of insecurity among not only local political 
leaders but also the non-Muslim communities in general, especially the non-Muslim 
indigenous groups. They have begun to realize that their economic, social and 
political rights have been compromised as the federal leaders preferred ‘new citizens’ 
over its own bonafide citizens (Sadiq, 2005), in order to make the new citizens their 
political allies in their effort to implement and later consolidate Ketuanan Melayu 
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(Malay hegemony) and in more recent times Ketuanan Islam (Muslim Supremacy)86, 
prioritizing the new citizens over the original inhabitants of Sabah.  
The federal government was said to prefer the new citizens because they 
strengthened the Muslim political influence in Sabah (based on selected interviews 
with key informants). Studies have indicated that the link between cross-border 
migration and political activities in Sabah has strengthened Muslim political 
influence in the territory. Sadiq (2005), Mutalib (1999), and Wan Sawaluddin, Ramli 
and Ahmad (2012), for example, argued that the immigrants had an enormous 
influence over the politics of Sabah, and more broadly the politics of Malaysia. Most 
importantly, the immigrants who were granted IC through Project IC admitted that 
they participated actively in the politics of the country by repeatedly casting their 
votes in each election from the 1980s. They also admitted that they had never voted 
for any other political party than the BN and its component parties. According to one 
‘new citizen’, “of course yes, why not. We have participated in the politics of 
Malaysia. We are the strong supporters of the Barisan National (BN) and we never 
once voted the political party that opposed the BN. This is how we show our 
gratitude to the BN government who have given us IC”. He even pointed out that the 
number of their population in Sabah is significant. He said, “I can confirm to you that 
the number of our people in this state is significant...probably more than 20 percent 
of the total population of Sabah” (interview with a key respondent on May 1st, 2014 
in Lahad Datu). 
The presence of a large number of new citizens or instant citizens of Malaysia 
created strong dissatisfaction towards Malay-Muslim leaders at both federal and 
86 See Chin (2014b, p. 83) 
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local level and the natives of Sabah began to oppose any Malay-Muslim leaders’ 
effort to further strengthen the Malay-Muslim domination. The natives’ objection 
over Malay-Muslim domination of Sabah’s politics is shown by their strong protest 
against Islamization of the indigenous peoples and until today most of them have 
refused to identify themselves as Malay. One interviewee said, “being Muslim does 
not necessarily means that we are Malays. In fact, many Islamized Kadazans, 
especially those who were forced to convert into Islam during Mustapha and Harris 
eras even have never practiced Islam in their life and do not speak Malay fluently” 
(interview with key respondent of this study on February 28th, 2014 in Tuaran).  
The non-Muslim natives objected to the proposal of Bungsu @ Aziz Jafar, the 
Sabah’s Mufti (an Islamic Scholar who is an interpreter or expounder of Islamic Law, 
the shariah and fiqh). He urged the conversion of natives and the labeling of Sabah’s 
bumiputra Muslims as Malays. This proposal was announced by Bungsu in his 
speech before a thousand people in a symposium titled Mendepani Agenda Asing 
(Facing the Foreign Agenda, MEGA) held on September 28, 201387. Their objection 
captured the sentiments of the natives against further strengthening of Malay-Muslim 
domination in Sabah. Their unwillingness to be identified as Malays stood in contrast 
to the new citizens who enjoyed the label Malays and supported the Malaysia state as 
they benefited from Malaysia’s rapid growth. The native objectors made their 
objection clear through a press conference held by Darrel Leiking, a Member of 
Parliament for Penampang on September 30, 2013. On behalf of the non-Muslim 
natives, he said: 
87 The symposium was jointly organized by Muslim no-government organizations (NGOs) Ikatan 
Muslimin Malaysia (Malaysian Muslim Solidarity, ISMA) and Persatuan Belia Islam Nasional 
(Malaysian Muslim Youth Organization, PEMBINA) in Putrajaya, Malaysia. 
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I express regret over the Malaynization proposal mooted by the Sabah Mufti 
Ustaz Bungsu @ Aziz Jafar at a symposium at Putrajaya recently, as the latter 
had claimed that many indigenous Muslims in Sabah still refuse to call 
themselves Malay. My stand is very clear on this matter. Sabah agreed to form 
Malaysia together with peninsular Malaysia, Singapore and Sarawak for 
security, economic prosperity, development, better education and healthcare 
and not in any way to become another Malay-majority state in the federation. 
Let’s take ethnic group A that has an equal ratio of Muslims and non-Muslims 
as an example. Would it make sense if a program to Malayanise the Muslims 
within ethnic A take place considering their language and hereditary customs 
are totally different from the Malays in peninsular Malaysia? It is 
understandable for the mufti to say that the Javanese and Bugis in the peninsula 
now refer to themselves as Malays since these three ethnic groups share the 
same language and hereditary customs but I don’t think Dusun and Murut 
ethnics in Sabah do” (Leiking, 2013, September 30).  
The indigenous peoples of Sabah since the 1980s have persistently tried to show their 
support as Malaysian citizens and to gain greater impact in Malaysian politics. This 
was noticeable between 1960 and 1990 when Donald Stephens and Pairin Kitingan 
attempted to unite all non-Muslim indigenous people and elevate their social status 
by using ethnic labels such as Kadazan, Kadazandusun or KadazanDusunMurut. 
Although the non-Muslim indigenous peoples’ political influence has been eroded 
systematically due to the significant increase in the size of Malay-Muslim 
population, in particular the legalized Malay Muslim immigrants, political activities 
in Sabah have becomes more ethnic based and more ethno-religious based.  
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 5.6 Change in the Relationship between the Non-Muslims and the Malay-
Muslims, and between the Indigenous and the New Citizens 
The growing ethnic or ethno-religious sentiments in Sabah due to the maneuvering of 
federal and local Malay-Muslim leaders for political gains significantly affected the 
relationship between the non-Muslim and the Malay-Muslim, and between the 
indigenous and the immigrants, better known as the new citizens of Malaysia. 
Although, Islamization never wielded the same influence as in West Malaysia, these 
factors changed the way the people of Sabah saw each other. Unlike in the era before 
independence where the relationship between the non-Muslims and the Malay-
Muslims, and the indigenous and the immigrants were amiable, in recent times the 
relationship has become increasingly one of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ as described by Tajfel 
and Turner (1979).  
Although Tamring (2008) and Sintang (2014) suggests that religious tolerance 
remained high in Sabah, in reality there was growing tension between the non-
Muslim and the Malay-Muslim. The predominance of Islam and the emergence of 
the Malay-Muslim hegemony produced apprehension among the non-Muslims about 
the future of their religious traditions, especially in the context of their right to 
continuously practice their faith. There was growing mistrust towards the Malay-
Muslims and this led to non-Muslim natives distancing themselves from the Malay-
Muslim community. At the time of my fieldwork in early 2014 this distancing from 
each other had become more noticeable in Sabah, especially in the urban areas. In 
explaining this, a Kadazandusun female (non-Muslim bumiputra) in her forties, at 
the same time a local political activist stressed that: 
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many of us as the traditional inhabitants of Sabah have become increasingly 
interested in distancing ourselves from the Muslims, especially the Muslim 
leaders because they have destroyed our trust, confidence and friendship when 
they decided to support federal leaders’ effort to legalize illegal Muslim 
immigrants and forced some of our elders to profess Islam in the past. Even if 
they have the ability to correct their wrongdoing by resolving these issues, they 
refrain to do so (interview with the key informant on January 10th 2014 in Kota 
Kinabalu).  
Apart from the objections to labeling the indigenous mualaf (literally ‘one who 
embraces Islam or a Muslim convert’) as Malay, there have been incidents of non-
Muslims opposing the construction of a mosque in some areas. For instance, when 
the government proposed the construction of a mosque in Penampang in 2013, the 
non-Muslims in this area strongly opposed such a plan and as a result it is still on-
hold until today (Percy, 2013).  
Similarly, the Malay-Muslims of Sabah, especially those who studied in West 
Malaysian universities and were affected by strong ethno-religious sentiments there 
(West Malaysia), also distanced themselves from their non-Muslim neighbors as they 
became super sensitive to all issues pertaining to Islam (Chin, 2013). Among the 
issues of contention is the use of word Allah by the Christians. The use of the word 
Allah especially became a sensitive issue for Malay-Muslims in Sabah following the 
Malay-led government’s decision to ban Christians and non-Muslims from using the 
word in their publication in 1986. Following the ban, many Muslims in Sabah 
increasingly saw the non-Muslims who continued to use Allah in their publications 
and in their worship as insulting Islam, even though they had used the title even 
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before independence. In addition, the Malay-Muslims also distanced themselves 
from the non-Muslims due to their strong prejudice against the non-Muslim 
traditions of keeping dogs in their house and eating pork, as both these activities 
were considered Haram (‘forbidden’ or ‘proscribed’) and unclean in Islam. This 
phenomenon is noted by Awang (2003) and Rahman and Hambali (2013) as the 
result of Muslims’ prejudice against other religions and their failure to understand 
the idea of universality in Islam.  
The Muslim’s attitude to other religions, in particular Christians, as well as Malay-
Muslim bumiputra dominance and the institutionalisation of Islamic faith, in turn, led 
to what Puyok (2014) calls the ‘rise of Christian political consciousness. This 
response began when the Catholic Church filed a suit against the government and 
won in the High Court. Following the victory, the Christian leaders who were 
traditionally conservative about Christians’ participation in politics88 began “to 
encourage their followers to challenge the abuse of power and seek a level playing 
field in terms of power relations for the good of all” (Puyok, 2014, p. 69: Yapp, 
2011). The President of Borneo Evangelical Mission, Jerry Dusing, for example, 
urged Christians to support political leaders and parties that committed to 
transforming the country and to ensuring that Malaysians are treated not according to 
their ethnicity and religion, but their constitutional rights (Puyok, 2014: To, 2013, 
January 26). In response to this encouragement, the Christians in Sabah and Sarawak 
became increasingly interested in participating in the political process to change the 
country’s political climate by supporting the opposition parties. Some Christian 
leaders such as Marunsai Dawai and Baru Bian even contested t the ruling party in 
88 The Christian leaders in Sabah traditionally teach their followers to respect the rule of law and 
authority, thus not associating Christian with the political activity. 
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the 2013 election. The aim of such moves was to topple the ruling party dominated 
by political leaders who in their view had contravened the promise of religious 
freedom clearly stated in the Twenty Point Agreement and the subsequent Article 11, 
Constitution of Malaysia.   
In explaining this, a key informant of this study, a Kadazandusun man (non-Muslim 
bumiputra) in his forties stressed that: 
by all means the Christians should participate actively in the political processes 
of the country if they so desire to challenge the abuse of power. They should 
join political parties and even contest the elections because such moves are part 
and parcel of the process towards a fair and equitable treatment in politics and 
administration of the country (interview with the key informant on January 7th 
2014 in Kota Kinabalu).  
In a similar tone, another informant of this study who was also a Kadazandusun male 
(non-Muslim bumiputra) in his fifties argued that: 
As a Christian, we should engage in good works, including participating in the 
political process because of the legitimate and significant role of government. 
Any decision made by the government certainly has substantial impact on all 
Christian, thus we should participate in the political process to ensure that the 
government treats us fairly and equitably (interview with the key informant on 
January 8th 2014 in Kota Kinabalu).  
The informants, therefore, as Christians got involved in political activities. He was 
among the leaders of a local political party which strongly opposed the abuse of 
power among the governing politicians. Their intense interest in political 
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participation that I observed during my stay in Kota Kinabalu was reflected in their 
carrying out a series of political meetings that focused on Sabahans’ rights contained 
in the Twenty Point Agreement. The meeting attended by the Christians was a 
significant example of the Christian political consciousness. This meeting also 
showed how the Christians had become increasingly unhappy with the Muslim-led 
governments.   
The long-term effect of this is the heightening of ethno-religious sentiments in 
Sabah. To complicate this, the indigenous people of Sabah who are both non-Muslim 
and mualaf have become more hostile towards immigrants who have been given 
citizenship rights. The indigenous people often see the presence of large numbers of 
new citizens as a serious threat to their political, economic and social rights as the 
natives of Sabah. They generally believe the new citizens have reduced their political 
influence. They find that they have become increasingly unable to choose their 
representatives, primarily because the political representatives can be determined 
long before the election due to the existence of large numbers of new citizens who 
commit themselves to particular political elites (Sadiq, 2009).  
Despite the fact that they played important roles in the economic development of 
Sabah, the new citizens were often seen by the indigenous people as potentially 
destabilizing Sabah as they posed a grave threat to national security (Tajari & 
Affendi, 2015; Kassim & Imang, 2007). The Kalabakan incident on December 29th, 
196389 and Lahad Datu incident on February 11th, 201390 were reminders that the 
89  Kalabakan incident was a combat war between Indonesian and Malaysian armed forces in Tawau 
of Sabah. The incident was inspired by Sukarno who opposed the formation of Malaysia with Sabah 
as part of this new federation. The war ended in 1966 following the defeat of Indonesian forces by the 
combination of armed forces from Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Malaysia. The war also ended 
following the elimination of communist influence in Indonesia under the rule of Suharto. 
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new citizens could be the source of a security crisis in the state. This was because 
both incidents involved the new citizens of Sabah. While the Kalabakan incident 
involved the new citizens of Malaysia from Indonesia, the Lahad Datu incident 
involved the new citizens from Philippines. The indigenous people felt their right as 
the real natives of Sabah had been eroded (Mutalib, 1999), including their rights to 
determine the government through elections, their rights to land ownership and 
employment opportunities in the public sector, and their opportunities to study in 
public universities and gain financial assistance (Mutalib, 1999; Kitingan, 1997). In 
fact, it was common for new citizens to admit that they acquired their citizenship 
through Project IC and after that were able to become actively involved in electoral 
politics, to work in the public sectors, own land, enroll in public universities and gain 
scholarships, and to obtain financial assistance to start any business activities. As one 
of those new citizens, a Bugis man (Muslim) in his forties who was interviewed in 
this study noted:  
some of us, like my niece, even have become the orang kanan (senior official) 
in the public sector....the directors, administrative officers and teachers. We are 
now Malaysian citizens, and therefore, like the Kadazandusun, we are also able 
to own a piece of land for farming, get financial assistance to start a business 
form the government. Many of our kids who are good in school also have 
enrolled in public universities and been granted scholarship (interview with a 
key respondent of this study on June 3rd, 2014 in Sandakan).   
90 The Lahad Datu incident was a military conflict between Malaysian armed forces and the group 
called themselves as the ‘Royal Security Forces of the Sultanate of Sulu and North Borneo 
(RSFSSNB)’ sent by Jamalul Kiram II, one of the claimants to the throne of Sultanate of Sulu in 
Lahad Datu of Sabah. Many of the RSFSSNB army are still living in Sabah and have a Malaysian 
Identification card. 
187 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Accordingly, it is not a suprise that the indigenous people refuse to acknowledge the 
new citizens as part of their society as they strongly feel that their rights as the 
indigenous or the lawful citizens of Malaysia have been stripped by this group of 
people. There is a widening of the social gap between them and the new citizens who 
usually live in different areas. The indigenous people usually live in kampungs and 
proper residential area, but the new citizens often live in squatter settlements, palm 
oil plantations and remote islands near cities in Sabah. Thus, society in Sabah has 
become more fragmented.  
 
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter analyzed the changing demographic landscape of Sabah that led to an 
escalation and diffusion of ethnic politics there. It was a phenomenon that changed 
the nature of social relationships between the non-Muslims and the Malay-Muslims, 
and between the indigenous and the new citizens. Specifically, the chapter showed 
that the federal leaders with the help of some local Muslim leaders helped to change 
the demography of Sabah from non-Muslim dominated to Malay-Muslim dominated 
through the legalization of illegal Muslim immigrants and the reclassification of 
indigenous population through Islamization. These actions contributed to friction in 
this region. There was awareness among the Malay-Muslims that ethnicity plays a 
crucial role in the politics of Malaysia as part of its consociational democracy. 
Additionally, the non-Muslim indigenous people felt their rights as natives had been 
systematically eroded. Thus, the growing ethno-religious friction now defines the 
social relationship and politics in Sabah. 
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Considering that these phenomena are the result of federal and local Muslim political 
leaders’ decision to manipulate cross-border migration and religious difference, it is 
now clear that the change in demographic character has played a significant role in 
the development, escalation and diffusion of ethnic politics in Sabah as a periphery 
state within the federation of Malaysia. This means federal leaders have expanded 
ethnic politics to Sabah through the strategy of changing the demographic landscape 
of Sabah from one dominated by non-Muslims to one dominated by Malay-Muslims 
based on manipulation of cross-border migration and religious difference. 
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 Chapter 6: Affirmative Action Policies and Ethnic Politics in Sabah 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The federal leaders’ decision in 1971 to implement affirmative action, also known as 
pro-bumiputra policies, in Sabah is significant. The policies have been the country’s 
guiding principle to elevate the socioeconomic status of the bumiputra as well as 
redress the ethnic economic imbalance. From the viewpoint of the government, these 
policies have achieved their objectives. In West Malaysia, in the years after the 
introduction of these ethnic based policies new Malay bumiputra business groups 
began to emerge (Tori, 1997). They were the AMDB group (Azman Hashim), the 
Sapura group (Shamsuddin Abdul Kadir), the Antah Group (Tengku Naquiddin and 
Tunku Iskandar of Negeri Sembilan royal family), the Melewar group (Tunku 
Abdullah and Tunku Iskandar), the Mofaz group (Mohamed Fauzy Abdul Hamid), 
the DRB group (Yahaya Ahmad) and the Taiping group (Suleiman Manan) (Tori, 
1997, p. 209). At the same time, the introduction of affirmative action policies 
resulted in the Chinese political parties losing their influence in the economic policy 
areas, especially after the resignation of Tun Tan Siew Sin, the President of MCA 
from his post as a Minister of Finance. He was replaced by Tun Hussein Onn from 
UMNO in 1974 (Milne, 1976). All these were acknowledged by the Malay-led 
federal government as a testimony to the success of the affirmative action policies. 
Nevertheless, Mason and Omar (2003) are correct that the policies that comprised the 
New Economic policy (NEP, 1971-1990), the National Education Policy (NEdP, 
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1971-1990), the National Culture Policy (NCP, 1971-1990), the New Development 
Policy (NDP, 1991-2000) and the National Vision Policy (NVP, 2001-2020) did not 
achieve their original objective, but deviated alarmingly from them. In this regard, 
Mason and Omar noted that “the plans [were] drawn up by technocrats and 
economists but [were] implemented by politicians. As such, implementation [of the 
policies] was often subverted by political expediency” (2003, p. 6). Indeed, it 
appeared that the policies’ implementation benefited the politicians, especially the 
UMNO-BN leaders who dominated the federal government. The strengthening of 
political patronage in Malaysia’s politics is an outcome of this.   
 These policies were implemented by the UMNO-BN leaders, in particular the Malay 
leaders of UMNO, to ensure continuous electoral support of Malay-Muslim 
bumiputra. Granting of government contracts and projects was the mainstay of the 
affirmative action policies (Ibrahim, 2013). Apart from this, federal leaders also gave 
out money during elections to the bumiputra communities in rural areas that still 
lagged in terms of socioeconomic advancement compared with the bumiputra in the 
urban areas. The UMNO leaders’ tendency to use money politics in their effort to 
gain electoral victory, however, made them indebted to the Chinese businessmen 
who provided financial support during elections. For this reason, when the federal 
leaders returned to power following their success, they were under obligation to 
return the favor rather than focusing on the general population (Mokhtar, Reen & 
Singh, 2013). In order to channel the policy benefits federal leaders promoted 
business partnership between the Chinese businessmen and the bumiputra (Gomez, 
1999; Gomez & Jomo, 1997; Emsley, 1996). As a result Malay bumiputra elites 
often become shareholders in their business.  
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As a consequence, the implementation of affirmative action has disadvantaged not 
only those ethnic groups who are excluded from the policies (the Chinese and the 
Indians) but also many within the bumiputra group. It has caused a disproportionate 
distribution of wealth among the bumiputra in Malaysia as the policies benefited 
only a few Malay bumiputra elites and those with strong political ties with UMNO. 
The bumiputra in the rural areas were disadvantaged as they usually did not have ties 
with the UMNO elites.    
To complicate the matter further, there was growing socioeconomic discrimination91 
against the non-Muslim bumiputra in Malaysia. This discrimination was especially 
blatant in Sabah where the non-Muslim bumiputra or to be more specific the 
Kadazandusun have “not shared in the so-called gains of the other bumiputra under 
[such policies] and other recent development efforts” (Ongkili, 2003, p. 206). The 
resulting discrimination in the implementation of affirmative action policies by the 
federal leaders had socioeconomic ramifications in Sabah.  
Accordingly, there was growing disenchantment with their bumiputra status among 
the non-Muslim indigenous groups who were largely concentrated in the rural areas 
of Sabah. This was particularly pertinent given their growing interest to revert to 
their traditional communal identity as Kadazandusun because they perceived 
themselves as no longer benefiting from the privileges analogous to the bumiputra 
policies (Ongkili, 2003). While reverting to their traditional communal identity, the 
non-Muslim indigenous groups joined forces with the non-indigenous (Chinese) in 
urging the federal leaders to uphold the past leaders’ promise of special position for 
91 The concept of socioeconomic discrimination here is defined as a discrimination or different 
standard of treatment and opportunities based on socioeconomic factors such as education and 
occupation.  
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all indigenous people of Sabah and to end the socioeconomic discrimination against 
not only the non-Muslim indigenous but also the non-indigenous citizens. This has 
characterised the political struggle among the indigenous groups in Sabah bringing 
ethnic politics to the fore, with an attendant deterioration in ethnic relations.  
This chapter focuses on the impact of ethnic politics in Sabah leading to tense 
relations between the communities. Specifically, it examines how bumiputra status 
accorded to the non-Muslim indigenous in Sabah has ethnicized politics in Sabah.    
 
6.2 The Spread of Bumiputraism in Sabah 
Before examining the impact of affirmative action policies on ethnic politics in 
Sabah, it is vital that one understands the history behind the term ‘bumiputra’. 
Historically, although it was once part of the British Empire like the Federation of 
Malaya, before 1963 Sabah was not politically associated with the Federation of 
Malaya. Apart from that, in terms of culture and demography, there was nothing in 
common between the people of Malaya and Sabah (Chin, 2014a; 2014b). Therefore, 
in the period prior to the formation of Malaysia in 1963, the introduction of special 
rights for the Malays as the ‘original people’ or bumiputra was neither relevant nor 
applicable to Sabah (Ongkili, 2003, p. 199).  
However, when the Malayan leaders began to seriously examine the proposed 
establishment of political union between Malaya and Singapore, the Malayan 
leaders, especially Tunku as the Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya, 
promised that the Malays’ special position as the bumiputra would be extended to the 
indigenous people of Sabah and Sarawak (Salleh, 2000, p. 139; Ibrahim, 2013, p. 
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301). The reason why Malayan leaders made such a promise was because initially 
the people of Sabah, in particular the indigenous, strongly opposed the proposed 
‘Greater Malaysian Federation’ (Smith, 1963). As explained earlier, the early 
indigenous leaders such as G.S. Sundang and Donald Stephens opined that joining 
Malaysia would not give any advantage to the people of Sabah as they saw the new 
federation as a new form of colonialism under Malaya. As they refused to be 
subjected to Malaya’s political domination, the early leaders of Sabah expressed their 
opposition against the proposed federation through the establishment of political 
parties such as Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Kadazan Bersatu (United Kadazan National 
Organization, UNKO) and Pertubuhan Pasok Momogun Bersatu (United Pasok 
Momogun Organization, Pasok Momogun). Together, these political parties 
expressed anti-Malaya sentiment throughout Sabah and urged the British to grant 
self-rule to Sabah. Such activities were seen by the Malayan leaders as an obstacle to 
the formation of Malaysia. To overcome such obstacles, the Malayan leaders 
promised that the special position enjoyed by the Malays as the bumiputra in the 
Peninsular would be extended to the natives or the indigenous people of Sabah if this 
Borneo territory would join the proposed new Federation of Malaysia.  
The promise of the privileged position for the indigenous people of Sabah (and 
Sarawak) as the bumiputra, regardless of their religion, was enshrined through the 
constitutional amendment made on September 16th, 1963. The amendment that saw 
the Federal Constitution of Malaya renamed as the Federal Constitution of Malaysia 
extended the special position of the Malays as bumiputra to the natives of Sabah and 
Sarawak. In this regard, Article 153 of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia 
specifically stated that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (the King of Malaysia) is required 
to safeguard the special position of the Malays and the natives of Sabah and 
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Sarawak, and the legitimate interests of other communities. The Article 153 of the 
Federal Constitution of Malaysia also required the King of Malaysia to reserve for 
the Malays and the natives of Sabah and Sarawak certain proportion of: (i) positions 
in the public service, (ii) scholarships, exhibitions and other similar educational or 
training privileges or special facilities given or accorded by the federal government, 
and (iii) any permits or licenses for the operation of any trade or business as required 
by federal law, subject to the provision of that law (The Commissioner of Law 
Revision Malaysia, 2010).    
Accordingly, Article 153 of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia was a sweetener for 
early political leaders, such as G.S. Sundang, Donald Stephens and Dato Mustapha, 
and they became convinced joining Malaysia was good for Sabah’s development 
(Ongkili, 2003; Luping, 1985). In other words, the promise of a privileged position 
for the indigenous people of Sabah like the Malays in Malaya (West Malaysia) 
underpinned the decision by the former to support the proposed federation. The 
federal leaders quickly declared that the term bumiputra would include all groups of 
indigenous people, including Muslim and non-Muslim, of Sabah as listed in the 
Article 161A of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia (Mason & Omar, 2003, p. 2).  
 
6.3 The Practical Application of Bumiputraism in Sabah 
The first affirmative action policy was known as the New Economic Policy (NEP). 
This policy was formulated by the National Operation Council (NOC) [Malay: 
Majlis Gerakan Negara (MAGERAN)] in 1970 and thereafter put in practice by the 
Malay-led federal government between 1971 and 1990 mainly to cater to the 
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socioeconomic interests of the bumiputra. This social group has always been the 
majority and politically dominant group in this country, but economically 
disadvantaged compared with the non-bumiputra communities. In other words, the 
NEP was an affirmative action policy formulated to cater to the majority and 
politically dominant community and thus NEP was different from affirmative action 
policies in other countries such as in Nigeria, United States of America, Belgium and 
Lebanon that catered to the minorities who were not only socioeconomically 
disadvantaged but also politically marginalized.   
The fundamental reason for this was the Malaysian government’s determination to 
remediate the existing ethnic tensions as a result of racial riots in 1969 in West 
Malaysia. In this regard, the Malaysian government firmly believed that ethnic 
tensions in the country could be resolved by elevating the socioeconomic status of 
Malays as the dominant group. The National Operation Council on October 9th, 1969 
concluded that the May 13 tragedy basically arose from mounting disappointment 
among the Malays over the unfair socioeconomic system. It was a system that had 
been promoted by the British during the colonial era (Andaya & Andaya, 2001). 
Under this socioeconomic system, as explained earlier in the Chapter 2, the Malayan 
people were segregated according to their occupation by the British to maintain 
control over Malaya’s politics and economic resources. The non-bumiputra, 
especially the Chinese who were concentrated in urban areas, owned a big chunk of 
the wealth in the country (Mokhtar, Reen & Singh, 2013). While the Chinese were 
seen as rich and holding the levers of economic power (Chua, 2012), the Malays 
were seen as afflicted by poverty. The Malay bumiputra usually lived in the rural 
areas and were confined to the agricultural sector with low per capita income. 
Ironically, the incidence of poverty was even worse among the Indians who were 
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concentrated in the estates. According to Mokhtar, Reen and Singh, this situation 
“reflected the differences in the incidence of poverty by race particularly in 
Peninsular Malaysia. The household monthly income in 1970 in Peninsular Malaysia 
ranged low as RM276 for the Malays, followed by RM478 for the Indians, RM632 
for the Chinese and RM1304 for other groups” (2013, p. 12).  
The result of the lower household monthly income of the Malay bumiputra compared 
with the non-bumiputra communities was the growing disappointment among the 
Malay bumiputra over their socioeconomic status. This was aggravated by the fact 
the non-bumiputra were determined to get equal socio-political rights as the 
bumiputra consolidated their political position. The Malay bumiputra felt that it was 
the existing socio-economic system that made the non-bumiputra emboldened to 
raise such a demand and in Tunku’s word they had won for themselves economic 
power (The National Operation Council, 1969, p. 64; Khoon, 1969; Slimming, 
1969). Furthermore, there were concerns among the Malays that such demands could 
affect their special privileged position within the country as guaranteed under the 
Article 153 of the Constitution of Malaysia (Wilford, 2007; Rock, 2016). Due to 
such fears, the Malays eventually began to feel threatened in terms of not only 
politics but also economic activities. As Vorys noted, “the Malays who already felt 
excluded in the country’s economic life, now began to feel a threat in their place” 
(2015, p. 363). The feeling of being threatened became the flashpoint that triggered 
the chain reaction of violence in Peninsular Malaysia, particularly when the non-
bumiputra began to celebrate the success of the Chinese dominated opposition party 
(DAP) when the ruling Malay-led alliance lost its 2/3 parliamentary majority for the 
first time since 1957. Thus, NOC concluded that it was the disappointment among 
the Malay bumiputra over the existing socioeconomic system that triggered the racial 
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riots as they felt that the increase in political influence of the non-bumiputra were 
mainly determined by their economic power.  
On this basis the NOC opined that correcting the economic imbalance between the 
bumiputra and the non-bumiputra is crucial (Economic Planning Unit, 2004; Aslam 
& Hassan, 2003; Tori, 1997). The NEP was driven by the government’s desire to 
provide the Malays with a greater share of Malaysia’s wealth while the previous 
system was seen as having created disproportionate patterns of wealth in the country.  
The initial two-pronged objectives of the NEP consisted of eradicating poverty in the 
country irrespective of race and the restructuring of socioeconomic structures of 
society to eliminate the identification of ethnicity with economic function. The NOC 
argued that the socio-political justification for these NEP objectives was not only the 
economic development of the country but also national unity and national security 
(Jawhar, 2011). As the Malaysian government explained, “national unity is 
unattainable without greater equity and balance among Malaysia’s social and ethnic 
groups in their participation in the development of the country and in the sharing of 
the benefits from modernisation of economic growth. National unity cannot be 
fostered if vast sections of the population remain poor and if sufficient productive 
employment opportunities are not created for the expanding labor force” 
(Government of Malaysia, 1971, p. 3-4). This notwithstanding, the basic idea, as 
Torii argued, “was to lift up the socioeconomic position of the bumiputra, and 
particularly the Malays at its core, whose economic positions were historically 
inferior, to bring them abreast of Chinese and other ethnic groups in Malaysia” 
(1997, p, 213).  
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To achieve this, the policy called for aggressive efforts to restructure employment, 
create a bumiputra commercial and industrial community, and ‘expand the pie’ 
namely by increasing the bumiputra share of pie or the corporate equity ownership 
from under 2% in 1970 to 30% by 1990 without reducing the size of the non-
bumiputra wealth ownership. Hence, the NOC as the policy maker, introduced 
bumiputra quotas as the key element of the NEP for access to public universities and 
the awards of scholarships, civil service employment and promotions, and the 
allocation of government contracts, special trade or business permits and licenses and 
financial assistance. This meant that the bumiputra were clearly favored in 
socioeconomic sphere under this policy as they were supposed to get easy access to 
government contracts, financial assistance, places in public tertiary institutions and 
scholarship.  
In order to impose bumiputra quotas, the policy makers made it clear that the 
implementation of NEP required greater economic power and resources in the hand 
of the state or the Malay-led federal government. This in turn resulted in 
opportunities for the ruling politicians based in West Malaysia, especially the ruling 
Malay political elites of UMNO as the backbone of federal government, to influence 
national development projects for wealth accumulation and to cement political 
support in the country. As Mokhtar, Reen and Singh argue, “the political elites used 
this power as a mechanism to get votes from the public. As the government 
controlled public enterprise to achieve the goal of the NEP, eventually it provided the 
ruling politicians an opportunity to be involved in development project. Development 
formulation has, for the most, pragmatically reopened to the ambitions of the ruling 
political leaders” (2013, p. 13).   
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Tun Abdul Razak Hussein, the new Prime Minister of Malaysia (1970-1976) and 
President of UMNO announced on May 27th, 1971 that “the government will take a 
direct and positive role in setting up commercial and industrial enterprise, to be held 
in trust for and eventually transferred to the Malay and other indigenous people” 
(Torii, 1997, p. 218). This marked the start of UMNO leaders’ significant influence 
in the establishment of national development projects such as Food Industries of 
Malaysia (FIMA), Lembaga Padi dan Beras Negara (National Paddy and Rice 
Authority, LPN), Urban Development Authority (UDA), Malaysian Rubber 
Development Corporation (MARDEC), Rubber Industry Smallholders’ Development 
Authority (RISDA) and Petroliam Nasional Berhad (Petronas). The ruling Malay 
elites also had a hand in the management of public bodies such as the State 
Economic Development Corporations (SEDCs), Majlis Amanah Rakyat (Peoples’ 
Trust Council, MARA) and Perbadanan Nasional Berhad (National Corporation, 
Pernas). Thus, the federal government influence over national development projects 
strengthened.  
When Mahathir Mohamed became the Prime Minister of Malaysia in 1981, he used 
public bodies and socioeconomic development projects to create UMNO crony 
capitalism and make the Malay bumiputra beholden to the UMNO for assistances. In 
the name of policy readjustments, Mahathir took several political steps to facilitate 
such ambitions. By 1995, he had privatized a total of 374 development projects such 
as Bakun Hydroelectric Power Project, ports throughout Malaysia, and several 
coastal highway and light rail transit systems in West Malaysia. These development 
projects were allocated to mainly Malay bumiputra with strong ties to UMNO 
(Pandian, 2005a). At the same time, he was selective in appointing only Malay 
bumiputra to manage or to become directors or chairmen of public enterprises and 
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trust agencies (Gomez, 2005). For this reason, the rakyat realised that Mahathir’s 
cronies got the lion’s share of NEP gains (Aeria, 2016; Nesadurai, 1998). This 
continued even when Mahathir’s tenure as the Prime Minister ended and Abdullah 
Ahmad Badawi took over the reins of power in 2003. The introduction of Bantuan 
Rakyat 1 Malaysia (Malaysia People’s Aid 1, BR1M) as financial aid for the poor, 
the appointment of Mohamad Salleh as the Chairman of National Feedlot 
Corporation (NFC) who had direct links with UMNO, and the appointment of Najib 
Razak to succeed Badawi in 2009 further consolidated cronyism and as a result the 
Malay bumiputra continued to feel obligated to UMNO.   
All these came at the expenses of the non-Muslim bumiputra or the non-Muslim 
indigenous groups in Sabah who were discriminated against despite being in the 
‘privileged’ group.  
 
6.4 Ethnic Discrimination against the Non-Muslim Bumiputra in Sabah 
While it is undeniable that implementation of affirmative action policies contributed 
to the reduction of poverty among the bumiputra as a whole (Hatta & Ali, 2013), it 
also heralded the beginning of ethnic discrimination against the non-Muslim 
indigenous groups in Sabah. Wealth in the hands of the bumiputra increased from 
only 4% in 1970 to 19.3% in 1990, and later 23.5% in 2011 (Funston, 2001, p. 193), 
but it came at a price of ethnic discrimination against the non-Muslims. The federal 
leaders made it clear that the measures associated with achieving NEP objectives 
largely focused on specific ethnic groups within the bumiputra rubric namely the 
majority ethnic group (Malays). Malay-Muslim bumiputra special rights were 
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expanded in the areas of education, civil service employments, access to government 
contracts and share of corporate equity. When the NEP privileges were extended to 
include the indigenous bumiputras in Sabah, it came at the expense of eroding the 
socioeconomic rights of the non-Muslim bumiputra. Even when this policy officially 
ended in 1990 and was replaced by the New Development Policy (NDP, 1991-2000) 
and the National Vision Policy (NVP, 2001-2020) they all retained these NEP 
features (Mohamad, 2012; Chin, 2009; Mason & Omar, 2003). Since these later 
policies continued to prioritize the Malay-Muslims, the position and status of non-
Muslim bumiputra in Sabah did not change. As Chin suggests, “in reality, most of 
the benefits were with the Malay community and the East Malaysia indigenous 
groups were relegated to ‘second class’ bumiputra. In the federal civil service, the 
largest employer of bumiputra in the country, only 2 percent of its 1.4 million civil 
servants are from the East Malaysian non-Muslim bumiputra community” (2014a, p. 
157). He also stated that “in theory, bumiputra are favored in all political, economic 
and social spheres under the infamous New Economic Policies (NEP). They are 
supposed to get easy access to government jobs, scholarships and places in public 
universities, special licenses and easy credit. In reality, it would appear that these 
benefits are only available to the Muslim bumiputra (MB) while the majority 
bumiputra, being non-Malay and non-Muslim, are marginalized or get very little 
benefit from the NEP and other affirmative action policies” (2014c, p. 109).  
The former Chief Minister of Sabah, Harris Salleh, even admitted that the 
implementation of affirmative action policies in Sabah have disadvantaged non-
Muslim bumiputra. He said: “more than 90 percent of those given the privileges of 
special allocations are Semenanjung (West Malaysia) Malays. Very few were 
allocated to Sabah and Sarawak Muslim bumiputra; none to non-Muslim 
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bumiputras” (Opinion, 2010, June 13). It is little wonder Sabah continued to lag in 
terms of socioeconomic advancement compared with the rest of the states in the 
Federation of Malaysia. Based on the concept of relative poverty that is closely tied 
to the distribution of income and the quantity and quality of services enjoyed by 
households, the rate of poverty in Sabah declined slowly from 58.3% in 1976 to 
4.0% in 2014 (see Table 6.1). In contrast, however, the poverty profile in Kelantan 
(as the state with highest poverty level in 1976 (67.1%) declined to 0.9% in 2014. 
The superior decline in poverty level was even experienced by Sarawak as its high 
poverty level in 1976 (56.5%) also declined to 0.9% in 2014. Sabah was the only 
state with more that 3.9% of poverty in the 2016 census with all other states 
recording less than 1.0%.  
In terms of the distribution of poor households by ethnic groups, Table 6.2 shows 
that the poor households in Sabah were mainly located in the rural areas, the areas 
heavily inhabited by the non-Muslim indigenous or the ethnic Kadazandusun. As can 
be seen in the table, the percentage of poor rural households were high between 1970 
(58.6%) and 2012 (12.5%), but declined sharply in 2014 to 7.3%. The percentage of 
poor households in urban areas was also high between 1970 (25.9%) and 1980 
(14.3%), and later declined significantly in 2014 to 1.9%. Despite the continuous 
decline, it also appeared that poverty incidence in the rural areas of Sabah remained 
significant compared with the percentage of poor households in urban areas. In 1970 
ethnic Kadazandusun were the most affected by poverty (38.7%) compared with 
other indigenous communities (32.3%) within Sabah. Even though poverty steadily 
declined in four decades (1970s - 2010s), the percentage of poor households among 
the Kadazandusun was still high in 2014 (20.0%) compared with the percentage of 
poor households among other indigenous groups (9.8%).  
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 Table 6.1: Incidence of Poverty by State in Malaysia, 1970-2009 (in percentage) 
 
 
 
  Year 
                                                   ___________________________________________ 
  States                               197092        1976       1990      1999       2000         2014 
  Terengganu                       68.9           60.3         31.3        14.9          4.0           0.6 
  Kelantan                            76.1           67.3         29.6        18.5          4.8           0.9 
  Sabah                                    -             58.3         34.3        20.1        19.7           4.0 
  Kedah                                63.2           61.6         29.9        13.5          5.3           0.3 
  Sarawak                                -             56.6         21.0          6.7          5.3           0.9 
  Perak                                 48.6           43.0         19.2          9.5          3.5           0.7 
  Pahang                              43.2           38.9         10.0          5.5          2.1           0.7 
  Melaka                              44.9           32.4         12.4          5.7          0.5           0.1 
  Negeri Sembilan               44.8           33.0           9.1          2.5          0.7           0.4 
  Penang                              43.7           32.4           8.7          2.7          1.2           0.3 
  Johore                               45.7           29.0           9.8          2.5          1.3           0.0 
  Selangor                            29.2           22.9           7.6         2.0           0.7           0.2 
  Perlis                                 73.9           59.8         31.3        13.3          6.0           0.2 
  Malaysia                            49.3           43.9         16.5         7.5           3.8           0.6 
 
Source: Balakrishnan (2016); Hatta & Ali (2013); Mat Zin (2011) 
 
 
One possible explanation is that the Kadazandusun experienced what Kurus and 
Tangau (2003) called ‘a long historical process of marginalization’ from the national 
socioeconomic development agenda. This was the direct result of federal leaders’ 
tendency to use affirmative action policies to improve the socioeconomic standing of 
Malay-Muslim bumiputra rather than the bumiputra as a whole. This would suggest 
that the affirmative action policies have not fully achieved their objective of uplifting 
the bumiputras’ socioeconomic standing in Malaysia.   
Ironically, the affirmative action policies have generally been hailed as a success by 
the federal government. As Mason and Omar explain,  
92 There was no census on poverty incident in Borneo before 1976. 
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in the Sixth Malaysian Plan (1991), the Federal Government reported that at the 
expiry of the policy in 1991, the NEP had succeeded in increasing the 
bumiputra’s share in the corporate equity ownership to 20%. This was some 
10% shy of the targeted 30% increase but was certainly a marked improvement 
from the under 2% in 1971. In other areas, such as education, training and 
employment, the accomplishment was more impressive. Already by the 
beginning of the 1980s, there saw the emergence of a sizeable bumiputra 
middle class, professionals, business community and even industries and 
corporate entrepreneurs (2003, p. 7).  
 
Table 6.2: Poverty Incidence in Sabah by Location and Ethnicity, 1970-2010 
                 (in percentage) 
 
 
                                                         Year 
     __________________________________ 
Selected households characteristics 1970    1980      1990       2012       2014 
a. Location 
-Urban    25.9     14.3         8.5          5.1         1.9 
-Rural    58.6     38.6       33.0        12.5         7.3 
b. Ethnicity 
-Kadazandusun   38.7         29.4       27.4        22.8       20.0 
-Other Indigenous  32.3     15.7       13.0        12.5         9.8 
 
Source: Department of Statistics Malaysia (2010; 2015); Omar (2010); Kurus & 
Tangau (2003)  
 
 
Mason and Omar, however, argued that these successes eluded East Malaysia (Sabah 
and Sarawak). As a matter of fact, though there is very limited official reporting on 
this matter, Ongkili (2003) and Chin (2014c) found the NEP and other affirmative 
action policies indeed disadvantaged the peoples of East Malaysia region, especially 
205 
 
Sabah, primarily affecting non-Muslim bumiputra. The Equal Right Trust through its 
report on patterns of discrimination and inequality in Malaysia published in 2012 
confirmed this finding.  
The report revealed that discrimination was rampant in the area of education. The 
implementation of National Education Policy (NEdP) in 1971 became the basis of 
discrimination in the area of education. It had three main aims, namely “to make 
Malay the main medium of instruction, to formulate a common curriculum based on 
the local context and needs of local schools including the English, Chinese and Tamil 
schools, and to foster patriotism in order to create as Malaysian nation” (Harun, 
2010, p. 587). When it was made known in Sabah, the policy came under attack from 
various quarters (Wahid, 1996). The change in the education system, in particular the 
content of the school curriculum pertaining to the language was a contentious issue 
when Malay replaced English as the main language of public school in line with the 
assertion of Malay-Muslim bumiputra special rights over the other ethnic groups in 
the country. The report observed that “the use of Malay as the language of instruction 
in state school directly disadvantages those whose first language is not Malay” 
(Equal Right Trust, 2012, p. 29). Thus, as the Malay was not their first language, the 
change in the medium of instruction from English to Malay in Sabah’s public schools 
disadvantaged the non-Muslims. Students who were fluent in Kadazandusun and 
English as their main language of interaction experienced difficulties in their learning 
when they had to attend Malay language schools (Equal Rights Trust, 2012). As a 
result, many non-Muslim indigenous students failed to qualify for university places 
due to their poor academic performance.  
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The poor academic qualifications also affected the non-Muslim indigenous students’ 
access to civil service employment. Means observed that over the years, “through the 
operation of Malay special rights giving recruitment and promotion preferences to 
Malays, the whole structure of government services has become a bastion of Malay 
power and the major avenue for Malay professional advancement. This pattern is 
particularly profound at the higher administrative and policy-making levels where 
Malay dominance comes to reality” (1991, p. 297-298). The Equal Rights Trust 
(2012) alluded to this matter of poor representation of non-Muslim indigenous 
people in the public service as directly attributable to their poor secondary school 
performance. Many non-Muslim indigenous Sabahans also claim to have 
experienced discrimination in civil service employment (Equal Right Trust, 2012). 
They argue that systematic discrimination against the non-Muslims indigenous 
people in Sabah has been ongoing since 1970s. One non-Muslim bumiputra 
respondent for this study, a male academic (51 years old) at the local university for 
example, claimed that, 
 the non-Muslim indigenous people who were supposed to lead the state and be 
dominant due to their ethnic majority status have been wilfully left behind and 
sidelined by the federal government in almost every spectrum of opportunity in 
both federal and state level of civil service. In some cases of new recruitment 
into the civil service, certain departments were taking in only the Malay-
Muslims and no non-Muslims. This phenomenon of discrimination against the 
non-Muslim indigenous escalated during the era when Mustapha was the Chief 
Minister of Sabah. During this era, those who converted to Muslim could easily 
get employment in the civil service and after that get promotions. But, the non-
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Muslims did not get the same opportunities (interview with key respondent of 
this study on February 5th, 2014 in Tuaran). 
Thus, ethnic discrimination resulted in the overwhelming ‘imbalance’ in various civil 
service departments in Sabah. In the institutions of higher learning such as Universiti 
Malaysia Sabah (University Malaysia of Sabah, UMS) and Universiti Teknologi 
MARA (University Technology of MARA, UiTM) in Sabah, this is clearly reflected 
in the ethnic composition of their executive personnel. Since establishment of the 
universities top officials have always been from the Malay-Muslim community. The 
imbalance is not due to the absence of qualified non-Muslim indigenes for such 
posts, but simply the result of the ruling politicians’ preference for Malay-Muslims. 
Despite the fact that there have been a few prominent non-Muslim indigenes in both 
universities from the beginning, none has ever been appointed to the senior posts 
(Rintod, 2013).  
There have been cases where long-serving non-Muslim indigenous officers remained 
in their posts while the new Malay-Muslim recruits without any experience climbed 
the ladder. One respondent said,  
in Yayasan Sabah, the native non-Muslim who serves in the Division II 
position for more than ten years remains in such position. However, even if 
they had no experience the new recruited Malay-Muslims could easily become 
the First Division official. You can even find that the job opportunities meant 
for locals have for the past few decades been taken by the Malayans. This 
especially happens in the federal departments such as Police department, 
education sectors, Immigration and National Registration Departments. This 
also happens in government-owned companies such as the Federal Land 
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Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority (FELCRA) and the Rubber 
Industry Smallholders Development Authority (RISDA) (interview with key 
respondent of this study, a non-Muslim bumiputra male in his sixties on 
December 13th, 2013 in Kudat).  
In 2014 Fernandez (2014, December 1) reported this bias against Orang Asal 
(indigenes) in the civil service as well as the discrimination against non-Muslim 
indigenous people, and there has been no improvement since then. The report 
specifically stated the new intake in the civil service was mostly of Muslims because 
only one non-Muslim indigenous and six Muslim indigenous persons were appointed 
for the posts. The report did not reveal the distribution of officers by their ethnicity 
(Teik, 2005, p. 18).  
Access to government contracts and shares of corporate equity also favoured the 
Muslims. Chin (2015, August 27) reports that “during the 1980s and 1990s, when 
Mahathir Mohamad was Prime Minister, major infrastructure projects were awarded 
to Malay companies with ties to UMNO. A vast privatization program also 
multiplied connections between the party and Malay big business, as many public 
utilities become so-called government linked companies, or GLCs were stifling with 
representing and promoting bumiputra interests”. In explaining this, one respondent 
aged 45 years old (non-Muslim bumiputra) who worked as a lawyer at a law firm in 
Kota Kinabalu and had written a book on Sabah politics stated that,  
the tendency among the federal leaders to award infrastructure projects to the 
Malay companies has continued even after Mahathir stepped down as the prime 
minister. Perhaps this has been the reason why many Kadazandusun converted 
to Islam and later become the recipients of bigger shares of wealth in the 
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country obtained through the award of government projects by the federal 
leaders and the local Malay-Muslim leaders (interview with key respondent of 
this study on April 4th, 2014 in Penampang). 
In addition to this, the implementation of National Cultural Policy (NCP) in the 
pretext of nation-building also further disadvantaged the non-Muslim indigenous. It 
formulated a national identity based on three main principles: 1) the national culture 
of Malaysia is based on the culture of indigenous people of the region, 2) other 
cultural elements which are suitable can be accepted as part of the national culture, 
and 3) Islam is to be an important element in shaping the national culture. Similar to 
other affirmative action policies, when it was made known in Sabah, the NCP also 
led to ethnic discrimination against the non-Muslim indigenes. The non-Muslims in 
Sabah were exposed and systematically forced to accept Islam as part of their 
culture. To do so, the government initiated an Islamic missionary movement called 
‘dakwah’ (Kumar, 2012). While the dakwah missionary workers were allocated 
between 6 and 9 million ringgit by both federal and local governing political leaders 
such as Mahathir, Mustapha and Harris, the Christian missionary workers were 
marginalised to intensify the dakwah movement in Sabah (Lim, 2008, p. 105-106). 
As explained in the previous chapter, this led to the conversion of at least 30,219 
non-Muslim indigenes to Islam between 1970 and 200493 (Kassim, 2009b; Lim, 
2008; 2013). This, however, has resulted in non-Muslim indigenes becoming more 
aware of what they have gained and lost from the implementation of affirmative 
action policies in Sabah, in particular the NCP (Chin, 2014c; Ibrahim, 2013; Ongkili, 
2003).  
93 See Table 5.3 in Chapter 5 
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Thus, based on the foregoing, it is undeniable that affirmative action has contributed 
to bumiputra socioeconomic development. In fact, its implementation, as Mokhtar, 
Reen and Singh (2013) argue, has led the bumiputra to venture out of the agricultural 
sector and paved the way for them to get involved in business and industries. 
Nevertheless, as noted earlier in this chapter, we also need to accept the fact that the 
implementation of affirmative action policies in Sabah has not only strengthened the 
political patronage system in this territory (Shamsul, 1986; Mohamad, 2009), but has 
disadvantaged the non-Muslim indigenous. Perhaps, this is because the NEP and 
other affirmative action policies were primarily designed to reform the economy to 
specifically meet Malay-Muslim expectations, in particular the Malay-Muslim 
bumiputra in West Malaysia for a greater share of the economy (Shome, 2002).  
Equally important in explaining the ethnic discrimination against the non-Muslim 
bumiputra is that Iban and other non-Muslim bumiputra economic development 
resulted from the implementation of affirmative action policies in Sarawak. Just like 
the Kadazandusun in Sabah, the Iban (and Dayaks) as the non-Muslim bumiputra in 
this land had also been marginalised under the affirmative action policies. In 
explaining this, Jayum (1994) stressed that Ibans (and Dayaks) who were 
traditionally concentrated in the low income sector or the primary sector (agriculture) 
continued to dominate this low income sector after the introduction of NEP and other 
affirmative action policies in 1971. Despite being part of the bumiputra category, the 
Ibans (and Dayaks) continued to be heavily under-represented in the high income 
sectors, the secondary and tertiary sectors. Table 6.3 shows that the percentage of 
non-Muslim bumiputra in the primary sector, secondary and tertiary sectors was 
about 64%, 12% and 17% in 1970 respectively. In 1980, the percentage of Ibans in 
these sectors accounted to about 67% (primary sector), 16% (secondary sector) and 
211 
 
21% (tertiary sector), thus suggesting that the Ibans’ share of the labour force in the 
low income sector actually increased. Nevertheless, the Malay-Muslim bumiputra 
share of the labour force in the low income sector was reduced from 16% in 1970 to 
about 14% in 1980. The Malay-Muslim bumiputra share of the labour force in 
secondary and tertiary sectors, however, remained high at about 66% in 1970 and 
72% in 1980.  
 
Table 6.3: Occupation by Ethnic Group in Sarawak, 1970-1980 
 
Occupational    1970    1980 
Sector  Non-Muslim  Malay-Muslim Non-Muslim  Malay-Muslim 
  Bumiputra Bumiputra  Bumiputra Bumiputra  
 
Primary  64%  16%  67%  14% 
 
Secondary  12%  30%  12%  29% 
 
Tertiary  17%  36%  14%  38% 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Jayum (1994, pp. 205-206). 
 
 
The under-representation in both secondary and tertiary sectors described the 
discrimination against the non-Muslim bumiputra in Sarawak. The result of the 
discrimination against them has been the decision among the Iban to identify 
themselves as ‘minority bumiputra’ in the hope that identifying with this rubric 
would qualify them for special consideration in the country’s affirmative action 
policies to uplift the lot of the native (Mason & Omar, 2003, p. 7). By using the 
terms, the second generation Ibans through the Parti Bansa Dayak Sarawak (Sarawak 
Native People’s Party, PBDS) mobilised non-Muslim bumiputra nationalism, and the 
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non-Muslim bumiputras in Sarawak secured political power in the Council Negeri 
elections of 1983, 1987 and 1991. This in turn provided the non-Muslim bumiputra 
entrepreneurs the opportunity to gain benefits from the affirmative action policies 
with the presence of their representatives in the Council Negeri, the coordinating 
body of development activities in the State.    
 
 
6.5 The Bumiputra Question and the Politicization of Communal Rights in 
Sabah 
From the above it is clear that the NEP and other affirmative action policies were 
created by the NOC or the government policy makers to improve the living standards 
of the bumiputra community in Malaysia, and specifically in Sabah. However, in 
reality, the bumiputra of both Malay-Muslim and non-Muslim indigenous groups do 
not have equal access to privileges or benefits. The NEP and other affirmative action 
policies have largely benefited the Malay-Muslim bumiputra, and in particular, West 
Malaysian Malay bumiputra. In contrast, non-Muslim bumiputra have been generally 
marginalized from the mainstream socioeconomic development agenda (Kurus & 
Tangau, 2003) because according to Mohamad (2009), and Mason and Omar (2003) 
it is deviation from NEP and other affirmative action policies’ initial objectives of 
uplifting bumiputra economic standing and redressing ethnic economic imbalance. 
The policies have become a tool for achieving certain political aims by the UMNO 
political elites as the backbones of the federal government.   
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With the marginalization of non-Muslim indigenous groups and the affirmative 
action policies’ success in bringing about socioeconomic development, ethnic 
political consciousness has strengthened among the people of Sabah, especially 
among the non-Muslim indigenous people. Ibrahim (2013) highlighted the impact of 
affirmative action policies in favor of the Malay-Muslim indigenous groups towards 
ethnic political consciousness among the non-Muslims in this region. He argued that 
the emphasis on one particular ethnic group, that is the Malay-Muslim, has made the 
non-Muslim indigenous groups in Sabah question their status as bumiputra because 
in reality they have been largely excluded from these socioeconomic benefits.  
As a result, the Kadazandusun community believe they are actually second class or 
third class bumiputra (Chin, 2014c), pseudo-bumiputra and bumiputra-celup94. The 
local scholar, Ongkili, summed up the unhappiness among the non-Muslim 
indigenous groups:  
not much can be said about the development of Kadazan bumiputraism today, 
except to note that Kadazandusuns are increasingly less enamored with the 
bumiputra status accorded to them 40 years ago. There is growing 
disenchantment with the term as Kadazans no longer subscribe to the ‘privilege 
analogue to the Malays’ policy. Many in the community treat it with difference, 
others tend to joke about it, hence the terms third class bumiputra, pseudo-
bumiputra and bumiputra-celup (2003, p. 205).  
The unhappiness among the non-Muslim indigenous groups also led to suspicion 
over how the federal and local Malay-Muslim leaders were able to secure Malay-
94 Bumiputra celup refers to indigenous people in Sabah and Sarawak who has been excluded from 
mainstream national socioeconomic development programs.   
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Muslim communities’ strong political support in each state election held since 1970s. 
They, as Sadiq (2005) argues, have accused the federal leaders and the local Malay-
Muslim leaders of blatantly using socioeconomic development programs/projects in 
Sabah to assure their contined support,  
The Malay-Muslims are usually the strong political supporters of UMNO-led 
BN because the government is always prioritizing them and as they are 
Muslims, there is no way that the Malay leaders at the federal level and the 
local Malay-Muslim bumiputra leaders would have excluded them from the 
socioeconomic development agenda (interview with a non-Muslim bumiputra 
male who was a government official in his fifties on January 10th, 2014 in Kota 
Kinabalu).  
In fact, there is general unhappiness and disagreement among the non-Muslim 
bumiputra in Sabah with the federal leaders’ preference for Malay-Muslim 
communities over other groups (Ongkili, 2003).  
The majority of Malay-Muslims interviewed for this study admitted they were strong 
supporters of UMNO-BN because the latter had provided them with opportunities to 
improve their standard of living. They even pointed out how the socioeconomic 
development programs/projects had benefited them such as the opportunity to work 
and get promotion in the federal civil service, opportunity to further their study via 
scholarship, and financial assistance from the UMNO-BN government to start their 
business. This is consistent with the findings of Mamat, Saat and Ariffin (1985), and 
Haque (2003) who argued that the perceived affirmative action policies’ contribution 
to the improvement of bumiputra socioeconomic conditions as a whole was not 
entirely true as the policies never ran a true course. Unlike the non-Muslim 
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indigenous groups, the Malay-Muslim indigenous groups of Sabah still manage to 
obtain the benefits from the implementation of affirmative action policies while the 
non-Muslim indigenous groups think that the federal leaders actually never upheld 
their promise of special rights for bumiputra as a whole in Sabah.  
Such perceptions, as mentioned earlier, have driven the perceived disadvantaged 
group to revert to their communal identity of Kadazandusun (Mason & Omar, 2003). 
The non-Muslim indigenous groups have urged federal leaders to end socioeconomic 
discrimination against them by reminding these leaders of the importance of 
upholding the promise of special privilege for all indigenous people of Sabah 
regardless of their religion, a promise made originally by Tunku and other Malayan 
leaders in 1963. To do so, the non-Muslim indigenous leaders such as Stephens and 
Pairin have continuously reminded all non-Muslim indigenous people of the 
importance of always taking good care of their communal identity as Kadazandusun 
described by Reid (1997) as an ‘endangered identity’. Pairin in his speech when 
officiating at the Penampang district level Kaamatan Festival in 2014 said “we do 
not want our culture to disappear and if this were to happen then we will lose our 
identity as a Kadazandusun” (Aziz, 2014, May 21). Apart from that, as Chin (1999b) 
argued, the non-Muslim leaders, in particular Pairin, urged the non-Muslim 
indigenous groups to remain united in urging the federal leaders to uphold their 
promise of non-Muslim indigenous socioeconomic rights and most importantly to 
end the socioeconomic discrimination against them.  
In accordance with such calls the majority of the Kadazandusuns have become 
relatively united to push for their socioeconomic rights as promised and to end the 
socioeconomic marginalization against them. Apart from the Kadazandusun, the 
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Chinese as a non-Muslim group and the non-Malay group were also supportive of the 
non-Muslim indigenous (Chin, 1999b). Perhaps the Chinese decided to support the 
non-Muslim indigenous move to push for their socioeconomic rights as bumiputra 
and end the existing ethnic discrimination because they also felt that the Malay 
centric policy also discriminated against them. According to Lim and Mun (2009) 
and Soong (2015) the introduction of affirmative action policies in favor of the 
bumiputra, and specifically the Malay-Muslims, were often described by the Chinese 
and other non-bumiputra communities in Malaysia, and specifically in Sabah as an 
act of discrimination against them by the federal government. It indicated that the 
Chinese were also unhappy with such policies. Therefore, it was not a surprise that 
they strongly supported the non-Muslim indigenous move to challenge the 
socioeconomic marginalization.  
Their unhappiness can be seen in the Kadazandusun declaration in Kota Kinabalu, 
Sabah on January 19th, 2008: “we condemn the BN government for its failure to 
bring about positive economic growth, to eradicate poverty and most of all to uplift 
the living standard and well-being of the Kadazandusun in the rural districts…we 
condemn the BN government for the divide and rule tactics that split the 
Kadazandusun community politically” (Administrator, 2008, January 19). Thus 
ethnic marginalization remained the main agenda of the Kadazandusun political 
activities, and this, arguably, in the eyes of federal leaders and the local Malay-
Muslim indigenous leaders contributed to the strengthening of Kadazandusun 
political influence and potentially lead to the decline of Malay-Muslim domination in 
Sabah politics.  
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On the basis of maintaining the Malay-Muslim political grip over Sabah, the federal 
leaders with the help of local Malay-Muslim leaders have become more interested in 
urging the local Muslims to identify themselves not only as bumiputra but also as 
Malay and to strongly support the UMNO-led BN and its components by 
emphasizing the opportunity to get benefits from the socioeconomic development 
programs/project by doing so. Masidi Majun, the Sabah UMNO’s strongman and an 
Islamized Kadazandusun, for example, during the UMNO youth and Puteri 
movement’s general meeting in Ranau on August 17th, 2014 urged the Kadazandusun 
to acknowledge that they are part of the larger group of the Malay stock that spread 
through the Malay isles, Indonesia, Borneo, the Philippines and more. He said, 
“while the people of the peninsula called themselves Malays, the true sense of Malay 
people is all of us” (Joseph, 2014, August 20; Daily Express, 2014, August 19). In 
addition, he also said “I also deny the notion of certain quarters that UMNO is an 
imported party from the peninsular Malaysia” (Joseph, 2014, August 20; Daily 
Express, 2014, August 20). Masidi’s claim that the Kadazandusun are part of the 
Malay stock and that UMNO is not an imported party from the peninsular generated 
anger among many Kadazandusuns who accused Masidi of being unreasonable on 
this issue.  
Despite the opposition from many Kadazandusuns, some Islamized Kadazandusun 
have been very supportive of Masidi’s suggestion as they felt that identifying 
themselves as such could situate themselves as the recipients of the UMNO-led 
federal government socioeconomic development programs. According to one 
Muslim non-bumiputra female (63 years old) who acquired citizenship after the 
1980s “identifying ourselves as Malays could enable us  easily to get benefits from 
the development programs taking place in Sabah” (interview with a key respondent 
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of this study on May 1st, 2014 in Lahad Datu). In addition, some Muslims in this 
territory who traditionally did not belong to the Malay ethnic group such as Sama-
Bajau and the Muslim immigrants from Indonesia and the Philippines even described 
themselves as Malays from the beginning. The local academic Saat (2008) in 
supporting this claim argued that the Sama-Bajau community in Sabah indeed can 
identify themselves as Malay because they historically belong to this ethnic group. 
He thus stressed that the Malaynization of Muslim communities in Sabah has been 
strongly supported by the Sama-Bajaus.  
Furthermore, with the politicization of the strong link between socioeconomic 
opportunities and ethnicity by the politicians’ fragmentation along ethnic lines has 
been growing in recent years. This is confirmed by the emergence of an Islamic 
version of Pesta Kaamatan.  
  
6.6 Pesta Kaamatan Islamic: Manifestation of Growing Disunity in Sabah   
The celebration of Pesta Kaamatan by a group of indigenous Muslim-converts 
headed by Nicholas Sylvester Muhammad Abdullah of Hidayah Center Foundation 
in the district of Papar on May 6th, 2017, can be considered as a manifestation of 
growing disunity among the people of Sabah. Specifically, it can be considered as an 
attempt by certain parties to consolidate the division between Muslims and non-
Muslims in Sabah. The significance of Islamic Kaamatan as a manifestation of 
growing disunity among the people of Sabah’s diverse society lies in the fact that it 
provided the people in this state with a measure of religious based social 
categorization.  
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The celebration of Islamic Kaamatan included a feature that had not characterized 
Kaamatan up to this time. It was the first time in which the celebration was 
connected with religion. As pointed out by Chan (2017), during the celebration of 
Islamic Kaamatan, there were several women dressed in a long, loose robe-like 
variation of the traditional Kadazandusun black-and-gold costume, but with their 
arms and heads all covered up with hijab. The traditional way of celebrating 
Kaamatan where the Bobohizan95started the celebration with worship of the 
Bambarazon (the rice spirit) called Magavau ceremony was also replaced with a 
thanksgiving prayer in Kadazandusun and Arabic by the local Islamic leader. Other 
essential Islamic elements presented by the organizers in this celebration were the 
Muslim beauty queen contest and the ethnic Islamic fashion show. The inclusion of 
these elements which portrayed a growing interest among the people of Sabah to 
differentiate themselves from each other can be described as the deviation of 
Kaamatan celebration from its character as a unifying force for the multiracial 
people of Sabah (Barlocco, 2016).  
In its traditional form, normally celebrated annually by the ethnic Kadazandusun 
over the whole of the month of May, Pesta Kaamatan or Kaamatan (harvest festival) 
has united all Sabahan who keen to preserve social harmony in the state through the 
spirit of ‘togetherness’. Organizers of Kaamatan aim to not only preserve the 
Kadazandusun culture but also foster social harmony in Sabah through its 
celebration. The state government has strongly supported Kaamatan by providing 
financial support, government facilities and declared May 30th and 31st as public 
95 Bobohizan refers to a highest priestess, a ritual specialist and a spirit medium in Kadazandusun 
pagan rites. The primary role of the Bobohizan is to appease the rice spirit called the Bambarazon 
during harvest festival (Kaamatan).  
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holidays in Sabah from the time when Sabah was named crown colony of North 
Borneo in 1960 (Ismail, Mansor & Samsudin, 2015). Since the 1960s, the following 
political parties, various ethnic associations and government agencies have been co-
organizing Kaamatan: the Kadazandusun Cultural Association (KDCA), the United 
Sabah Dusun Association (USDA), the Sabah Momogun Rungus Association 
(SAMORA), the Sabah United Party (PBS), the United Pasokmomogun 
Kadazandusun Organization (UPKO), the United Sabah National Organization 
(USNO), the Parti Bersatu Rakyat Jelata Sabah (Sabah People’s United Front, 
BERJAYA), the Chief Minister Office of Sabah, the Sabah Tourism Ministry and the 
Sabah Tourism Promotion Corporation (STPC).  
Arguably, Kaamatan has helped unify Sabah’s diverse communities. The 
significance of Kaamatan as a unifying force has been confirmed by some key 
political figures in Sabah and in West Malaysia. Musa Aman, Chief Minister of 
Sabah, for example, in his speech during the launch of a month-long Kaamatan 
celebration on May 1st, 2017 in Tambunan said, “Kaamatan helps to unify Sabah’s 
diverse communities by bringing people together and promoting cultural 
understanding” (Bernama, 2017, May 1; The Star, 2017, May 2). His views were 
echoed by the West Malaysia based 1Malaysia Foundation trustee Lee Lam Thye: 
“the festival of Kaamatan should be a unifying force in bringing people of different 
races together for a common goal and for the country’s success. We must remember 
that the process of establishing a united Malaysian nation is a continuous one and 
what has been achieved so far must be nurtured and reinforced. Unity is a priceless 
gift, a symbol of our humanity and the foundation upon which we build relationship, 
families, communities and nation” (Bernama, 2017, May 30: Nation, 2017, May 31). 
This view is bolstered by the presence of large numbers of people from all ethnic 
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groups who are keen to separate culture from religion (Bernama, 2017, June 1; 
Hashim, 2017). The people enjoy Unduk Ngadau (beauty pageant), Sugandoi 
Kaamatan (Kaamatan singing contest), Sumazau dance (Kadazandusun traditional 
dance), moginum kinomol (drinking rice wine), magavau (a ritual to invite 
Bambaazon96 to the festival and is conducted only by the Bobohizan97) and various 
traditional activities such as mipulos (arm wrestling) and mogunatip (bamboo dance) 
during Kaamatan festival.   
However, the celebration of the Islamic Kaamatan poses a threat to this. The event 
has the support of Sabah Tourism Minister Masidi Manjun who is also the UMNO 
division head for Ranau constituency, the Sabah Islamic Religious Affair Department 
and the Islamic Development Department of Sabah (Davidson, 2017). The 
celebration of Islamic Kaamatan gained momentum among Muslim communities as 
indicated by the emergence of a proposed schedule of similar celebrations throughout 
Sabah. These programs were scheduled to be held in several more districts statewide, 
in Keningau on May 11, followed by Ranau on May 12, Kudat on May 16 and 
culminating in a two-day finale in Kundasang on May 20. The Sabah deputy chief 
minister as well as the Kadazandusun Huguan Siou98 Pairin Kitingan commented 
that “either the organizers are completely ignorant of the noble intentions of 
Kaamatan, or they have a deliberate agenda” (Ariffin, 2017, May 21).  
The Islamic Kaamatan can be seen as part of the effort to increase the size of the 
Muslim population through the Islamization of traditional festivals. The organizers 
confessed that their principal objective was to develop Islam in Sabah, in line with 
96 Bambaazon or Bambarayon is a Kadazandusun word for rice soul (Ooi, 2009, pp. 253-254).  
97 Bobohizan or Bobolian is a Kadazandusun word that refers to a high priestess or a spirit medium in 
Kadazandusun pagan rites (Ooi, 2009, p. 37). 
98 Huguan Siou is a Kadazandusun word which means paramount leader. 
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the ongoing efforts to Islamize the indigenous population. Their ultimate aim is to 
change the demographic make-up of Sabah and its political character from non-
Muslim dominated to one which is Malay-Muslim dominated. This development is 
gradually destroying the social harmony between Muslim and non-Muslim 
communities.     
Despite gaining party support, the celebration of the Islamic Kaamatan has come 
under strong criticism from the people of Sabah, especially the non-Muslims who 
consider the festival as an attempt to widen the division between the Muslims and the 
non-Muslims (Chan, 2017). They have even urged the organizers to not destroy the 
Kaamatan as it is Orang Asal (the Malay term for original people) way of fostering 
social harmony in Sabah and tearing down any serious racial divide in the larger 
interest of improving ethnic relations in the country. Joeman, who is also the 
Jaringan Orang Asal SeMalaysia (the Indigenous Peoples Network of Malaysia, 
JOAS) secretariat director, for example, said “please do not rape our culture, our 
adat99 and the essence of being Orang Asal and try to make it some sorry state of 
celebration your way” (Chan, 2017, May 8). The organizers later apologized for 
renaming the festival by adding the word ‘Islamic’.  
However, the latest development has done little to change the prevailing view that 
the Kaamatan celebration held by this group of indigenous Muslim-converts is non-
inclusive (Ariffin, 2017). The non-inclusive nature of their Kaamatan thus 
showcases the growing disunity between the Muslim and non-Muslim communities 
in Sabah, even when they come from the same cultural background. It also 
showcases the fact that beyond its connection with the Kadazandusuns’ traditional 
99 Adat is a Malay word of local customary practices and tradition.  
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culture, Kaamatan symbolises the continuity of struggle between the governing 
politicians and ethnic minorities, the Kadazandusun, over the role it should play 
within the Malaysian politics.  
Historically, the celebration of first Kaamatan in 1960, as Loh (1992) argued, marked 
the important turning point in the memory of the Kadazandusuns. It provided the 
Kadazandusuns with a sense of being in control of Sabah and of their own destiny 
following the colonial decision to fulfill the Kadazandusuns’ demand of recognising 
the Kaamatan as the Kadazandusuns’ harvest festival and its proclamation as a 
public holiday. In addition, it was also the first time in which the Kaamatan was 
being celebrated in the same venue and time rather than taking place in different 
localities after each single harvesting of paddy (Barlocco, 2016; Loh, 1992).  Since 
then, in particular after the formation of Malaysia, the celebration of Kaamatan was 
often associated with the Kadazandusuns’ determination or victory in acquiring state 
political power through election. Such a development, however, led to the growing 
interest among some governing Muslim politicians such as Datu Mustapha and 
Harris Salleh to systematically manipulate the festival in their effort to weaken the 
Kadazandusuns’ political influence.  
In 1976, for example, the Kaamatan was celebrated after the electoral defeat of Chief 
Minister Tun Mustapha, initiator of Kadazandusun conversion to Islam campaign 
(Barlocco, 2016). However, as explained Chapter 4, in 1982 Kaamatan celebrations 
were renamed Pesta Rakyat (People’s Festival) by the Chief Minister Harris Salleh 
as a way of diluting Kadazandusun’s political influence through the reclassification 
of all indigenous people in Sabah as Pribumi (Barlocco, 2016). The 1982 Kaamatan 
was also celebrated with a ceremony of conversion of some Kadazandusun to Islam, 
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resulting in the elimination of certain rituals carried out by the Bobohizan and the 
shortening of the celebration from two to one day. This suggests that the Pesta 
Kaamatan celebration plays important role in the politicization of ethnic identity in 
Sabah. Thus, it was not a surprise when the celebration of Islamic Kaamatan was 
strongly supported as well as opposed by some politicians in this state.  
 
6.7 Conclusion 
Affirmative action policies meant to uplift bumiputra socioeconomic standing as a 
whole had unintended consequences in the escalation and diffusion of ethnic politics 
in Sabah. The implementation of affirmative action policies in favor of the Malay-
Muslim bumiputra has highlighted ethnic differences in Sabah. Originally 
conceptualized and introduced in West Malaysia, when these policies were 
introduced in Sabah, the indigenous people began to feel a stark difference in the 
treatment of respective communities. This not only strengthened ethnic differences, 
but most importantly made them aware of the importance of ethnicity in politics. 
This in turn led to the growing importance of ethnic politics in Sabah. Therefore, it 
must be emphasized that the federal leaders’ decision to introduce the Malay-Muslim 
centric affirmative action policies in Sabah with a focus on indigenous bumiputra 
contributed to the development, escalation and diffusion of ethnic politics in Sabah. 
The non-Muslim or the non-Malay bumiputra and other non-Muslim communities 
(also defined as non-bumiputra in the Malaysian constitution) became critical of the 
federal leaders’ treatment of them as the Malaysian citizens, and specifically as 
bumiputra.  
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The prime beneficiaries of affirmative action were the Malay-Muslim indigenous 
group although the indigenous and the bumiputra people as a whole did benefit from 
the policies as an instrument of federal political power. This led to growing ethnic 
friction not only in the political but also the social arena of Sabah society. The 
growing unhappiness among the non-Muslim indigenous and other non-Muslim 
communities towards such policies was the source of ethnic tensions not only 
between the Malay-Muslim indigenous and non-Muslim indigenous groups, but also 
between the Malay-Muslim indigenous, the non-Muslim indigenous and the non-
indigenous or the non-bumiputra groups. The tensions were high especially between 
the Malay-Muslim indigenous and the non-Malay indigenous groups even though it 
was not as heightened as in West Malaysia. Yusoff (1999; 2001; 2002), Chin (1994; 
2014a; 2014b) and Sadiq (2005; 2009) found tensions most obvious between the 
Malay-Muslim indigenous and the non-Muslim indigenous groups in Sabah’s socio-
political development.  
This indicates that the implementation of any policies with principal aims of uplifting 
the citizens’ socioeconomic standing in favor of a specific ethnic group can create a 
basis for the development, escalation and diffusion of ethnic politics in a periphery 
originally not plagued by ethnic politics. It also suggests that any socioeconomic 
development agenda should exclude ethnic discrimination because it provokes 
unhappiness among the non-privileged group leading to rising tensions between the 
beneficiaries and the marginalized groups. Thus, the end result of overlooking this 
issue is the strengthening of social segregation along ethnic lines which may prove to 
be very difficult to resolve. In Rwanda, when the people of two major ethnic groups, 
Hutus and Tutsis, began to link their socioeconomic advancement opportunities with 
ethnicity they began to distance themselves with growing tensions between both 
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ethnic groups. The strong link between socioeconomic improvement opportunities 
and ethnicity led to the worsening of ethnic relations. This is especially true when the 
politicians from different ethnic groups mobilize political support by sowing ethnic 
hatred to consolidate their economic and political interests. As Alesna and La Ferrara 
(2005) argue, politicians are often inclined to use ethnic hatred to mobilize political 
support leading to widening of communal disparities. Given that affirmative action 
has been used as a tool by the federal government to discriminate one group against 
the other, I argue that in order to prevent political elites from using ethnic hatred for 
political mobilization the pro-bumiputra, or to be more specific Malay-centric 
affirmative action, must end.  
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 Chapter 7: Conclusion  
 
7.1 Introduction 
Although ethnic politics has declined in many countries globally100 following the 
efforts by their elites to prevent their country from sinking to political decay 
(Newman, 1991; Bai, 2010), it has instead become consolidated in some plural 
societies (Lijphat, 1969) like Malaysia. This has been a direct result of ruling 
politicians’ reliance on ethnic politics to secure power. Recent developments in 
Malaysia shows that ethnic politics has been used as a political strategy by the ruling 
regime to secure power, and has led to the consolidation of ethnic identity in the 
country. In the process, the federal politicians based in West Malaysia (federal 
leaders) have taken measures to expand ethnic politics in the periphery state of Sabah 
which traditionally was not plagued by such a phenomenon. The federal leaders did 
this to influence voting patterns in Sabah. Muslim bumiputra who after 1980 made 
up the majority in Sabah now support the Malay-led or UMNO-led BN coalition and 
have refused to support non-ethnic based and/or non-Malay dominated political 
parties such as the Parti Keadilan Rakyat (People’s Justice Party, PKR) and Parti 
Tindakan Demokratik (Democratic Action Party, DAP) as demonstrated in the 13th 
Malaysia’s General Election (GE13) (Hazis, 2015; Saravanamuthu, 2016). This has 
led to the growing ethnic conflict in Sabah. 
100 Most societies increasingly view ethnic division as a root cause of conflict, and which would lead 
to political decay characterized by political chaos and disorder. Some countries have even banned 
ethnic parties. For example, since 1990 ethnic and other identity-based parties has been banned in sub-
Saharan Africa such as Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. Libya followed this footstep and banned 
political parties based on ethnicity.   
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This study examines the spread of ethnic politics in Sabah as part of the Federation 
of Malaysia. It focuses on the governing politicians’ role in the development and the 
escalation and diffusion of ethnic politics in Sabah since the late colonial era 
especially after Tunku announced his aspiration for a merger between Malaya, 
Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak in 1961. This study also investigates strategies used 
by the ruling regime and specifically the ruling politicians to bring ethnicity to the 
fore in Sabah politics. This study began with the premise that the consociational 
democracy which underpinned the formation of Malaysia played an important role in 
the emergence of politicians who aligned themselves with ethnic politics because it 
made the ethnic divide crucial in Malaysian politics. 
 
7.2 Ethnic Politics and the Governing Politicians 
The aim of this thesis is to unravel why and how the ruling federal political elites 
expanded ethnic politics to the periphery namely Sabah. By throwing light on this 
issue, this thesis contributes to knowledge and debates surrounding the nature of 
ethnic politics. It also focuses on how ethnic politics was successfully used by the 
federal elites to create political division in the periphery and the reason why a 
traditionally ‘non-ethnic’ state like Sabah could succumb to the manipulation of 
ethnicity to serve the ends of the ruling regime. Therefore, this thesis proposes 
the use of historical and ethnographic understandings for an in-depth analysis of 
the process through which the strong relationship between ethnic politics and 
governing politicians has come into being in Malaysia, and specifically in Sabah. 
To do so, this thesis has employed an ethnohistorical approach to allow the use of 
history and ethnography concurrently in tracing the evolution of ethnic politics in 
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West Malaysia and to show how this impacted on society in Sabah bringing ethnic 
identification to the fore when traditionally it was not the case. 
This thesis demonstrates that ethnicity was instrumental to achieve the objective of 
the federal leaders where it served as a readily available tool to ‘divide and rule’ 
Sabah and hence preserve the Malay-led coalition government. Consociationalism, a 
form of democracy that seeks to regulate the sharing of power in a state that 
comprises diverse groups (distinct ethnic, religious, political, national and linguistics 
groups) underpinned these efforts. It is well known that ethnicity can unify and 
separate people within any country. Consociational democracy has been a feature of 
government in West Malaysia since 1957 based on its plural character. There were 
three main ethnic groups namely Malays, Chinese and Indian, or two groups, namely 
Malay and non-Malay (Chinese and Indian). Although they coexisted, there was not 
much inter-mingling between the ‘races’ as a result of the divide and rule policy of 
the British. Thus, West Malaysia was characterized by strong ethnicity in the 
competition for political power among political elites101. This, together with the idea 
of Ketuanan Melayu was instrumental in mobilizing Malay political support against 
other ethnic groups to concentrate power in the hands of a few Malay political elites.  
Due to the intense competition between Malays and non-Malays, consociational 
democracy made political collaboration between ethnic groups essential. The 
political collaboration between Malays and non-Malays through the establishment of 
101 To date, appeared there is no solid evidence that ethnicity will cease to play a significant role in 
West Malaysia’s politics. This is attested by the emergence new ethnic based organization as key 
supporters of BN such as Pertubuhan Pribumi Perkasa (Mighty Native Organisation, PERKASA) and 
Gerakan Merah (Red Shirt Movement) and Jaringan Melayu Malaysia (Malaysia Malay Network, 
JMM). The leaders of these organizations became more focused on inciting hatred among members 
towards other ethnic groups in their desire for political power.   
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the Alliance Party in 1952 was evidence of the sharing of power between political 
elites of these ethnic groups. The principal aim of power sharing at the elite level was 
to remedy the intense competition for political power between these political elites. 
Despite such an aim, however, it appeared that this political collaboration never 
successfully remediated the strained relationships between the Malays and the non-
Malays (Hirchman, 1986). These strained relations eventually led to the outbreak of 
ethnic violence on May 13th, 1969. 
Application of consociational democracy as a basis for state formation also led to 
uneasy relations between the Malays and the non-Malays sparking confrontations 
every now and then. Specifically, the application of the consociational principle over 
ordinary majority rule required political elites of the ethnic majority to dominate the 
country’s politics and was the key factor in ensuring tense ethnic relations between 
both ethnic groups. This underlined the importance of Ketuanan Melayu (Malay 
supremacy) and in recent times Ketuanan Islam (Muslim supremacy) to secure the 
political interests of the majority ‘race’ and in particular political elites of Malay 
within UMNO.  The concept of Ketuanan Melayu was based on the view that Malays 
were the early inhabitants of Malaya, even if the original population in the land were 
the Orang Asli. The Malay leaders of UMNO continue to spread the belief that the 
masses need UMNO to maintain their status as the dominant group and they must 
resist any efforts to undermine their perceived supremacy. Thus, UMNO is touted as 
the only protector of Malay interests.   
The UMNO leaders have stressed that Ketuanan Melayu should always be the basis 
for the Malaysian nation-state. However, other politicians, in particular politicians of 
non-Malay communities, have seen Ketuanan Melayu as the Malay elites’ ploy to 
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subordinate other ethnic groups and promote a Malay-based hegemony. This has 
sparked strong opposition among the non-Malays and the rise of ethnonationalist 
sentiments in the country. The rejection of Ketuanan Melayu was viewed by the 
Malay governing political elites from UMNO as a threat to the preservation of 
Malay-led political system and their political survival, especially when they began to 
perceive that the non-Malay or non-bumiputra population would increase in size due 
to migration, high fertility and the potential inclusion of the Chinese-majority 
Singapore in the Federation, especially as the Chinese since the beginning have 
strongly opposed such a political system.  
Thus the Malay political elites threw their support behind a merger between Malaya, 
Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak in 1961 to form the federation of Malaysia in 1963, 
principally to maintain a Malay-led political system that ensured their political 
domination via their numerical advantage. However, fears of losing power due to 
growing sentiments of the anti-ethnic based political system and the tendency among 
political elites in Sabah to oppose the Malay-led federal government made the 
federal leaders more inclined to expand ethnic politics to Sabah. In order to secure 
their position that could only be achieved via a political framework based on Malay 
domination, federal leaders implemented several strategies to expand ethnic politics 
to Sabah. Among them, they introduced West Malaysia’s political system that 
focused on exploiting ethno-religious differences, restructuring the demographic 
character of Sabah by legalization of immigrants from neighboring countries, the 
Islamization of indigenous peoples, and implementing affirmative action policies that 
were primarily designed to reform the economy to specifically meet Malay-Muslim 
bumiputra expectations. Together, these strategies contributed to the development, 
escalation and diffusion of ethnic politics in Sabah as local elites adopted the divide 
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and rule policy along ethnic lines as in West Malaysia as their tool for political 
mobilization. This ultimately resulted in the growing tense relations between those of 
different ethno-religious background and pitted Muslims against the non-Muslims.  
Thus contrary to Lijphat (1968; 1969; 2003), and McGarry and O’Leary’s (1995; 
2016) view that consociational democracy can prevent the escalation of ethnic 
conflict in a plural society, Sabah witnessed the strengthening of ethno-religious 
sentiments while West Malaysia experienced ethnic violence in 1969. The findings 
of this thesis suggest that Malaysia’s peculiar consociational democracy consolidated 
ethnic political tensions due to the application of the majority rule principal which 
accorded political domination through the allocation of the post of Prime Minister 
and most of the ministries to the Malay political elites as they represented the ethnic 
group that constituted the majority of the country’s population. Additionally, this 
thesis shows ethnic hostilities and consociational democracy are two sides of the 
same coin as consociationalism can lead to tense relations between different ethnic 
groups who live in the same political unit.  
It is clear from this thesis that ethnicity can be manipulated to give rise to ethnic 
politics. An examination of Malaysia’s politics shows that ruling political elites are 
capable of expanding ethnic politics to peripheral regions such as Sabah that were 
traditionally not plagued by ethnic differences by embarking on various strategies to 
advance their own political interests. Ethnicity as the basis of ethnic politics can be 
constructed and reconstructed by political actors allowing it to be expanded to the 
periphery in Sabah. Ruling political elites at the federal level played a significant role 
in transforming Sabah into a state plagued by ethnic and religious differences. This 
effectively violated the spirit of federation and compromised Sabah’s political 
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autonomy within the federation due to their direct involvement in the administration 
and formation of Sabah government, but most importantly the federal political elites 
through the involvement of local political elites extended the ideology of Ketuanan 
Melayu (Malay supremacy) or Ketuanan Islam (Muslim supremacy) in Sabah (Chin, 
2014b). As a result, this influenced Sabah’s political development leading to clear 
ethnic boundaries between the Muslims and non-Muslims. 
However, it has to be emphasized that the development of ethnic politics and its 
escalation in the periphery would not have been possible without the active 
participation of the locals, especially the politicians. In fact, exporting West 
Malaysia’s model of government based on ethnic division, reconstruction of 
demographic structure and implementation of affirmative action policies that focused 
on Malay-Muslim bumiputra population initially appeared to have been less effective 
in Sabah as the rakyat (people) of Sabah tended to separate ethnicity from political 
activities. However, over time, local Malay-Muslim politicians’ strong support of 
West Malaysia based ethnic parties in contrast to their non-Muslim counterparts’ 
determination to oppose ethnic discrimination and inequality did have an impact in 
terms of dividing the polity along ethnic lines. This is because the local politicians of 
both sides were concerned about sustaining their political career as well as advancing 
their economic gains. Malay-Muslim political leaders in Sabah persuaded the rakyat 
through various economic and social incentives and strategies to identify themselves 
as Malays and support Muslim-led political parties. In contrast, the local non-Muslim 
political leaders perceived such efforts as a threat to their political career, and in 
order to remain competitive in both the local and national political arena, persuaded 
the rakyat of the real dangers of the imposition of dominant culture on their own 
existence. This resulted in the revitalization of non-Muslims or to be more specific of 
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the Kadazandusun cultural and political movement to project Kadazandusun identity. 
The main objective of this movement is to promote Kadazandusun culture, 
highlighting their status as original inhabitants of Sabah and most importantly to 
express their strong opposition against the federal and local Malay-Muslim political 
leaders’ effort to promote Malaynization in Sabah for their own political benefits.  
In sum, the expansion of ethnic politics that led to growing ethnic conflicts in Sabah 
can be regarded as the product of not only governing politicians at the national level 
effort to ensure the maintenance of a Malay-led coalition government for their own 
political benefits, but also an outcome of political collaboration between federal and 
local political elites, and political competition between local politicians. The public, 
on the other hand, seems to have allowed this to happen due to their acceptance of 
consociational democracy. Such findings, therefore, suggest that in an analysis of 
expanding ethnic politics in the periphery we must not only focuses on the role 
played by the governing federal politicians for their political interests and to maintain 
their political hegemony, but also need to take into account the response of both local 
politicians and the masses toward the federal politicians’ efforts to legitimize and 
maintain their political hegemony. In fact, as the findings of this thesis shows, the 
resistance of local politicians and rakyat ‘people’ against the ruling UMNO-BN elite 
hegemony and the peculiar nature of consociational democracy led to growing 
tensions between the majority and minority and played a significant role in the 
expansion of ethnic politics in Sabah. This is especially true when the vast majority 
of people in Sabah began to understand that ethnicity can be used as one of the most 
politically effective forms of resistance against the UMNO-BN regime as well as in 
the maintenance of political elites’ hegemony in the politics of modern plural society 
(Boulanger, 2009).  
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Another striking finding of the thesis is that ethnic politics in Malaysia is largely 
influenced by one particular ethnic group, that is the Malays. It is clear the ruling 
Malay elites used ethnicity to mobilize political support as key players of ethnic 
politics premised on Ketuanan Melayu. Scholars such as Koon (1996), Guan (2002, 
2010), Lim (2008), Kesavapany, Mani and Ramasamy (2008) and Berger (2010) 
have suggested that it is the Malay determination to safeguard their perceived ethnic 
hegemony that has prevented the growth of an inclusive multicultural Malaysian 
society, and strengthened ethnic politics in Malaysia, and specifically in Sabah. This 
has led to Malay identity creation, and the growing determination among the Malays 
to safeguard their perceived ethnic group superiority status via the expansion of 
ethnic politics based on Ketuanan Melayu in Sabah. By understanding how ethnic 
politics has operated historically in Malaysia and specifically in Sabah, we are now 
in a better position to appreciate its contribution to ethnic conflict.   
Furthermore, by viewing ethnic politics as an expandable phenomenon, this thesis 
has demonstrated how the majority is made in the periphery state. The thesis has 
highlighted the fact that the ethnic majority in Sabah is exactly “made, not born” 
(Gladney, 1998, p. 1) and that the majority is made under specific historical, political 
and social circumstances. It is thus clear that it was not only the politicians’ 
determination to maintain power but also the social and historic contours of the 
Malaysian political system which largely focuses on ethnic make up that allowed the 
formation of the ethnic majority in the periphery state of Sabah. I contend that the 
Muslim bumiputra cannot emerge from a minority to a majority without these 
factors. The making of an ethnic majority, however, does not mean that ethnic 
politics in Sabah is necessarily advanced in a progressive sense as compared to West 
Malaysia’s politics. As explained, recent evidence suggests that despite the growing 
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importance of ethnicity in Sabah’s politics, West Malaysia’s politics remains highly 
influenced by ethnicity. Much of this development is determined by the key 
characteristics of society in both territories, whether the rakyat and the politicians 
there remain committed to ethnic based politics concentrating on safeguarding the 
interests of one group within the society or become more interested in speaking up 
for and protecting all Malaysians.     
  
7.3 Implications of the Thesis 
The implications of this thesis are three-fold. First, at the theoretical level, the thesis 
demonstrates that ethnic politics in countries characterised by plural society and 
consociationalism can be expanded to other regions through federation and the 
various strategies of the governing politicians for their political survival. The 
findings of this thesis show that the governing politicians in West Malaysia have 
successfully expanded ethnic politics to Sabah through the formation of the 
Malaysian federation, the implementation of West Malaysia’s model of government 
based on the ethnic divide, the manipulation of Islam and migration from 
neighboring countries such as Indonesia and Philippine, and the implementation of 
an affirmative action policy designed to protect the interest of Malay-Muslim 
bumiputra communities rather than bumiputra communities as a whole. The result of 
such efforts has been the growing ethnic conflict in Sabah. The thesis also shows that 
such efforts have been the result of consociationalism that accorded power to the 
political elites from the majority ethnic group but not to the politicians from non-
majority ethnic groups.  
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Apart from that, the findings of this thesis also demonstrated the importance of the 
relationship between politicians and the society in expanding ethnic politics to the 
periphery. This suggests that any analysis focused on governing politicians and 
consociationalism is inadequate. What is required, therefore, is to take into account 
the role of not only ruling political elites and consociationalism but also the 
relationship between politicians and society.  
Second, from a policy perspective, it highlights the importance of terminating ethnic 
based consociational democracy and ethnic based policies to prevent the country 
from political collapse. The democratic system should not be based on ethnicity but 
on equitable development regardless of ethnicity. The thesis suggests that the 
termination of the Malay-led coalition government is vital as it undermines 
government commitment to the public because all politicians are inclined to 
manipulate ethnicity for political mobilization. This can be achieved through the 
introduction of a more inclusive and transparent democratic system and national 
development policies. The findings of this thesis show that before 1963 ethnic 
relations problems were absent in Sabah, principally because the state’s politics and 
policies were not ethnic based but rather the focus of the government was on 
improving and uplifting the socioeconomic conditions of all its people. The 
application of ethnic based consociational democracy in Sabah following the creation 
of the Malaysian federation in 1963 and the implementation of Malay-centric 
policies in 1971, however, provoked growing awareness among the people of Sabah 
of the importance of ethnicity which led to conflict between the Malay-Muslim and 
non-Muslim communities. The non-Muslim communities increasingly felt 
marginalized and disappointed in the racially and religiously biased democratic 
system and policies. When disappointment soared, they mounted on opposition 
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against the ruling political elites at both federal and local level. Thus, ethnic conflict 
between non-Muslim and Malay-Muslim was inevitable as Malay-Muslim political 
leaders went all out to ensure sustained Muslim support by manipulating ethno-
religious sentiments.  
While the governing politicians have been able to legitimize their power through the 
implementation of ethnic based policies and ethnic based consociational democracy 
system, they now must appreciate the importance of making sure that the country 
will not experience political collapse. In order to prevent the country from 
descending into chaos, the Malaysian government must set in motion the abolition of 
the ethnic based political system because it has become an instrument of deceit by 
politicians. The consociational democracy and policies that prioritized Malay-
Muslims have failed to assuage the feelings of alienation of the minority as cries of 
marginalization continues. Such policies have proven overtime to be counter-
productive because they deny the nation of competent leadership as the leaders are a 
product of ethnic bias and not of competence. 
Therefore, this thesis emphasizes the importance of different ethnic groups uniting 
behind a common cause. In this regard, the findings of this thesis shows that if 
Malaysia is to escape the problem posed by ethnic politics (ethnic conflict), there is a 
need for attitudinal and mental change on the part of politicians, especially the 
governing politicians from all ethnic groups. There should be a realization among the 
people that politicians’ only interest is to manipulate ethnicity to further their ends. 
Lessons can be learnt from developed countries such Australia, Switzerland, Sweden 
and Russia, which are multi-ethnic countries that have risen to world reckoning 
politically and economically as their politicians focused more on socioeconomic 
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development without any ethnic influence. Thus, the ruling regime in Malaysia must 
place national interest above personal and ethnic interests. The time has come for 
Malaysians as a whole to rise above all forms of ethnic distrust and hatred, especially 
as the socioeconomic conditions of the country continue to worsen (Ries, 2017; 
Jasin, 2016; Menon, 2014; Mariapun, Hairi & Ng, 2016). In this respect, I agree with 
Ade-Ibijola (2016) that no nation can attain progress when people are suspicious of 
one another fuelled by historical resentment.   
Finally, the thesis indicates that ethnic politics leading to ethnic conflicts can be 
maintained by both federal and local political elites. Both federal political leaders 
based in West Malaysia and political elites in Sabah as a part of Malaysian federation 
have consolidated ethnic politics to maintain power and to make their presence more 
calculable in the country’s political arena respectively. Such moves facilitate the 
maintenance of ethnic politics and after that consolidate ethnic conflicts in Malaysia, 
and specifically in Sabah because their move to use ethnic politics for their own 
interests through the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ narrative. Thus, federal and state political 
elites’ effort to secure power through their strategies explains why ethnic politics is 
still a feature of Malaysian politics.  
 
7.4 Agenda for Further Research 
Overall, the study has made a number of essential and unique contributions to the 
theorization of ethnic politics in modern plural societies, particularly with regard to 
the survival and consolidation of ethnic politics in some countries but its decline in 
others. It shows how the ruling elites in the center (federal government of Kuala 
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Lumpur, in this case) by either directly or indirectly expanding ethnic politics in the 
periphery influence the way that people express their social identification and 
contribute to growing tense ethnic relations in this state. Regardless, there is potential 
for further research in this area. One further research is a more thorough and 
systematic examination of the generational differences of what Hashmi and Majeed 
(2015) calls internal instability that occurs as a result of ethnic political activities 
between the core and periphery, especially with regard to where both may be heading 
in the future. The present study has not specifically focused distinctions between the 
core and periphery in regard to these generational differences. There is a tendency 
among social scientists to concentrate on the core, rather than all states within the 
country. This is especially true as far as Malaysia, and specifically Sabah, is 
concerned. As Lim observes, “Sabah and Sarawak are often underexplored or 
virtually ignored in mainstream analysis of the country’s political system…… 
primarily because they do not conform to the conventional perspectives of ethnic 
politics found in West Malaysia” (2008, pp. 1-2). Therefore, it is suggested that this 
topic is studied to show differences between the core and the periphery states in 
terms of their internal instability.  
It is also imperative to examine the role of external powers in perpetuating ethnic 
politics. Investigation on this topic is also crucial as over the past few years 
developing countries have received support from economic conglomerates in 
developed countries for perpetuating ethnic politics in those countries for their own 
interests. In Syria, for example, President Assad received monetary and non-
monetary support such as weapons and military training from Russia, Iran, North 
Korea and the Greece based trading company, Naftomar (Donati & Farge, 2012). In 
contrast, the Syrian ethno-religious opposition constantly received monetary and 
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non-monetary support from United States, United Kingdom, France, Arab league and 
the Free Iraqi Army (William, 2012). As a result, ethnic politics in Syria were 
maintained. Accordingly, it would be useful to examine the extent of foreign 
influence over politicians’ attitude towards spreading and consolidating ethnic 
politics.  
Further research could also focus on how politicians expand their political influence 
to maximize wealth. In this respect, it would be useful, for example, to embark on a 
more comprehensive examination of politicians’ role in the consolidation of ethnic 
politics as their source of wealth in modern plural societies. Arguably, this would 
provide valuable insights concerning the politicians’ tendency to do whatever they 
can to ensure ethnic politics at the national level and in the periphery enable them to 
stay in power and maximize wealth.  
Moreover, since plural societies in developing countries have been aspiring to 
achieve developed nation status, it would be useful to investigate the implications of 
ethnic politics for such aspirations. It is hoped that research of this type can steer 
politicians, policy makers, non-government organizations and academics towards 
supporting efforts to minimize the ramifications of ethnic politics. This is crucial to 
prevent another Syria, Afghanistan and Cambodia because the consolidation of 
ethnic politics could lead to the political collapse of a country (Roessler, 2016). 
Research on this topic can focus on politicians’ interests in manipulating ethnicity for 
their political survival, the negative impacts on youth attitudes towards others and 
how such antagonistic attitudes undermine youth aspirations to reach developed 
nation status. Focusing on the ethnic manipulation of youth attitudes will provide 
information for politicians, policy makers, non-government organizations and 
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academics to create a strategy to ensure future ethnic relations in their country do not 
worsen because youth are the successor of a country’s leadership and their attitude 
towards others is vital in the maintenance of political stability and harmonious ethnic 
relations (Hamid & Hanafiah, 2016).  
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Appendix 
 
 
Perjanjian 20 Perkara (the 20-point of agreement) 
Source: Luping (1989, p. 12-14) 
 
The full text of the 20-point of agreement or the so-called memorandum submitted 
by United National Kadazan Organization (UNKO), United Sabah National 
Organization (USNO), United Party (UP), Democratic Party (DP)102, and the 
National Pasok Momogun Organization (Pasok) to the British are as follow: 
1. Religion 
 While there was no objection to Islam being the national religion of Malaysia, 
there should be no state religion in North Borneo, and the provisions relating to 
Islam in the present Constitution of Malaya should not apply to North Borneo 
(Sabah). 
2. Language 
a. Malay should be the national language of the federation; 
b. English should continue to be used for a period of 10 years after Malaysia 
Day; 
c. English should be an official language of North Borneo for all purposes, State 
or Federal, without limitations of time. 
 
3. Constitution 
 Whilst accepting the present Constitution of the Federation of Malaya should 
form the basis of the Constitution of Malaysia, the Constitution of Malaysia 
should be a completely new document drafted and agreed in the light of a free 
association of states and should not be a series of amendments to a constitution 
drafted and agreed by different states in totally different circumstances a new 
constitution for North Borneo (Sabah) was of course essential. 
4. Head of the Federation 
 The head of State in North Borneo should not be eligible for election as head of 
the Federation. 
5. Name of the Federation 
 ‘Malaysia’ but not ‘Melayu Raya’. 
6. Immigration 
102 Prior to the formation of Sabah National Party (SANAP), there were two Chinese political parties 
in North Borneo namely United Party (UP) and Democratic Party (DP). The UP was formed in 
Sandakan on February 1962 by Khoo Siak Chiew. This political party was formed to charter for the 
big timber and wealthy English-educated Hakka and Teocew Chinese businessmen interests. The DP 
was formed in Kota Kinabalu on November 1961 by Peter Chin to charter the Chinese Wholesale and 
retail businessman interests. Both parties merged to form Borneo Utara National Party (BUNAP) on 
October 1962. It was then renamed the Sabah National Party (SANAP) on August 31st 1963 and 
eventually became the Sabah Chinese Association (SCA) in May 1965 (Yusof 1999, p. 3; Luping 
1985, p. 137).   
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 Control over immigration into any part of Malaysia from outside should rest 
with the Central Government but entry into North Borneo should also require the 
approval of the State Government. The Federal Government should not be able 
to veto the entry of persons into North Borneo for State Government purposes 
except on strictly security grounds. North Borneo should have unfettered control 
over the movement of persons other than those in Federal Government employ 
from parts of Malaysia into North Borneo. 
7. Right of Secession 
 There should be no right to secede from Federation. 
8. Borneanization 
 Borneanization of the public service should proceed as quickly as possible. 
9. British Officers 
 Every effort should be made to encourage British officers to remain in the public 
service until their places can be taken by suitably qualified people from North 
Borneo. 
10. Citizenship 
 The recommendations in paragraph 148 (k) of the Report of the Cobbold 
Commission should govern the citizenship rights in the Federation of North 
Borneo subject to the following amendments: 
a. Sub-paragraph (i) should not contain the proviso as to five years residence; 
b. In order to tie up with law, sub-paragraph (ii) (a) should read ‘7 out of 10 
years’ instead of ‘8 out of the 12 years’ 
c. Sub-paragraph (iii) should not contain any restriction tied to the citizenship of 
parents – a person born in North Borneo after Malaysia must be a federal 
citizen. 
 
11. Tariffs and Finance 
 North Borneo or Sabah should retain control of its own finance, development 
and tariff, and should have the right to work up its own taxation and to raise 
loans on its own credit. 
12. Special Position of Indigenous Race 
 In principles the indigenous races of North Borneo should enjoy special rights 
analogues to those enjoyed by Malays in Malaya, but the present Malays 
formula in this regard is not necessarily applicable in North Borneo. 
13. State Government 
a. The Prime Minister should be elected by unofficial members of Legislative 
Council, 
b. There should be a proper Ministerial system in North Borneo. 
 
14. Transitional Period 
 This should be seven years and during such period legislative power must be left 
with the State of North Borneo by the Constitution and not be merely delegated 
to the State Government by the Federal Government. 
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15. Education 
 The existing education system of North Borneo should be maintained and for 
this reason it should be under the state control. 
16. Constitutional Safeguard 
 No amendment modification or withdraw of any special safeguard granted to 
North Borneo should be made by the Central Government without positive 
concurrence of the Government of the State of North Borneo. The power of 
amending the Constitution of the State of North Borneo should belong 
exclusively to the people in the State.  
17. Representation in Federal 
 This should take account not only of the population of North Borneo but also of 
its size and potentialities and in any case should not be less than that of 
Singapore. 
18. Name of Head of State 
 ‘Yang Dipertua Negara’ 
19. Name of State 
 ‘Sabah’ 
20. Land, Forest, Local Government, etc. 
 The provisions in the Constitutional of the Federation in respect of the powers of 
the National Land Council not apply in North Borneo. Likewise, the National 
Council for Local Government should apply in North Borneo. 
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